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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Essence, Explanation, and Modal Knowledge 
by 
Antonella Mallozzi 
 
 
 
Advisor: David Papineau 
 
 
The primary aim of this project is to put forward a novel account of knowledge of 
metaphysical modality. I call this the “Essentialist Superexplanatory” account of modal knowledge, 
because it relies on the following two main theses: (a) knowledge of metaphysical necessity is 
grounded in knowledge of essence; and (b) essences are properties, sets of properties, or 
mechanisms, having distinctive explanatory powers for how things are. While thesis (a) is quite 
popular in the current debates, mostly thanks to Kit Fine’s recent work in modal metaphysics, thesis 
(b) introduces an original brand of essentialism. As I show by means of various examples involving 
both kinds and individuals, it seems fruitful to think of essences as underlying cores which cause a 
multitude of typical properties of things. Because of this, essences explain why those properties 
consistently co-occur in those kinds and individuals—in this sense essences are “superexplanatory” 
for how things are.  
This account of essence has crucial consequences at the epistemological level. For essences 
are things that we discover empirically, typically via scientific investigation. Although the discovery 
of essence has been held to be a central task of philosophy since Aristotle introduced it, essences 
have also been often disparaged in contemporary debates as hidden mysterious entities, or some sort 
of relic of a pre-scientific era. The Essentialist Superexplanatory account aims to overcome those 
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prejudices and show that there is a scientifically grounded way to clarify in what sense essential 
properties constitute the “nature” of things. If this is correct, the epistemology of central cases of 
metaphysical necessity is much easier than many have thought. For we infer what is necessarily true 
of things from our knowledge of what is essential to things.   
The Essentialist Superexplanatory account owes much to the work of Saul Kripke in the 
1970s and 1980s; especially to his main insight that modal knowledge proceeds inferentially, from 
premises concerning the actual makeup of the world to conclusions about the non-actual and 
necessary. In fact, a further crucial component of my account is a Kripkean bridge-principle 
connecting essence and necessity, both at the constitutive-metaphysical level and at the epistemic-
normative level. In its simplest formulation, this bridge-principle says that if something is essentially 
in a certain way, then it is (metaphysically) necessarily that way: “If x is essentially F, then necessarily 
x is F”. 
Also importantly, from a methodological point of view, the Essentialist Superexplanatory 
account prioritizes the investigation of modal metaphysics, and of essence in particular, for 
elucidating knowledge of modality. I call it accordingly a “modal-metaphysics-first” approach to 
modal knowledge and oppose it to the more traditional “means-first” approach that has dominated 
the literature in the past twenty years or so.   
As to the structure of the work, this dissertation is not a traditional monograph. Instead, it is 
composed of three related but independent research articles, each with its own abstract, plus a final 
Appendix. Here is a brief summary of each piece. 
In the first article, “Two Notions of Metaphysical Modality”, I argue that Conceivability-
theory as cashed out by David Chalmers does not help cast light on knowledge of genuine 
metaphysical modality as traditionally pictured by Kripke. Instead, Chalmers’ conceivability only 
safely ranges over logical-conceptual possibility under standards of ideal coherence. I show how, at 
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bottom, Chalmers and Kripke are operating with two different, incompatible notions of 
metaphysical modality. This article was published in Synthese (“online first”) on February 1st, 2018: 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1702-2.  
In the second article, “Putting Modal Metaphysics First”, I present my metaphysics-first 
approach to modal knowledge against the dominant tradition and lay out my positive “Essentialist 
Superexplanatory” account. I use chemical kinds as a case-study and illustrate how essences cause 
and explain the many properties that are typically shared by all the instances of a kind. Knowing 
what is essential to (the instances of) the kind in this sense is the basis for knowing what is necessary 
for (the instances of) the kind. This article was published in Synthese (“online first”) on May 29th, 
2018: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1828-2.  
In the third article, “Essentialist Constraints on Counterfactual Knowledge”, I turn to 
Timothy Williamson’s Counterfactual-theory. I discuss a number of problems that have been raised 
for it by the recent literature and argue that those all ultimately trace back to the failure to elucidate 
the proper normative constraints on modal reasoning. By means of various examples, I show how 
the Essentialist Superexplanatory account instead clarifies such constraints, and thus constitutes a 
better account of how we gain modal knowledge. This article is in preparation for the volume 
“Modal Thinking”, edited by A. Vaidya and D. Prelevic, forthcoming with Oxford University Press. 
Finally, in the Appendix, I discuss a category of potentially problematic cases for the 
Essentialist Superexplanatory account, namely what I call the “purely a priori metaphysical 
necessities”. I lay out a pluralistic picture of modal space which distinguishes different kinds of 
necessity, based on their source. Specifically, it distinguishes between two kinds of metaphysical 
necessities: the “general” vs. the “distinctively” metaphysical necessities. I show how this helps us 
handle the a priori cases, and sketch a possible way forward for modal epistemology. 
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 1 
Introduction 
We often have a strong sense that things might have been different. We might regret having 
done something and wish we had made a different choice, or perhaps feel relieved realizing that we 
might have just avoided a dangerous or uncomfortable situation. Similarly when we think of the 
environment and actual global problems: earth might not have been warming and ice might not have 
been melting in the last decades, had humans not acted so recklessly with their fossil fuel emissions. 
Think also of things that are not up to us. There might have been purple cows, perhaps. Or there 
might not have been water on earth, so that life would have never developed. A second moon might 
have been orbiting around us. And so on. For any fact we can think of, there seem to be a myriad of 
alternatives that could have been, but are not, actual. On the other hand, many things seem like they 
could not possibly have been different. Given that the chemical composition of water is H2O, water 
could not have had another molecular constitution. Regardless of whether human beings ever used 
arithmetic, it seems that arithmetical laws could not have been different.  
Modal thinking is widespread. Reasoning about what is possible and what is not, and the 
evaluation of all sorts of counterfactual scenarios, play a crucial role in everyday life; for example in 
making choices and planning future action, in learning from experience, as well as in interpreting 
others’ behavior and apportioning praise and blame. Also, modal thinking is a key theoretical tool in 
scientific practice, where counterfactual reasoning helps formulating hypotheses and predictions. At 
the socio-political level, our ability to work for a better world may be to an important extent a 
function of our ability to imagine other possible worlds, i.e., other ways our own world could be. 
But on what basis do we judge such non-actual matters? How do we know necessities and 
possibilities? This is the central question for modal epistemology, and the target of my dissertation.  
I should clarify that the sorts of modalities here at stake are species of the so-called “alethic” 
modalities, or those modalities that have to do with truth. These include metaphysical possibility and 
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necessity, which is my main focus here, as well as logical, and nomological modality among others. 
These are opposed to “non-alethic” modalities, such as normative possibility and necessity (moral, 
legal, etc). Much of the present project is dedicated to elucidating metaphysical modality, in 
particular in connection to essence. But it is worth mentioning that, in its broadest formulation, the 
notion of modality I am working with is quite different from the ancient one—the one that for 
example Plato, Aristotle, or the Stoics were working with.  
Although, “possibility” could in certain contexts mean being non-contradictory (so, basically, 
what we would now call strictly “logical” possibility), what stands out the most from the ancient 
conception of possibility is its being tied to actuality. This is especially clear in Aristotle’s 
metaphysics, where being possible basically means having the potentiality of being actual. But the 
general idea pervades all ancient thought. Possibilities are bound to actuality or confined to our 
world and its “real” history, so to say. We can understand these possibilities as diachronic 
“prospective” possibilities, which are open at a certain moment in time, but then vanish or cease to 
exist once an event is actualized. In this sense, the ancient conception of possibility is more similar 
to what philosophers now often call “epistemic” possibility or possibility for all one knows in a 
certain context. The modal operators could be translated into temporal operators: possibility is what 
might be true at some time; necessity is what is always true; impossibility is what is never true. 
Importantly, within the ancient paradigm, all generic possibilities will be actualized—Arthur Lovejoy 
called this the “Principle of Plenitude”.1 Genuine possibility coincides with actualized potentiality. 
Otherwise put, actualization as the criterion for genuine possibility. Thus, in ancient thought there 
seem to be no such things as alternative, unrealized states of affairs, or what we now also call other 
“possible worlds”.  
                                               
1  Lovejoy, A. (1936), The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
 3 
By contrast, the modern notion—the one here at stake—understands possibility in terms of 
simultaneous non-actual courses of events, which might have but have not turned out to be true. 
This modern conception was first introduced by the medievals, and John Duns Scotus in particular. 
Scotus redefined a contingent event by departing from the traditional temporal-extensional modal 
semantics: “I do not call something contingent because it is not always or necessarily the case, but 
because its opposite could be actual at the very moment when it occurs”2. Scholars conjecture that 
Scotus was probably drawing from Augustine’s seminal theological conception of God as acting by 
choice between alternative histories. For Augustine, God has freely chosen the actual world and its 
providential plan from alternatives which he could have realized, but did not will to. The important 
idea in the background, which carries over all the way to our time, is that there is an eternal domain 
of simultaneous alternatives or unrealized possibilities, instead of one single and necessary world 
order. The more specific notion of “metaphysical” modality I work with in this dissertation should 
be thought of as further specifying this modern notion.  
In particular, I am going to focus on cases of distinctively metaphysical modalities.  
By this, I mean specifically a notion of possibility and necessity that is (a) different at least from 
matters of logical-conceptual coherence and apriority; and (b) de re in the sense of being dependent 
on the nature of things or their essence. Requirement (a) holds that it is logically-conceptually 
possible, and a priori-epistemically possible, that e.g. water is not H2O, or that Saul Kripke is Rudolf 
Carnap’s son. However, given that water is H2O—namely, that very substance with that particular 
molecular structure—it is metaphysically impossible that water is not H2O. Analogously, given that 
Saul Kripke—i.e., that very individual with his own particular origin—is not Rudolf Carnap’s son, it 
is metaphysically impossible that instead he is. Requirement (b) specifies that these modal facts 
                                               
2  Ord. I.2.1.1–2, quoted in Knuttila (2008), “Medieval Modal Theories and Modal Logic”, in D. M. Gabbay and J. 
Woods (eds.), Handbook of the History of Logic 2: Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 505–578: 569. This 
whole brief historical excursus owes a lot to Knuttila’s excellent essay. 
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depend on facts about essence or the nature or fundamental makeup of the world. A large portion 
of my dissertation is dedicated precisely to clarify this requirement; but the rough idea is that 
whether it is metaphysically possible for, say, a sample of water to lack atoms of hydrogen is a 
matter of the fundamental nature or essence of water (that is, its atomic structure). 
This characterization of metaphysical modality covers many (I would say all) typical cases of 
metaphysical necessity in the literature, including those involving natural kinds, individuals’ origin, 
and the constitution of particulars. Indeed, many of those examples are familiar from Kripke's work, 
who reintroduced essence in metaphysics in the 1970s especially against Quine’s criticisms. On the 
other hand, this “distinctively metaphysical” necessity excludes other necessities such as logical 
necessities, conceptual-analytic necessities, and normative necessities. I have gathered these together 
within the category of the “purely a priori necessities”, and discussed them to a brief extent in the 
final Appendix. That has given me also the opportunity to think about the different sources of 
necessity, and the way the different modal sub-fields are interrelated. I have thus drawn a map of 
modal space, specifically of the space of “general metaphysical” necessity, which is included in the 
Appendix (Fig. 1). 
The main aim of this project, as mentioned, is to answer the central question for modal 
epistemology of how we know about metaphysical modality. I call my proposal the “Essentialist 
Superexplanatory” account because it relies on the following two main theses. First, knowledge of 
metaphysical necessity is grounded in knowledge of essence; and, second, essences are properties, 
sets of properties, or mechanisms, having distinctive explanatory powers for how things are. The 
first thesis is the epistemological correlate of requirement (b) above for metaphysical modality. It is 
familiar not just from Saul Kripke’s work but also E.J. Lowe’s as well as Bob Hale’s; and it has 
become increasingly popular in the latest debates, especially among the many followers of Kit Fine’s 
work in modal metaphysics. The second thesis introduces instead an original brand of essentialism. 
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As I show by means of various examples involving both kinds and individuals, it seems fruitful to 
think of essences as underlying cores which cause a multitude of typical properties of things. 
Because of this, essences explain why those properties consistently co-occur in those kinds and 
individuals—in this sense essences are “superexplanatory” for how things are.  
 This account of essence has crucial consequences at the epistemological level. For essences 
are things that we discover empirically, typically via scientific investigation. Although the discovery 
of essence has been held to be a central task of philosophy since Aristotle introduced it, essences 
have also been often disparaged in contemporary debates as hidden mysterious entities, or some sort 
of relic of a pre-scientific era. The Essentialist Superexplanatory account aims to overcome those 
prejudices and show that there is a scientifically grounded way to clarify in what sense essential 
properties constitute the “nature” of things. If this is correct, the epistemology of central cases of 
metaphysical necessity is much easier than many have thought. For we infer what is necessarily true 
of things from our knowledge of what is essential to things.  
 As anticipated, the Essentialist Superexplanatory account owes much to the work of Kripke 
in the 1970s and 1980s; in particular, to his main insight that modal knowledge proceeds 
inferentially, from premises concerning the makeup of the world to conclusions about the non-
actual and necessary. In fact, a further crucial component of my account is a Kripkean bridge-
principle connecting essence and necessity, both at the constitutive-metaphysical level and at the 
epistemic-normative level. In its simplest formulation, this bridge-principle says that if something is 
essentially in a certain way, then it is (metaphysically) necessarily that way: “If x is essentially F, then 
necessarily x is F”. 
Also importantly, from a methodological point of view, the Essentialist Superexplanatory 
account prioritizes the investigation of modal metaphysics, and of essence in particular, for 
elucidating knowledge of modality. I call it accordingly a “modal-metaphysics-first” approach to 
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modal knowledge, and oppose it to the more traditional “means-first” approach that has dominated 
the literature in the past twenty years or so.   
I shall not go further into the details of my account in the present Introduction; in particular, 
I shall not rehearse its main arguments. Instead, I shall briefly present the structure of the work and 
how the content is organized. A main feature of this dissertation is that it is not a traditional 
monograph. Instead, it is composed of three related but independent research articles, each with its 
own abstract, plus a final Appendix. 
In the first article, “Two Notions of Metaphysical Modality”, I argue that Conceivability-
theory as cashed out by David Chalmers does not help cast light on knowledge of genuine 
metaphysical modality as traditionally pictured by Kripke. Instead, Chalmers’ conceivability only 
safely ranges over logical-conceptual possibility under standards of ideal coherence. I show how, at 
bottom, Chalmers and Kripke are operating with two different, incompatible notions of 
metaphysical modality. This article was published in Synthese (“online first”) on February 1st, 2018: 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1702-2. 
In the second article, “Putting Modal Metaphysics First”, I present my metaphysics-first 
approach to modal knowledge against the dominant tradition and lay out my positive “Essentialist 
Superexplanatory” account. I use chemical kinds as a case-study and illustrate how essences cause 
and explain the many properties that are typically shared by all the instances of a kind. Knowing 
what is essential to (the instances of) the kind in this sense is the basis for knowing what is necessary 
for (the instances of) the kind. This article was published in Synthese (“online first”) on May 29th, 
2018: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1828-2. 
In the third article, “Essentialist Constraints on Counterfactual Knowledge”, I turn to 
Timothy Williamson’s Counterfactual-theory. I discuss a number of problems that have been raised 
for it by the recent literature and argue that those all ultimately trace back to the failure to elucidate 
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the proper normative constraints on modal reasoning. By means of various examples, I show how 
the Essentialist Superexplanatory account instead clarifies such constraints, and thus constitutes a 
better account of how we gain modal knowledge. This article is in preparation for the volume 
“Modal Thinking”, edited by A. Vaidya and D. Prelevic, forthcoming with Oxford University Press. 
Finally, in the Appendix, I discuss a category of potentially problematic cases for the 
Essentialist Superexplanatory account, namely what I call the “purely a priori metaphysical 
necessities”. I lay out a pluralistic picture of modal space which distinguishes different kinds of 
necessity, based on their source. Specifically, it distinguishes between two kinds of metaphysical 
necessities: the “general” vs. the “distinctively” metaphysical necessities. I show how this helps us 
handle the a priori cases, and sketch a possible way forward for modal epistemology.
 
  
 8 
Two Notions of Metaphysical Modality 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The paper explores the project of an ambitious modal epistemology that attempts to combine the a 
priori methods of Chalmers' 2D semantics with Kripke's modal metaphysics. I argue that such a 
project is not viable. The ambitious modal epistemology involves an inconsistent triad composed of 
(1) Modal Monism, (2) Two-Dimensionalism, and what I call (3) “Metaphysical Kripkeanism”. I 
present the three theses and show how only two of those can be true at a time. There is a 
fundamental incompatibility between Chalmers' Modal Rationalism and Kripke's modal metaphysics. 
Specifically, Chalmers' conceivability entails possibilities that a Kripkean rejects as genuinely 
metaphysical. However, three positive stances in modal epistemology emerge from the combinations 
that the triad allows. One of those offers a promising way forward for 2D modal epistemologies. 
But it comes with a cost, as it requires abandoning modal monism and reshaping the scope of what a 
priori conceivability can give us access to. 
 
 
Introduction   
Although there has been a recent turn toward modal empiricism in the epistemology of 
modality, there is still a need to look carefully at a priori methods in the acquisition of modal 
knowledge. The issue of whether, to what extent, and how we may have a priori access to 
metaphysical modality is still central to modal epistemology. There is an alluring idea coming out of 
two-dimensionalist (2D) treatments of modal knowledge—the brand I have in mind is David 
Chalmers’ Modal Rationalism. The idea is that we may be able to build an “ambitious” a priori 2D 
modal epistemology, which also satisfies Kripkean metaphysical requirements. In a time where 
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broadly Aristotelian views of the kind Kripke put forward are also at the center of parallel debates in 
modal metaphysics, the project of such a modal epistemology seems appealing across the board. 
However, Chalmers’ Modal Rationalism offers an account of modal knowledge that rests on a 
conception of metaphysical modality that is incompatible with the kind of metaphysical modality 
that is at the heart of Kripke's work or those that build off of his work. As I argue, Chalmers’ 2D 
framework may provide the structure for a Kripkean modal epistemology only given major 
modifications to its original program at the level of modal metaphysics. 
The alluring idea derives from Chalmers’ response to a challenge posed by Kripke’s cases of 
the necessary a posteriori. The Kripkean cases seem to show that what is a priori conceivable may not 
be metaphysically possible. To use a familiar example, while we seem to be able to conceive that 
Hesperus is not Phosphorus, that is not a genuine metaphysical possibility. Empirical investigation 
eliminates a priori open possibilities or epistemic possibilities. In this case, it eliminates the a priori 
possibility that those are two distinct heavenly bodies. Furthermore, empirical investigation 
combined with Kripke’s necessity-generating principles (i.e., the necessity of identity, the necessity of 
origin, of kind-membership, and of substance composition) seems to give us access to the space of 
metaphysical possibility. On the basis of those principles and the relevant empirical information, we 
are in a position to rule out certain a priori conceivable hypotheses as merely logically or conceptually 
coherent epistemic possibilities. It is a priori conceivable that Hesperus is not Phosphorus. But given 
that Hesperus is Phosphorus and given the necessity of identity, it is not possible that Hesperus is 
not Phosphorus. I call this the “Kripkean Challenge”: Kripke’s a posteriori necessities are an apparent 
counterexample to the claim that a priori conceivability entails metaphysical possibility. More 
generally, accommodating the Kripkean cases is a fundamental task for any modal epistemology that 
advocates a priori methods. 
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Chalmers proposes an a priori, conceivability-based route to metaphysical modal knowledge 
that aims to answer the Kripkean Challenge. His Modal Rationalism deploys a 2D semantics that 
assumes one single modal primitive (modal monism). This means that, for Chalmers, logico-conceptual 
possibility and metaphysical possibility coincide, though we can still draw the desired distinctions by 
using the 2D semantic apparatus. Moreover, we can allegedly accommodate the Kripkean cases at 
the level of the secondary dimension, in such a way that they are no longer problematic for a 
rationalist account. If Chalmers is right, modal monism together with the 2D structure give us a way 
to neutralize the Kripkean challenge and to maintain that a priori conceivability entails metaphysical 
possibility. 
Chalmers’ proposal has had a groundbreaking role in the debates on the epistemology of 
modality and has triggered many responses. Most of the critical literature responding to Chalmers’ 
work in the past fifteen years has focused on providing “internal” or direct criticisms of his project, 
that is, various kinds of objections or counterexamples aimed to spot flaws within his account.1 My 
aim is not to add another such criticism of Modal Rationalism to the existing literature. Rather, my 
target is the alluring idea, mentioned in the beginning, that Chalmers’ Modal Rationalism could 
accommodate a Kripkean view of metaphysical modality; or, otherwise put, that Kripkeans with 
rationalist sympathies could find in Chalmers’ account a suitable modal epistemology. If that were 
the case, the project of what I called an “ambitious” modal epistemology combining 2D a priori 
methods with a broadly Aristotelian metaphysics would succeed. But the fact that Chalmers' 2D 
framework accommodates the cases of the necessary a posteriori at the semantic level does not suffice 
to provide a viable modal epistemology for a Kripkean, because of their conflicting underlying 
metaphysical commitments. Even a “2D-friendly” Kripkean who accepts the core semantic thesis that 
expressions have two dimensions of meaning will still reject its consequences at the level of modal 
                                               
1 This literature is vast, but see e.g. Goff & Papineau (2014); Roca-Royes (2011); Soames (2005); Vaidya (2008); Worley 
(2003). See also Chalmers’ discussion of a number of objections in his (2010): 154-205. 
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metaphysics. Specifically, she will refuse to regard (many of) the 2D primary possibilities as genuine 
metaphysical possibilities. 
As I argue, the project of such an ambitious modal epistemology involves an inconsistent triad 
whose elements are (1) modal monism, (2) two-dimensionalism, and what I call (3) “metaphysical 
Kripkeanism”. I present the three theses and give reasons why only two of those can be true at a time. 
Thesis (3), metaphysical Kripkeanism, is what causes the most problems in the attempted 
combination.  For the bridge-principles and a posteriori necessities are the cornerstones of Kripke’s 
modal metaphysics. They hinge on an underlying metaphysics of essence, and the idea that the actual world 
is a source of necessity. On the other hand, Chalmers’ two-dimensionalism itself comes equipped with a 
broad modal metaphysics that hardly fits the Kripkean essentialist commitments. Two-
dimensionalism (2) joined to modal monism (1) results in an a priori “conceptual” modal 
metaphysics, for which modality is grounded in ideally rational concepts of possibility and necessity 
and ideally coherent entailment relations. There is only one source of necessity for Chalmers—and 
that is not to be found in the nature of things. Instead, we should look at a priori conceptual truths 
having to do with our understanding of the concept of necessity.  
Thus, the purported ambitious modal epistemology would have to somehow fit together two 
conflicting views of metaphysical modality. On the one hand, it would have to hold an a priori 
conceptual metaphysics, built out of theses (1) and (2). On the other hand, however, it would also have 
to respect the requirements of an essentialist metaphysics articulated by thesis (3). Those determine 
incompatible views of what is genuinely possible, and incompatible views of what a priori methods 
can give us access to. The consequence is that Chalmers’ conceivability entails possibilities that a 
Kripkean still rejects as genuinely metaphysical. Modal Rationalism cannot incorporate metaphysical 
Kripkeanism. 
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However, there is also a positive story to be told, as three substantive stances in modal 
epistemology emerge from the combinations that the triad allows. Two of those are different 
versions of Kripkeanism: the Monistic Kripkean combines (3) metaphysical Kripkeanism with a 
version of (1) modal monism; and the 2D Kripkean combines (3) metaphysical Kripkeanism with (2) 
two-dimensionalism. Exploring those views may contribute to gain some insight into familiar 
interpretative tensions in Naming and Necessity. Finally, Pure Two-Dimensionalism drops metaphysical 
Kripkeanism, while keeping (2) two-dimensionalism, together with Chalmers’ version of (1) modal 
monism. Pure Two-Dimensionalism seems to best reflect Chalmers’ own view; whereas 2D 
Kripkeanism is probably the best compromise for a Kripkean friendly to the 2D approach to modal 
epistemology. However, it comes with a cost, as it requires abandoning modal monism and 
reshaping the scope of what a priori conceivability can give us access to. 
I conclude by suggesting a broader moral for modal epistemology: in order to elucidate 
modal knowledge, we need to first look at the sources of necessity. Clarifying what grounds modal truth 
in the different domains (logico-conceptual, epistemic, metaphysical, etc.) is the prerequisite for 
understanding the use and scope of a priori methods for modal knowledge. 
 
1. Desiderata for Modal Epistemology 
Many modal epistemologists agree that a promising account of metaphysical modal 
knowledge should aim to meet the following desiderata: (i) distinguishing metaphysical possibilities 
from other kinds of possibilities; (ii) integrating the Kripkean bridge-principles and the necessary a 
posteriori; (iii) respecting the fundamentally a priori character of modal inquiry. 
Desideratum (i) narrows down the focus to metaphysical modality, especially as opposed to 
epistemic modality. At first approximation, epistemic modality has to do with the possibilities open 
to subjects relative to what they know, under certain specified conditions, e.g., given the kind or 
 13 
amount of information available. By contrast, metaphysical modality concerns the possibilities that 
are determined by the nature or identity of things. Those are also sometimes cashed out as objective 
possibilities (Williamson 2016).2  
Desideratum (ii) insists on compliance with familiar results from Naming and Necessity. Many 
metaphysical necessities are grounded in the way the actual world is, and accordingly are only 
knowable via empirical investigation. Correspondingly, many metaphysical possibilities are also 
constrained by the features of the actual world. Kripke’s essentialist bridge-principles such as the 
necessity of origins, of composition (substance), of fundamental kind, and the necessity of identity, 
clarify to an important extent the content of metaphysical necessity and set substantial constraints 
for metaphysical possibility.3 
On the other hand, if a posteriori investigation is required to know many necessities, that does 
not look like the whole story. Empirical experience seems confined to tell us only about what is 
actual, so our modal judgments seem at most only partially empirically justified. That was already 
Kant’s diagnosis of our puzzlement with necessary statements: “experience teaches us that a thing is 
so and so, but not that it cannot be otherwise” (CPR: B3). In fact, for Kripke the bridge-principles 
are a priori. This explains desideratum (iii): when we isolate the basic principles underlying our modal 
beliefs from possible empirical content, an a priori step of some sort (e.g., inferential, or intuitive) 
                                               
2 Some might reject desideratum (i): one might be skeptical that there is a distinctive kind of metaphysical possibility as 
opposed to other kinds of possibilities, and hold instead a monistic view with only one kind of modality. However, even 
modal monists usually acknowledge at least a minimal distinction between two notions of modality—indeed, the 2D 
framework rests on this distinction. I take it that the skeptical reader will grant (i) under such a minimal understanding. 
At any rate, she should grant it as a dialectical point: for this distinction is shared by both Chalmers and the Kripkeans. 
3 Some might reject desideratum (ii): Kripke’s essentialist bridge-principles and examples are not uncontroversial. But 
note that complying with desideratum (ii) does not require further endorsing Kripke’s modal metaphysics (what I call 
here metaphysical Kripkeanism). In fact, Chalmers’ Modal Rationalism is a working example of how to fix the cases of the 
necessary a posteriori without endorsing the Kripkean modal metaphysics. Because of that, the skeptical reader should 
grant (ii) as a dialectical point. 
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seems required in order to justify our modal judgments. Put simply, modal investigation and 
knowledge seem importantly partly a priori.4 
 
2.  Chalmers’ Proposal 
Chalmers’ Modal Rationalism is a working example of how to comply with desiderata (i)-(iii).5 
Chalmers defends an a priori, conceivability-based route to metaphysical modal knowledge, thus 
satisfying (iii); it also aims to respect the Kripkean principles and examples, thus satisfying (ii). 
Specifically, Chalmers’ project appears to answer the Kripkean Challenge: 
 
(Kripkean Challenge) Conceivability does not entail possibility since not everything we conceive is 
(metaphysically) possible. 
 
                                               
4 Cf. Peacocke (1999: 41). See also Hale (forthcoming; 2013: ch. 11), and Lowe (2012). For recent discussion of the 
connection between apriority and modality, see Bueno & Shalkowski (forthcoming); Casullo (forthcoming; 2014); Vaidya 
(2017a; 2017b). Some might reject desideratum (iii). I mentioned a recent empirical turn in modal epistemology: modal 
empiricists eschew a priori means and defend non-traditional epistemic sources and procedures for modal knowledge like 
perception, inductive and abductive reasoning, and (quasi-perceptual) imagination. They typically frame modal 
investigation as an extension of scientific investigation, and prefer naturalist and externalist stances in epistemology. 
Also, they tend to focus on knowledge of “nearby” possibilities as opposed to the remote “extravagant” ones (see e.g. 
the essays in Fischer & Leon 2017; Strohminger 2015; Williamson 2016a; 2016b; 2007: ch. 5). Although I also see 
metaphysical modal knowledge as generally grounded in empirical knowledge (specifically, in essentialist knowledge: see 
my ‘Putting Modal Metaphysics First’), I also distance myself from the more radical aspects of modal empiricism. First, I 
am skeptical that a posteriori ways of knowing by themselves can lead us to knowledge of metaphysical modality. The 
non-actual is something that structurally or by its very nature escapes empirical observation and experience. Second, I 
question the scope of those theories. While they seem to safely range over physical-nomological possibility, it is less clear 
that they cast light beyond that into the metaphysical realm. Metaphysical possibility is covered to the extent that it 
coincides with physical-nomological possibility; thereby it remains largely unexplored. Third, it is not obvious that the 
methods modal empiricists appeal to are themselves purely empirical. The justification of induction, for example, is a 
longstanding problem: e.g. BonJour (1998) argues that it is a priori. Wilson & Biggs (2016) argue that abduction is a priori. 
In any case, the skeptical reader should still grant (iii) as a dialectical point, as a priori methods and justification play a 
central role for modal knowledge for both Chalmers and the Kripkeans. 
5 Chalmers defends Modal Rationalism in his (2002a), but see also his (2004), (2010), (2011). As mentioned, most 
contemporary accounts fail to satisfy one or another of the desiderata above. A notable exception is Hale (2013: ch. 11), 
which in my view has the further merit of grounding knowledge of necessity in knowledge of essence. 
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Answering this challenge means finding some way to grant the necessary a posteriori and 
explaining how, nevertheless, a priori conceivability could entail metaphysical possibility. 
Chalmers’ strategy consists in distinguishing different notions of conceivability as well as 
possibility—thereby also satisfying desideratum (i)—and connecting a kind of conceivability with a 
kind of possibility: 
 
(CP)  Ideal, primary conceivability entails primary possibility.6 
 
When something is ideally conceivable, it is so from the virtual stance of a reasoner “free of 
all contingent cognitive limitations” (Chalmers 2002: 148), which basically eliminates modal error 
and potential counterexamples based on our cognitive limitations.7 Furthermore, primary 
conceivability is the way we evaluate an expression’s primary intension.8 Primary intensions carry the 
descriptive content a priori associated with a linguistic expression and return its referent or truth-
                                               
6 More precisely, positive ideal primary conceivability. Whereas negative conceivability is the inability to exclude certain 
possibilities a priori, positive conceivability requires construing positive hypotheses and coherently filling in relevant 
details. This distinction is not relevant for what follows and I set it aside. Roca-Royes (2011) offers an excellent criticism 
of a variety of conceivability-based accounts of de re modal knowledge. However, I disagree with her that Chalmers’ 
primary aim is to elucidate de re and essentialist modal knowledge. That seems rather a nice potential advantage of his view 
(if it holds). Moreover, Chalmers’ basic link between (idealized) conceivability and (primary) possibility, which is one of 
Roca-Royes’ main targets, is not problematic from the point of view of metaphysical Kripkeanism, and thereby it would 
not be problematic for an ambitious modal epistemology. 
7 Chalmers mentions highly difficult unsolved mathematical problems, e.g. Goldbach’s conjecture: both its truth and its 
falsity are prima facie conceivable, but only one is ideally conceivable (2004: 145). Many have objected to this notion of 
ideal conceivability, e.g. Priest: “the ideality involved is that of some infinite and infallible a priori reasoner—not a very 
useful notion for mere mortals” (2016: 2660, fn.37). See also Worley (2003). Priest further objects that actually any 
decent mathematician can conceive of the conjecture being true and also of the conjecture being false, and they would 
not magically lose this ability if a proof of one or the other were found: examples proliferates in history. We might 
further note that mathematicians seem to conceive of contradictory scenarios any time they engage in a proof by 
contradiction. But Chalmers reiterates (in conversation) that while we might negatively conceive of these proofs (we might 
not exclude them a priori), we cannot positively conceive them (building the proof itself). 
8 I am only sketching the basics of Chalmers’ 2D framework, assuming that the reader is already familiar with it and 
narrowing my focus to those aspects that are relevant for my discussion of Modal Rationalism. Another notable example 
of a 2D framework with a similar program as Chalmers’ is Frank Jackson’s (1998), though Jackson does not apply it to 
modal epistemology. For an extensive discussion of 2D semantics and a comparison between Chalmers’ and other 2D 
programs (including Jackson’s), see Chalmers (2004). 
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value at a world considered as actual. Accordingly, primary conceivability requires putting aside 
empirical information about our world while supposing that a certain world is actual, and virtually 
taking the perspective of a speaker within that world. This is a purely a priori exercise based on 
considerations of logical and conceptual coherence of the hypotheses under examination. As 
Chalmers puts it more formally, primary conceivability consists in evaluating a priori entailments: 
given a sentence S and a world W, “the primary intension of S is true in W if the material 
conditional ‘if W is actual, then S’ is a priori” (2002: 163).9 That distinguishes it from secondary 
conceivability, which is empirically informed by how our world is and constrained by the Kripkean 
bridge-principles. Secondary intensions return the referent or truth-value of an expression at a world 
considered as counterfactual. Thus, evaluating different intensions is in fact looking at different 
possibilities. We judge a sentence to be true or false depending on how the world at which the 
intension is evaluated looks like.  
This apparatus seems to provide the tools to neutralize the Kripkean Challenge. For 
Chalmers, sentences describing Kripkean a posteriori necessities express multiple propositions: they 
are secondarily necessary but primarily contingent. This means that ideal primary conceivability 
captures a specific kind of possibilities, i.e., primary possibilities, that are sometimes secondarily 
impossible. Accordingly, a priori conceivability does entail (a kind of) possibility. When we conceive 
e.g., that Hesperus is not Phosphorus, we are not struggling to stretch our imagination beyond 
metaphysical possibility. For Chalmers, there is a primary possibility verifying ‘Hesperus is not 
Phosphorus’ (i.e., a world where the evening star and the morning star are distinct). However, it is 
still secondarily impossible that Hesperus is not Phosphorus (given that both ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorus’ refer to Venus). Our modal evaluations seem no longer restricted by the Kripkean 
                                               
9 Chalmers works with a broad notion of a priori justification (“S is a priori when it expresses a thought that can be justified 
independently of experience” 2010: 548). Some (e.g. Devitt 2005) have objected to such negative formulations on the 
grounds that they do not say what the a priori is. The epistemology of the a priori is notoriously a thorny issue. Here I 
grant Chalmers’ broad formulation. 
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assumptions built in the subjunctive mood. Modal thinking expands to cover an unexplored space of 
possibility, where ideally rational hypotheses are also genuine possibilities. At the same time, those 
Kripkean assumptions still stand, and the bonds of metaphysical necessity are preserved. 
With such an apparatus in hand, it is tempting to think that Chalmers’ Modal Rationalism 
may accomplish the difficult task of deploying 2D methods for modal knowledge in a way that 
satisfies the requirements of a Kripkean modal metaphysics. The envisioned ambitious modal 
epistemology may seem within reach. Indeed, why would a Kripkean resist Modal Rationalism?  
 
3. An Inconsistent Triad 
I argue that the project of combining Chalmers’ Modal Rationalism with a Kripkean modal 
metaphysics entails an inconsistent triad composed of the following theses: 
 
(1) Modal Monism (there is only one modal primitive. Metaphysical=logical=conceptual possibility) 
(2) Two-Dimensionalism (expressions capture two dimensions of possibility: epistemic and metaphysical) 
(3) Metaphysical Kripkeanism (metaphysical modality depends on the essential features of the actual 
world plus the Kripkean bridge-principles) 
 
Only two of the three theses can be true at one time. Specifically, the inconsistency lies in 
the conflict between Chalmers’ own modal metaphysics, which can be thought of as the 
combination of (1) and (2), coming up against the Kripkean’s (3). The latter can only be compatible 
with either (1) or (2), not both. Here is how to unpack each thesis and the inconsistency in more 
detail. 
Metaphysical Kripkeanism (3) holds that metaphysical modality is de re, in things. Things are 
necessarily or contingently in a certain way independently of how we choose to describe them or 
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conceptualize them. Their modal profiles depend instead on their fundamental nature. Both 
individuals and kinds have essential properties, which constitutively determine not just how things are, 
but how they must be across possible worlds. The bridge-principles capture this dependence relation 
between the nature of the actual world and metaphysical necessity, based on essential properties of 
things.10 
Kripke introduces this notion of metaphysical modality in the context of his famous 
distinction between the a priori and the necessary (1980: 35-36). He distinguishes metaphysical 
necessity from three other notions or senses of necessity: first, epistemological necessity, which “might 
just mean a priori”. Second, physical necessity; and, third, logical necessity. Setting aside epistemological 
necessity for the moment, modal space is arguably carved out in such a way that metaphysical 
possibility is not as broad as logical possibility but not as narrow as physical possibility. For Kripke, we 
can get a grip on the content of metaphysical necessity by simply asking ourselves: “is it possible 
that, in this respect, the world should have been different from the way it is?” (36: my emphasis). The “world” 
is for Kripke a combination of the actual makeup of things—individuals and kinds, with their 
essential properties—together with the bridge-principles that govern necessity. This combination 
sets the parameters for genuine metaphysical possibility. 
Accordingly, in conducting our modal evaluations, we should reason from how the world 
is—from its actual makeup—to how it must be. The bridge-principles that guide modal inference 
have the form ‘P→☐P’ (1971: 153). Certain essential features of the actual world, P, determine what 
must be the case (metaphysically) or what is the case at all worlds, ☐P. These principles bridge the 
realm of the actual and non-modal with the realm of the non-actual and necessary. Furthermore, it 
                                               
10 A distinction between trivial vs. non-trivial essentialist import of Kripke’s a posteriori necessities has become standard 
(probably after Salmon, 1981: 82-87). Cases involving identities between rigid designators may only commit one to the 
“trivially” essential property of self-identity (and, although more tentatively, so do the cases of theoretical identifications. 
See also fn.13 below). Whereas, cases of kind essentialism and origin essentialism rather involve a commitment to 
“substantive” or non-trivially essential properties. I will discuss examples of both types. 
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appears that modal inquiry has an important empirical aspect: in most cases, it is informed by 
observation and scientific investigation.11 In Kripke’s words: “in general, science attempts, by 
investigating basic structural traits, to find the nature, and thus the essence (in the philosophical sense) 
of the kind” (1980: 138).12 It was an empirical discovery that heat is molecular kinetic energy: we 
discovered its fundamental nature or, simply, what heat is. That means, for Kripke, that heat could 
not have been anything else than molecular motion: given that heat is molecular motion, it is 
necessarily so.13 This is the powerful, two-sided idea behind Kripke’s necessary a posteriori. We need 
empirical information about the world in order to know certain necessities (an epistemic thesis); but 
this is so, in turn, because those necessities are grounded in the way the world is or in the intrinsic 
nature of things (a metaphysical thesis). Kripke has illuminated another source of necessity besides the 
traditional a priori logico-analytic necessity. Our world—specifically, the essences of things—
generates metaphysical necessities. 
Given this picture of metaphysical modality, it is not clear that Chalmers’ primary 
possibilities can be genuinely metaphysical for a Kripkean. From the point of view of metaphysical 
Kripkeanism, Chalmers’ account seems in danger of allowing worlds that go against the nature of 
things—that is, primarily possible worlds that deny the essential properties of things. Two-
dimensionalism has a more generous attitude, we may say, to what is possible and enriches the 
picture with further possibilities. But those are de dicto, purely a priori possibilities. From the 2D 
                                               
11 Not in all cases. The truths of logic and mathematics are presumably both necessary and purely a priori, for Kripke. 
12 If Kripke is right, essences are not hidden substrata or mysterious entities, but rather an object of scientific 
investigation. Unfortunately, Kripke does not further explore the metaphysics and epistemology of essence. In my 
‘Putting Modal Metaphysics First’, I argue that we can effectively do so by pursuing the thesis that, at least in the case of 
natural kinds, the essence of the kind is what causes and explains all the many, many other properties and behaviors shared 
by all the instances of the kind.  
13 This is one of Kripke’s paradigmatic theoretical identifications, typically having the form of identity sentences involving a 
rigid (general) term for natural kinds on the left-hand side and a rigid semantically complex expression on the right-hand 
side (1980: 125-140). It is a matter of debate what exactly the semantic status of the right-hand side expressions is (for a 
survey, see Beebee & Sabbarton-Leary 2010), but this is an issue at the level of language and reference that we do not 
have to settle here. 
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perspective modality is a matter of ideally rational concepts and entailments; thereby, metaphysical 
possibility is largely independent of how things actually are and their essential properties. “Primary 
conceivability is always an a priori matter. We consider specific ways the world might be, in such a 
way that the true character of the actual world is irrelevant” (Chalmers 2002: 158). The 2D 
parameters for the scope of metaphysical possibility turn out to be antithetical to the Kripkean’s, as 
they allow for worlds that she would not accept. 
To illustrate, take Kripke’s example of the necessity of (biological) origin. According to 
Kripke’s principle, it is metaphysically impossible for a human being to have different parents than 
the ones she actually has. While Chalmers’ framework respects this principle at the level of the 
secondary dimension, it also treats ideally a priori conceivable possibilities—i.e., primary 
possibilities—as genuine metaphysical possibilities (again, there is only one modal primitive). Since it 
seems ideally a priori conceivable that a human being might have had different parents from those 
she actually has, we should conclude that this is primarily and, as such, metaphysically possible. But 
for a Kripkean this is unacceptable. 
Let us look at this contrast more closely. Chalmers’ strategy to avoid worlds that go against 
the nature of things from a Kripkean perspective can be broken down in two parts. On the one 
hand, Chalmers stresses that the worlds in question verify the primary intension of the relevant 
expressions, which is independent of their actual referents (i.e., of that particular human being and 
her parents). Primary intensions only capture an aspect of content under a specific mode of 
presentation (i.e., the rules for assigning names to referents, based on their semantic content). Since 
that intension is a priori and independent of the nature of the actual referents, it should not conflict 
with the nature of those referents, namely with what is essentially true of them. As I explain below 
(sections 4.1-4.2), this bit of Chalmers’ strategy appears to meet the Kripkean requirements only 
superficially, that is, only at the level of semantics. Although this is sufficient for the two-
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dimensionalists’ purposes, it does not satisfy the Kripkeans’. For her, those possibilities may still go 
against the nature of things. Depending on whether we consider an “orthodox monistic” Kripkean, 
or a “2D-friendly” Kripkean, primary possibilities turn out to be either impossible tout-court, or 
merely epistemic not metaphysical possibilities (or scenarios, as they are often called).  
On the other hand—this is the second bit of the strategy—Chalmers emphasizes that the 
Kripkean necessities are preserved at the level of the secondary dimension. This is so thanks to the 
rules for assigning secondary intensions that respect the Kripkean bridge-principles. However, those 
rules are here motivated by the 2D machinery itself—they are conceptual truths based on our 
understanding of linguistic expressions and of the notion of metaphysical necessity. From a 
Kripkean perspective, it seems accordingly largely arbitrary that the rules are like that. In fact, two-
dimensionalists simply disregard such rules when evaluating primary intensions. When switching 
from a referential, de re reading to a descriptive, de dicto reading of expressions, one considers the a 
priori associated intensions while disregarding the actual referents and their properties, as well as the 
bridge-principles. But a Kripkean finds this wrong. Far from being merely arbitrary conceptual 
truths, the bridge-principles are rather tied to the actual makeup of the world. For the Kripkean, 
modal space is structured bottom-up, from the nature of things to the possibilities that their 
essences allow; it is not primitively a priori given in the manner Chalmers holds. 
The contrast becomes especially clear if we distinguish a strictly semantic Kripkeanism from 
metaphysical Kripkeanism.14 The 2D project only signs up for the former. Integrating semantic 
Kripkeanism requires fixing the cases of the necessary a posteriori and respecting the bridge-
principles; whereas the essentialist commitments belong to metaphysical Kripkeanism. However, the 
latter is further needed to get the ambitious modal epistemology off the ground. For a Kripkean, 
compliance with the bridge-principles and the examples of the necessary a posteriori is not something 
                                               
14 Thanks to Jonathan Schaffer for suggesting this distinction. 
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that one can just opt out of by adding suitable intensional content to our expressions. It is instead a 
matter of respecting the nature of things, where that is independent of any description or mode of 
presentation. As I am picturing the Kripkean stance, one can hardly accommodate the semantic 
doctrine without taking into account also the underlying metaphysics. The attempt to divorce them 
has the consequence of going against the Kripkean requirements themselves, while endorsing a 
largely arbitrary modal metaphysics that disregards the nature of things. Thus, the ambitious modal 
epistemology that would successfully combine the 2D framework with a Kripkean metaphysics turns 
out to be rather out of reach. 
Some tenacious modal epistemologist might suggest that we avoid this difficulty by 
distinguishing different sources of necessity. Roughly: a priori logico-conceptual truths and ideally rational 
entailments would be the source of primary-epistemic necessity; whereas the essential makeup of the 
world would be the source of secondary-metaphysical necessity. Distinguishing between sources of 
necessity would provide a corresponding qualitative distinction between kinds of possibilities or 
possible worlds—namely between genuinely metaphysically possible worlds vs. epistemically 
possible worlds or scenarios. 
This is an attractive possibility. In fact, this is the route chosen by the 2D Kripkean (4.2 
below). However, taking this route requires giving up a central component of Chalmers’ account, 
that is, the commitment to modal monism (1). Modal monism can be cashed out in a number of ways. 
It may capture the idea of a single modal primitive or source of necessity; or a single kind of 
possibility; or, also, formally, the notion of a single space of worlds. Those are not equivalent 
characterizations. For example, one might hold that there is a single source of necessity, while 
drawing nonetheless interesting distinctions between e.g. logical vs. metaphysical possibility.15 
Furthermore, regardless of one’s theoretical commitments, one might choose to work with either a 
                                               
15 See e.g. Vaidya (2006); Hale (2013). 
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monistic or a dualistic space of worlds, depending on one’s particular purposes. In Chalmers’ 
account, however, all those notions line up: he describes monism in terms of a single modal 
primitive, and a single space of worlds. Moreover, there is only one source of necessity—logico-
conceptual necessity—whereas the nature or essences of things play no role. Logico-conceptual 
possibility is coextensive with metaphysical possibility: “Of course I hold that conceptual 
possibility=logical possibility=metaphysical possibility (at the level of worlds)” (1999: 478). Any 
logico-conceptual possibility is also a metaphysical possibility, with no qualitative distinction 
between them. “Ultimately, there is just one circle of modal concepts, including both the rational 
modal concepts...and the metaphysical modal concepts” (2002: 194). 
Still, according to Chalmers, endorsing monism does not compromise the desired modal 
distinctions. We do not need two modal primitives or distinct sources of necessity, and so we do not 
need two kinds of qualitatively different worlds, since the intensional apparatus can account for all 
the differences we are interested in. Any world that is logico-conceptually possible is also 
metaphysically possible; but different intensions will be verified, or satisfied, at each world. 
Otherwise put, whether something is primarily or secondarily possible depends on where an 
intension is verified or satisfied within a single space of metaphysically possible worlds; not on 
whether a certain world is located in the space of genuine metaphysical possibility as opposed to 
mere epistemic possibility. 
It follows that Chalmers’ monism cannot accommodate the de re essentialist Kripkean 
commitments that locate the source of metaphysical necessity in the nature of things. His monism 
forgoes that further source and rather tracks such commitments back to the a priori semantic rules 
for assigning secondary intensions. On the other hand, a dualistic picture of modality, by adding a 
further source of necessity, could provide the desired corresponding qualitative distinction between 
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kinds of possibilities. That is probably the only way to successfully meet the requirements of 
metaphysical Kripkeanism while preserving the core thesis of 2D semantics. 
 
4. Three Positive Views 
On the bright side, the triad allows three combinations, which correspond to three positive 
views in conceptual space. Two of those are broadly Kripkean, by both including (3) metaphysical 
Kripkeanism. One, which I am calling Monistic Kripkeanism, endorses a version of (1) modal monism. 
The other, which I am calling 2D Kripkeanism, endorses (2) two-dimensionalism. It is a 
methodological point in Naming and Necessity that Kripke does not aim to offer formal theses or 
definitions that satisfy sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. Rather, he is interested in broad 
pictures (1980: 93). That is why both strands of Kripkeanism appear to be consistent with Kripke’s 
views. Indeed, besides being interesting positions per se, these may help us gain some deeper insight 
into those pictures that Kripke laid out. On the other hand, exploring both strands of Kripkeanism 
casts light on why Chalmers and Kripke’s modal metaphysics are fundamentally incompatible. The 
last available stance resulting from the triad, which I am calling Pure Two-Dimensionalism, drops (3) 
metaphysical Kripkeanism while retaining (2) the 2D framework together with (1) a monistic picture 
of modality. 
In the remainder of the paper, I examine those three views in turn. In the end, the following 
should be clear. From the Kripkean perspective, Chalmers’ Modal Rationalism is not a viable option. 
For it either (a) fails to neutralize the Kripkean Challenge (conceivability still does not entail 
possibility); or (b) the main conceivability-to-possibility thesis has to be amended to avoid the 
Kripkean Challenge; but with the result that a priori conceivability may fail to access genuine 
metaphysical possibility. The Monistic Kripkean represents outcome (a): for her, a priori 
conceivability still does not entail metaphysical possibility. The 2D Kripkean represents outcome (b): 
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for her, a priori conceivability only entails epistemic possibilities having ideally coherent logico-
conceptual content, which however may not be genuine metaphysical possibilities. Finally, the Pure 
Two-Dimensionalist replaces metaphysical Kripkeanism with her own monistic modal metaphysics, 
which is grounded in purely a priori rational notions rather than in the de re essential profiles of 
things. Whichever of the three views one chooses, the project of fully combining the original 
program of Modal Rationalism with metaphysical Kripkeanism into a coherent modal epistemology 
does not succeed. 
 
4.1. Giving Up Two-Dimensionalism: The Monistic Kripkean 
It seems common ground between Chalmers and both the Monistic and the 2D Kripkean 
that cases like ‘Hesperus is not Phosphorus’, ‘Cicero is not Tully’, ‘Water is not H2O’, ‘Heat is not 
molecular motion’, and so on are metaphysically impossible. The question is whether a Kripkean 
could concede that they are still possible in some interesting sense; and, if yes, what more precisely is 
the content of those possibilities. 
The Monistic Kripkean rejects the 2D framework and the thesis that expressions have a 
further, primary intension. Accordingly, she also rejects Chalmers’ take on a posteriori necessities. For 
her, the relevant examples are possible only in the loose sense that it is not a priori that, for example, 
Hesperus is Phosphorus. The possibility that Hesperus might not have been Phosphorus is illusory: it 
only corresponds to a subject’s lack of information about certain astronomical facts. “Obviously, the 
‘might’ here is purely ‘epistemic’—it merely expresses our present state of ignorance, or uncertainty” 
(Kripke 1980: 102-103). Strictly, that does not even count as a possibility at all: we shall not model it 
by means of possible worlds. In general, for the Monistic Kripkean there is no distinct primary 
possibility, no further dimension of possibility besides the metaphysical one. When we speak of 
epistemic possibility, we do not refer to objective possibilities “out there” in the metaphysical realm. 
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For the Monistic Kripkean, often the scenarios that one conceives when conceiving the 
falsity of some a posteriori necessity are (ceteris paribus) metaphysically possible. But, crucially, the 
objects thus conceived are alien and unrelated to the actual ones. For Kripke, in such cases we are 
“qualitatively in the same epistemic situation that in fact obtains” (1980: 142), but what we are considering 
is a different object. Examples proliferate. Supposing that this particular table could have been made 
of ice rather than wood means supposing that “I could have the same sensory evidence that I in fact 
have, about a table which was made of ice” (ivi). Had there been a substance having the same 
phenomenal properties as water, but having a completely different atomic structure, that would not 
have been water but rather some other substance (1980: 128-129). Insisting that Hesperus might not 
have been Phosphorus, or Cicero might not have been Tully, only amounts to contemplating cases 
involving, say, Sch-Hesperus, Sch-Cicero, and so on.16  
In this perspective, 2D ways of explaining Kripkean intuitions do not succeed.17 For the 
Monistic Kripkean, the content that Chalmers takes to be verified at a scenario or primary possibility 
does not really falsify an a posteriori necessity, because it does not involve the actual objects that we 
should be considering, but other ones that only have superficial properties similar to those. What the 
two-dimensionalist takes to be primarily possible is instead for the Monistic Kripkean only the 
misguided expression of a momentary state of ignorance, or an epistemic illusion.18 More generally, 
metaphysical Kripkeanism holds that the actual world with its individuals, kinds and relevant 
essential properties determine the scope of metaphysical possibility. The possible is constrained by the 
actual. For the Monistic Kripkean this means that there is only one space of possibility, i.e., 
metaphysical possibility—and nothing beyond that. Thus, she endorses a version of modal monism. 
                                               
16 What about a scenario where e.g. ‘Tully’ refers to the actual individual, while ‘Cicero’ to someone else? For the 
Monistic Kripkean this would still not be a possibility where Tully is not Cicero; but rather one where Tully is not also called 
Cicero. For surely the metalinguistic statement “Cicero and Tully are names of the same Roman orator” might have been 
false (cf. 1971:154). 
17 Pace Chalmers (2010: 188-189, fn.3). 
18 See Yablo (2006) for an insightful discussion of such cases.   
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For her, too, there is only one source of necessity and one kind of possibilities or possible worlds, 
i.e., the genuinely metaphysically possible worlds. But her version of monism differs from Chalmers’ 
in two crucial respects. First, no merely epistemic possibility has a place within modal space. And 
second, the source of metaphysical necessity lies in the makeup of the actual world as determined by 
the essential properties of individuals and kinds.19 
That is why a priori conceivability does not really help cast light on metaphysical possibility, 
for the Monistic Kripkean. One needs to know how things actually are and which kinds of principles 
one ought to follow in order to reason about metaphysical modality. That is also why Chalmers’ 
modal metaphysics is antithetical to Kripke’s. Both the intrinsic and structural features of the actual 
world as well as the Kripkean essentialist principles are irrelevant to the content of Chalmers’ 
primary possibilities. 
From the point of view of the philosophy of language, Kripkean intuitions against an 
intensional semantics like Chalmers’ may not be surprising. As mentioned, for the Monistic 
Kripkean, sentences expressing a posteriori necessities do not carry the extra-content needed to build 
the typical surrogate primary possibilities. Chalmers stresses that intensions are functions not 
descriptions; they rather reveal an expression’s cognitive role, similarly as coarse-grained Fregean 
senses do (2002b). Still, his 2D framework operates under the main assumption that expressions 
have an associated descriptive content (Papineau: 2007; Soames: 2005). This is something that the 
                                               
19 Kripke’s discussion suggests some form of nomological necessitarianism, for which the laws of nature are 
metaphysically necessary. Theoretical identifications and scientific statements more generally are “not contingent truths 
but necessary truths in the strictest possible sense” (1980: 125, my emphasis). And at least for a range of cases, “it might be 
that when something’s physically necessary, it always is necessary tout court” (99). Still, Kripke is also cautious: “physical 
necessity might turn out to be necessity in the highest degree. But that’s a question which I don’t wish to prejudge” (ivi). 
Overall, it seems safe to say that Kripke endorses a weak necessitarianism for which properties are individuated by their 
role in laws or their causal role. E.g.: “It's not just that it's a scientific law [that gold has atomic number 79], but of course 
we can imagine a world in which it would fail. Any world in which we imagine a substance which does not have these 
properties is a world in which we imagine a substance which is not gold, provided these properties form the basis of 
what the substance is” (125). 
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Monistic Kripkean rejects. She may hold, as some put it, that expressions are often radically opaque 
(Goff & Papineau: 2014).20 
Finally, for the Monistic Kripkean the Kripkean Challenge itself seems misguided. The 
conceivability of the falsity of an a posteriori necessity turns out to be only apparent, and quickly fades 
away. How can one conceive that this particular table is not made of wood, that water is not H2O, that 
Hesperus is not Phosphorus, that Cicero is not Tully? We struggle to deny the essentialist bridge-
principles, and ultimately the necessity of identity. But every time we seem to be doing it, we realize 
that a shift in content occurred. Chalmers is trying to press a de dicto reading, supposedly available at 
the level of the primary dimension, which would not violate the essentialist principles and the 
necessity of identity. But the Monistic Kripkean pushes back with the de re reading and denies any 
further dimension of meaning.21 
                                               
20 Kripkean Monism entails a sort of direct reference about meaning. This is the view, as Devitt puts it regarding names, that 
“the meaning of a name is simply its bearer" (2015: 128). Cf. Soames (2002; 2005), Salmon (1986). However, it is worth 
stressing that although Kripke rejected descriptivism, he never explicitly endorsed direct reference. Perhaps more in 
seminars than in print, Kripke has remarked that senses qua associated descriptions are fine so long as they are not 
treated as definitions of the corresponding expressions. They are not part of the content of an expression, and do not 
provide necessary and sufficient conditions to determine their extension. Does this leave any room for Chalmers’ 
intensions? Perhaps only for a sort of secondary ones: “in the formal semantics of modal logic, the ‘sense’ of a term t is 
usually taken to be the (possibly partial) function which assigns to each possible world H the referent of t at H. For a 
rigid designator, such a function is constant” (Kripke 1980: 56, fn. 22). ‘Cicero’ or ‘Hesperus’ cannot fail to pick out the 
very same individual at all possible worlds where that individual exists. Those names would not pick out someone else in 
the primary dimension, like Chalmers wants. But, again, this does not necessarily make of Kripke himself a Monistic 
Kripkean. 
21 Thus, I disagree with Goff (in Goff & Papineau 2014) that radically opaque expressions provide examples of strong 
necessities, because those expressions lack the further dimension of meaning that is needed to build such cases. Chalmers 
characterizes a strong (a posteriori) necessity as what a counterexample to (CP) would look like, if there were such a thing 
(then of course everyone took up the challenge and tried to come up with a good case. For discussion: Chalmers 2010: 
170-180). A strong necessity must be: (i) metaphysically-secondarily necessary; (ii) epistemically-primarily necessary; (iii) 
conceivably false. In the case of radically opaque expressions, against Goff, I do not see how (ii) is satisfied, given that 
no extra descriptive content motivates such a further dimension. Instead, the Monistic Kripkean neutralizes Chalmers’ 
challenge by simply rejecting his 2D analysis of a posteriori necessities as weakly necessary because primarily contingent. It is 
rather the 2D Kripkean the one who has the theoretical resources to build cases of strong necessities (i.e., modal dualism). 
However, I recommend against engaging with such a quest after strong necessities. Given Chalmers’ setup, any such 
attempt is doomed to failure. Since he treats conceivability and epistemic-primary possibility as de facto coextensive, any 
conceivable falsity (iii) automatically denies epistemic-primary necessity (ii). 
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To take stock: in order to accommodate the Monistic Kripkean’s view, Chalmers would 
appear to have only two options. The first: he could concede that what we refer to as e.g. “water” at 
worlds where ‘water is not H2O’ is verified, is rather some other substance (similarly for the other 
examples). While this would make it a genuine metaphysical possibility for the Monistic Kripkean, it 
would also leave her wondering why we should be calling such a substance “water”. For her, the 
very idea of a further dimension of meaning seems misguided. After all, that further intensional 
content leads us astray by having familiar terms pick out alien referents across possible worlds. The 
second: Chalmers could agree that the possibility of water not being H2O is merely illusory, and it is 
better described in terms of a momentary subjective state of ignorance. For that matter, it could 
even still be called “epistemic”. However, the unwanted result is that that would not constitute a 
genuine metaphysical possibility. Rejecting both those options, on the other hand, would seem to 
put Chalmers in a bad spot: for the only alternative available seems to be that we can conceive de re 
metaphysical impossibilities, including actual water not being H2O. While this may be a perfectly 
respectable view (Priest 2016), it is clearly a non-starter in this context. For such a view not only 
directly denies the Kripkean assumptions; but it also amounts to rejecting Chalmers’ whole setup. 
In terms of the triad, the Monistic Kripkean rejects (2) two-dimensionalism, while retaining 
(3) metaphysical Kripkeanism. The space of possibilities for her covers only metaphysical 
possibilities, thereby she endorses (1) monism. 
 
4.2. Giving Up Monism: The 2D Kripkean 
The 2D Kripkean has some sympathy for two-dimensionalism. She is more flexible about 
the philosophy of language and engages with Chalmers’ 2D framework. For her, expressions may 
have some extra descriptive content and that plausibly opens up a further dimension of possibility. 
As we might put it, where the Monistic Kripkean only sees a misdescription, the 2D Kripkean sees 
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an epistemic possibility that is not merely a momentary illusion. Thus, the 2D Kripkean agrees with 
Chalmers that there is a more robust sense in which “a world with XYZ in the oceans can be seen as 
satisfying the statement ‘Water is not H2O’” (Chalmers 2002: 162). 
For the 2D Kripkean, we can speak of e.g. “Hesperus” not “Sch-Hesperus”, actual “water”, 
and so on when considering controversial primary possibilities, without thereby denying the 
essentialist principles or the necessity of identity. For she agrees that the relevant descriptions or 
associated Fregean senses partly constitute the content of expressions. So, even once we know how 
things have actually turned out, we can still make sense of those epistemic possibilities and model 
them by means of a suitable world-semantics. For the 2D Kripkean, modal space is richer. 
However, crucially, such robust epistemic possibilities are qualitatively different from 
genuine metaphysical possibilities. Modal space as the 2D Kripkean envisages it is dualistic not 
monistic, with two sources of necessity. On the one hand, there is the actual makeup of the world 
with all its de re properties. This is the source of metaphysical necessity—more precisely, in the 
essential properties of things. On the other hand, there are the ideally rational modal concepts and 
the a priori entailments resulting from the intensional contents of expressions. That is instead the 
source of epistemic necessity. Epistemically possible worlds or epistemic possibilities, in this light, 
although robust (not merely momentary psychological states) may not be also metaphysically 
possible worlds or metaphysical possibilities. Accordingly, the 2D Kripkean endorses an amended 
version of (CP) for which primary conceivability only gives us access to ideally coherent a priori 
epistemic possibilities, or scenarios, with no metaphysical import.22 As anticipated, endorsing a 
qualitative difference between sources of necessity and corresponding kinds of possibilities is 
                                               
22 Strictly, with only some metaphysical import. For scenarios in some cases map metaphysical possibility. So, although we 
cannot generally infer metaphysical possibility from epistemic possibility, the relevant intensional contents might provide 
a connection that does allow for such inferences in certain cases (Thanks to an anonymous referee for drawing my 
attention to this point).  
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probably the only way to construe a coherent modal metaphysics that is both Kripkean and “2D-
friendly”. 
In fact, the 2D Kripkean finds Chalmers’ modal monism puzzling. How can Chalmers treat 
both primary and secondary possibilities (or possible worlds) as genuinely metaphysical? Recall that 
monism commits one to accepting that primary-epistemic possibilities are verified by metaphysically 
possible worlds, just like genuine Kripkean possibilities are. Chalmers converts the qualitative 
difference between epistemic and metaphysical possibility into an intensional difference, which is 
dependent on one’s (ideal) evaluative standpoint. In the case of a posteriori necessities, such worlds 
cannot be genuinely metaphysically possible from a Kripkean perspective. Specifically, the 2D 
Kripkean might object that Chalmers commits what I call “modal upgrading”. In Chalmers’ picture, 
purely a priori ideally coherent logico-conceptual possibilities seem to have been promoted or 
upgraded to the status of full-fledged metaphysical possibilities. Primary intensions, just like secondary 
intensions, are verified by worlds that are theoretically-qualitatively indistinguishable from all the 
other worlds—most importantly, from our world. For Chalmers, there is a metaphysical possibility 
or world where Hesperus is not Phosphorus, or water is not H2O—actually, a “first class metaphysical 
possibility” (2002a: 165). This seems unacceptable for a Kripkean—even for the 2D Kripkean. 
In sum, for the 2D Kripkean we can accept the 2D semantic apparatus—in fact, we should. 
Expressions do pack multiple meanings or intensions; and we do have multiple ways of evaluating 
those tokens. But this semantic apparatus and its rational epistemic implications need not have any 
metaphysical import. Monism is a further thesis. It is precisely the combination of 2D semantics and 
modal monism that even the most open-minded Kripkean rejects. For her, considerations of 
rational coherence cannot carry over onto matters of metaphysical possibility, on pain of falling into 
modal upgrading. What is genuinely possible is not a matter of how we (or even ideally rational 
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beings) evaluate a priori statements. What is genuinely possible is a matter of how things really are—
of their nature or essential properties. 
I should stress that the 2D Kripkean does not dismiss epistemic-primary possibilities as 
illusory (like the Monistic Kripkean does). Nor does she suggest that the content of such possibilities 
is merely a function of one’s modal intuitions, which would trivialize the link between conceivability 
and possibility (not to mention treat genuine possibilities as psychological products). For the 2D 
Kripkean, both epistemic-primary possibilities and metaphysical-secondary possibilities are “real” in 
the sense that they are independent of our conceptualization and subjective intuitions. However, 
they are grounded in different aspects of reality, which makes them qualitatively different and 
irreducible to each other. The difference is categorical or metaphysical: the two modalities hold in 
virtue of different primitive aspects of reality. Borrowing Fine’s (2005) terminology, we might call 
such epistemic-primary necessities that structure reality “transcendental truths”. For they are taken to 
hold necessarily “regardless of the circumstances or how things turn out”. As the term suggests, 
those would be in effect preconditions for the existence of any world. Like a web or empty structure, 
such necessities would set the a priori fundamental conditions for world-existence. Both logically and 
metaphysically possible worlds would constitutively depend on such necessities.23 In this perspective, 
epistemic a priori modality would be perfectly “real” and capture fundamental aspects of reality. But 
since it would also be constitutively independent of the particular features of the world—it would be 
independent of the features of any world—by itself it would not help us cast light on what is 
genuinely metaphysically possible. By dealing with a priori preconditions of possibility, epistemic 
modality would simply lack the resources to capture the metaphysically-based modal profiles of 
things. 
                                               
23 Arguably, epistemic necessities include, at a first approximation, mathematical, logical, and traditional 
analytic/conceptual truths. What distinguishes this class of truths is that they are necessarily truth-preserving patterns of 
inference (Cf. Hale 2013: 60-62; see also his forthcoming). 
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In conclusion, although more flexible with the philosophy of language, the 2D Kripkean 
does not negotiate the metaphysics. She does expand the space of possibility but maintains that 
metaphysical modality is rooted in the essential makeup up of the actual world. The resulting picture 
is therefore dualistic. 
Looking back at the triad, (2) two-dimensionalism and (3) metaphysical Kripkeanism cannot 
be conjoined with (1) modal monism. From the point of view of the 2D Kripkean, Modal 
Rationalism can only be viable if paired with modal dualism.24 
Here is the general dialectic. From a broadly Kripkean perspective, Chalmers’ Modal 
Rationalism seems to do either of the following. It may give us access to primary-epistemic 
possibilities which verify an expression’s primary intension. Although these have the correct de re 
content (i.e., they involve the actual referents), they are not genuine metaphysical possibilities. This is 
the 2D Kripkean’s position, combining (2) and (3). In effect, this is a sort of severed Modal 
Rationalism, which only elucidates our a priori access to part of the modal space—the purely 
epistemic space. Alternatively, Chalmers’ conceivability may give us access to certain metaphysical 
possibilities. Although those are genuine possibilities also for the Kripkean, they crucially involve 
different referents not the actual ones (the ‘sch’- reconstructions of the relevant actual referents). 
This is the Monistic Kripkean’s position, combining (1) and (3). Either way, from a Kripkean 
perspective conceivability does not entail possibility in Chalmers’ sense, and a priori access to 
metaphysical modality is blocked. Once again, Modal Rationalism cannot be successfully combined 
with a Kripkean modal metaphysics. 
 
 
                                               
24 Chalmers does not reject in principle modal dualism. He concedes that “a two-space model is coherent and useful for 
various purposes” (2011: 79, fn. 9). Moreover, he has devised a technical account of possibility in terms of purely 
epistemic scenarios—constituted by maximally consistent sentence-types of an ideal language. However, he admits that 
his metaphysical claims will not go through if one works with the pure epistemic construction (2010: 552-3). 
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4.3. Intermezzo: Two Notions of Metaphysical Modality 
One might wonder whether at the heart of this dialectic is a terminological issue. Perhaps there 
is a misunderstanding concerning the term ‘metaphysical’ that Chalmers and the Kripkean might 
work out together. From Chalmers’ point of view, both primary-epistemic possibilities and 
secondary-Kripkean possibilities are metaphysical. For the Kripkeans, only the latter deserved to be 
called so. But couldn’t this conflict be simplified by saying that Chalmers is willing to call “water” 
something that the Kripkean is not?  
From a certain point of view, it does seem so. After all, the scenario depicting ‘Water is not 
H2O’ that both Chalmers and the Kripkeans contemplate has probably the same features: namely a 
world-state where some liquid substance looks exactly like water and has the same roles as actual 
water. Chalmers wants to call that “water” while also at the same time denying that it is H2O. The 
Kripkeans, instead, either do not want to call it “water” but something else, whatever it is (this is 
Monistic Kripkean), or accept calling it “water” but only insofar as the described scenario is not a 
genuine metaphysical possibility (the 2D Kripkean). Maybe all the ambitious modal epistemologist 
needs to solve the inconsistency and get her project off the ground is to specify further senses of 
‘metaphysical modality’. She might need to distinguish between, say, a notion of “strict” metaphysical 
possibility vs. an “epistemic-but-somehow-still-metaphysical” possibility. 
But the apparent terminological point is only the tip of a world-view. For Chalmers, the 
metaphysical makeup of possible worlds or the content of genuine metaphysical possibility can 
change as long as the scenario that verifies the relevant intensions is ideally coherent. We can call 
those different things at the other worlds with the same old words, as long as we are careful not to 
fall into a contradiction. But for the Kripkeans this is unacceptable. For her, what a possible world 
could look like, both intrinsically and structurally, is determined by how the actual world looks like, 
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not by the descriptive content of our expressions.25 We cannot just associate familiar words to 
different things when that involves a deep metaphysical change—e.g., a change in the structure of a 
fundamental kind, or one that leads us to give up transworld identity. From a Kripkean perspective, 
Chalmers’ metaphysical modality may seem dangerously flimsy. Primary conceivability can only tell 
us that if things are so and so, given the descriptive content of a primary intension under ideal 
rationality, then certain counterfactuals follow. But that does not address the issue of how the modal 
realm really is. Given two-dimensionalism and a liberal approach to what is metaphysically possible, 
modal monism can only be integrated given a purely a priori logico-conceptual notion of modality, 
while a Kripkean modal metaphysics is excluded.26 
 
4.4. Giving Up Metaphysical Kripkeanism: The Pure Two-Dimensionalist 
This leads us to the Pure Two-Dimensionalist view, the last available option from the triad. Pure 
Two-Dimensionalism consists of maintaining the combination of (1) modal monism with (2) two-
dimensionalism; while endorsing a notion of metaphysical modality that is non-Kripkean and 
independent of the nature of things. A two-dimensionalist who is only committed to semantic 
Kripkeanism and does not want to give up modal monism would choose this option. Metaphysical 
possibility itself is a priori rooted in those primitive logico-conceptual structures and relations that 
hold regardless of how the actual world happens to be. Our world with its essential makeup does 
not play any special role for what is metaphysically possible. More than that, for the Pure Two-
Dimensionalist our world is itself one of countless epistemic possibilities within a monistic modal 
                                               
25 Similarly, Soames: “[Kripke] did not view language as the source of the necessary a posteriori status of his examples. 
Instead, he looked to metaphysics” (2005: 203). 
26 Cf. Vaidya: “[Chalmers’ considerations] suggest that the conception of modality at play is one that eliminates the 
notion of metaphysical modality as originally conceived by Kripke” (2008: 196). 
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space—it is just the possibility or world that happens to have been actualized. Antithetically to the 
Kripkean view, the actual is determined by the possible.27 
The Pure Two-Dimensionalist view seems to best reflect Chalmers’ own view. That gives us 
a key to interpret certain suggestive remarks of his, for example, that “the concept of metaphysical 
modality itself has roots in the epistemic domain” (2010: 566). Indeed, we noted that Chalmers’ 
framework rests on a sort of a priori conceptual metaphysics. Unfortunately, though, he does not expand 
on these ideas, leaving us with the puzzle of how exactly Kripkean counterfactual possibilities are 
rooted a priori in the epistemic domain. The worry here is that his reassurances that the epistemic 
notions are wholly grounded in rational notions will hardly convince a Kripkean that such epistemic 
notions also capture genuine metaphysical possibility. The notion of intensional content certainly 
implies that modal truth is partly built into our expressions. It is constitutive of an expression’s 
intensional content that the referent(s) of that expression have certain modal features. But what 
those features are is not generally an a priori matter for the Kripkean. Moreover, given Chalmers’ use 
of the 2D framework, it seems that both the primary and secondary dimensions ultimately capture de 
dicto modality. 
On the other hand, Chalmers holds that a Kripkean modal metaphysics of the kind outlined 
here “will put constraints on the space of possible worlds that are brute and inexplicable” (1996: 
137). For the Kripkean, however, it is not clear why those constraints should be brute and inexplicable. 
In her view, the constraints derive from the fundamental nature of our world. Its essential makeup 
plus the bridge-principles determine the range of genuine metaphysical possibilities. For her, this is 
simply how nature is. Perhaps the “brutality” of the relevant constraints could be traced back to their 
                                               
27 In a talk at Princeton in November 2012, Chalmers presented this idea by recalling David Armstrong’s point that 
“There is a picture in Leibniz, in Lewis, and in other metaphysicians that the actual swims in a wider sea, the sea of the possible. 
The actual is just one case of the possible” (Chalmers, ‘Two Concepts of Metaphysical Possibility’, quoting from 
Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge University Press 1997: 173-174 my emphasis. Slides available at 
http://consc.net/slides/possibility.pdf). 
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being at the mercy of nature; or of how God shaped reality, if one prefers. In this sense, how the 
modal realm is may be a brute matter. But the constraints for her are not brute in the sense of 
unjustified, or “inexplicable”. The nature of the actual world as revealed by empirical investigation 
draws the boundary between the epistemic and the metaphysical space—it justifies and explains that 
boundary. Moreover, the Kripkean might contend that, from her perspective, it seems equally brute 
and inexplicable to grant that logico-conceptual coherence—however pure and idealized—gives us a 
secure criterion for metaphysical possibility. 
A broader moral for modal epistemology emerges from this conflict. In trying to elucidate 
our knowledge of possibility and necessity we need to first get clear about the underlying modal 
metaphysics, particularly about the source(s) of necessity. As I like to put it, it might prove fruitful to 
approach the epistemology of modality by putting modal metaphysics first. Conceivability as used by 
traditional rationalism may guide us safely to possibility within a purely conceptual-epistemic 
understanding of modal metaphysics; whereas this seems more controversial if the source of 
necessity is located in the essential properties of things. Such an essentialist modal metaphysics 
would instead likely be captured by non-uniform modal epistemology, combining different methods 
and procedures. And we may predict an analogous result on the assumption that there are multiple 
sources of necessity, and a fragmented, non-monistic picture of modality and modal space.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Finally, I should note that the sort of modal knowledge that Modal Rationalism promises 
does not appear to match broadly Kripkean metaphysical interests. For ex hypothesi (CP) primary 
possibilities are the only possibilities we may access a priori. Knowledge of secondary possibility 
remains an a posteriori matter for Chalmers, since we need empirical information concerning the 
actual world in order to conceive and judge those matters (secondary conceivability). In other words, 
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primary a priori conceivability does not have the resources to illuminate Kripkean possibilities.28 Yet, 
arguably those are the possibilities that Kripkeans are interested in. In general, Kripkeans are mostly 
concerned with how things are—actually—and how they might have gone—counterfactually. They 
have a special interest in how our world might have been different; which is probably why they may 
find Kripke’s picture of de re modality so attractive and consolatory. 
From a Kripkean perspective, Modal Rationalism may give us a general formula to construct 
perfectly coherent hypotheses, which however might have very little to do with how the modal 
realm really is. Chalmers’ strategy of taking modal issues to the semantic level is not really an answer 
to the Kripkean worries. For a Kripkean, we cannot just reduce metaphysical modal differences to 
purely intensional ones. There is a whole world standing in between that reduction, and that is the 
actual world as we can come to know it.29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
28 The only cases where primary conceivability captures secondary possibility are those where the primary and secondary 
intensions of the relevant expressions coincide. For Chalmers, those include mathematical and analytic truths, and 
phenomenal truths (2010: ch.6). However, it might be objected that whereas mathematical and analytic truths seem to 
obviously verify the thesis, the class of phenomenal truths makes it on the other hand extremely controversial. 
29 Thanks to Nate Bice, Paul Boghossian, David Chalmers, Michael Devitt, Mateo Duque, David Papineau, Jonathan 
Schaffer, Anand Vaidya, and two anonymous referees for useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Thanks also to 
the audiences at the GEM – Ground Essence and Modality conference in Helsinki in June 2016 and at the PLM 
Masterclass in Stockholm in June 2015. 
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Putting Modal Metaphysics First1 
 
 
Abstract 
I propose that we approach the epistemology of modality by putting modal metaphysics first and, 
specifically, by investigating the metaphysics of essence. Following a prominent Neo-Aristotelian view, 
I hold that metaphysical necessity depends on the nature of things, namely their essences. I further 
clarify that essences are core properties having distinctive superexplanatory powers. In the case of 
natural kinds, which is my focus in the paper, superexplanatoriness is due to the fact that the essence 
of a kind is what causes all the many properties and behaviors that are typically shared by all the 
instances of the kind. Accordingly, we know what is necessarily true of kinds by knowing what is 
essential to them in the sense of actually playing such causal-explanatory roles. Modal reasoning 
aimed at discovering metaphysical necessity thus proceeds via essentialist deduction: we move from 
essentialist truths to reach necessary truths. 
 
 
Introduction 
I recommend approaching the epistemology of modality by putting modal metaphysics first. In 
order to elucidate knowledge of modality, we should first have a good grip on what this knowledge 
is about. For we cannot hope to explain how we know the truths of a given domain without some 
conception of what constitutes the truths of that domain. (My focus here is metaphysical modality, but 
an analogous point can be made for logical modality, physical modality, and so on). Putting modal 
metaphysics first means prioritizing questions concerning the proper domain and scope of 
metaphysical modality, and what grounds this kind of modal truth as opposed to other modalities.  
                                               
1 Inspired by the title of Michael Devitt’s book Putting Metaphysics First, Oxford: OUP (2010). 
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More precisely, this is an essence-first approach to modal knowledge. Following a prominent 
Neo-Aristotelian view, I hold that the metaphysically necessary truths depend on truths about 
essences. There is a distinctive source of metaphysical necessity, which is located in the nature of 
things—specifically, in their essential properties. Accordingly, knowledge of necessity should be 
understood primarily in terms of essentialist knowledge. Metaphysical investigation guides us to 
formulate principled criteria for modal knowledge based on essentialist truth. 
Typical cases of metaphysical necessities (after Kripke’s Naming and Necessity) include 
fundamental kind membership, individuals’ origins, the constitution of particulars, and certain cases 
of the necessity of identity. In this paper I focus on the necessities involving natural kinds.2 Chemical, 
biological, geological, physical, and even astrophysical kinds are all good examples. So, for instance, 
the metal silver could not have had a different atomic number than the one it actually has, though it 
probably might have been blue and dull, rather than white and shiny. These are metaphysical modal 
claims which, I maintain, depend on facts about essence. But what is the essence or nature of a natural 
kind?  
My thesis is that essences have special explanatory powers for natural kinds—indeed, they are 
superexplanatory for the many properties and behaviors that are typically shared by all the instances of 
a kind.  
In philosophy of science, many agree that natural kinds are causally grounded. There is an 
underlying property or set of properties, or a mechanism, which causes the many properties and 
behaviors that are typically shared by all the instances of a kind. That crucially explains what is 
sometimes called the “epistemic fertility” of natural kinds: namely, the fact that they support a wide 
set of scientific practices including inductive, taxonomic, and explanatory practices. My proposal is 
                                               
2 For a discussion of other typical cases of metaphysical necessities, see Godman, Mallozzi, and Papineau: “Essential Properties are 
Super-Explanatory. Taming Metaphysical Modality” (ms.) 
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that this underlying causal core, or mechanism, is the essence of a natural kind. Essences cause the 
many properties and behaviors that typically characterize all the instances of a kind, and that is why 
they are in turn superexplanatory with respect to all such instances.  
We thus have a better grip on what it is about the nature or identity of a kind that determines 
modal implications; or what roles essence plays for the modal profiles of the instances of natural 
kinds—particularly, for their necessary properties.  
If this metaphysical story is correct, the modal epistemology of a wide range of cases is 
simpler than many have supposed. Essentialist knowledge is within our reach; actually, it is largely 
available to us already. For in many cases essentialist knowledge is empirical, scientific knowledge about 
the fundamental nature of kinds, particularly about their causal structure. Understanding what is 
necessarily true of silver is a function of understanding what is essential to silver, in the sense of 
actually playing the relevant causal-explanatory role for all the instances of this element. More 
generally, reasoning aimed at grasping metaphysical necessity proceeds via essentialist deduction: we 
move from essentialist truths to reach necessary truths. 
 
The Plan 
In section 1, I explain the modal metaphysics-first approach and situate it within the broader 
debate. In section 2, I lay out what I call a “constitutive” notion of essence in line with the Neo-
Aristotelian notion promoted by Fine and introduce a basic Kripkean bridge-principle for 
knowledge of necessity. In section 3, I propose that, in the case of natural kinds, such an essence or 
nature is characterized by distinctive causal and explanatory powers for the occurrence of all the 
properties typically shared by the instances of a kind. In section 4, I say more about the causal and 
explanatory powers of essence and address a few objections. In section 5, I explain how the 
Kripkean basic bridge-principle captures the metaphysical relationship between essence and 
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necessity and guides modal inference accordingly. In section 6, I take stock and make some 
conclusive remarks. 
 
1. Switching the Focus. Why Modal Metaphysics First 
Putting modal metaphysics first means elucidating the subject matter of modal knowledge as 
the basis to elucidate how we gain modal knowledge. The project might thus be seen broadly as a 
contribution to the attempt to meet, in the area of metaphysical modality, Christopher Peacocke’s 
Integration Challenge: namely, “the general task of providing, for any given area, a simultaneously 
acceptable metaphysics and epistemology” (1999: 1). Moreover, while discussing the nature of x 
before addressing the issue of how we know about x is generally a profitable methodology (because 
an answer to the latter issue largely depends on what x is), we see additional advantages in the case 
of metaphysical necessity. For we learn from the modal metaphysics that the epistemology of 
modality depends on the epistemology of essence. 
What I am recommending is in a way a return to modal metaphysics. The epistemology of 
modality of the past two decades or so (starting perhaps with van Inwagen’s 1998 seminal paper) 
might be seen as a whole as a response to much philosophy of modality up to that point, which had 
focused instead mostly on modal metaphysics. (Think of the enormous literature following the 
developments in modal logic in the 1960s and 1970s, and the many issues concerning possible 
worlds, their ontology, and the conditions for individual transworld identity in particular. Think of 
the work of Kripke and Lewis, and of all those who built off of their work throughout the 1980s). In 
the face of so much modal metaphysics, it then seemed natural to turn to the central question of how 
we know, or form justified beliefs about, such modal matters, and to the investigation of modal and 
counterfactual reasoning.  
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The dominant approach in the past twenty years has indeed focused on the analysis of the 
proper means (i.e., the methods, or cognitive-psychological processes) that we use in modal reasoning 
and in forming modal beliefs. This approach is widespread: it includes the family of so-called 
conceivability theories (Chalmers 2002; Yablo 1993; Menzies 1998); as well as those appealing to modal 
intuition (BonJour 1998; Bealer 2002; Chudnoff 2013); but also those theories variously appealing to 
imaginative exercises, counterfactual reasoning, and similarity reasoning (Ichikawa & Jarvis 2011; Kung 
2010; Williamson 2007; Roca-Royes 2016). These “means-first” theories, as I call them, may operate 
on the basis of specific notions of metaphysical possibility and necessity, and sometimes include 
some discussion of modal metaphysics. Accordingly, they may still be regarded as proper ways of 
addressing Peacocke’s Integration Challenge. However, it is not one of these theories’ primary aims 
to tackle the issue of the source of metaphysical modal truth; nor, a fortiori, to undertake the study of 
essence and its relationship to modality. 
Some question the idea that there is something uniquely “metaphysically significant” about 
metaphysical necessity (Clarke-Doane 2017). Others go further and assimilate metaphysical 
modality, depending on the cases, to the domain of physical modality, or logical modality, etc. (Priest 
“Metaphysical Necessity: A Skeptical Perspective” ms.) I will not take issue with such deflationary 
and skeptical views.3 There are a number of positive characterizations of “metaphysical modality” 
that we might consider instead. A classic reference is Naming & Necessity, where Kripke carves out a 
notion that is distinct from both physical necessity and epistemic necessity (“which might just mean a 
priori”). He encourages us to ask ourselves: “is it possible that, in this respect, the world should have been 
                                               
3 An even more radical challenge comes from recent forms of modal anti-realism such as Thomasson’s Modal Normativism (2007) and 
Sidelle’s Conventionalism (1989). These theorists deny that our modal language describes real facts “out there” in the world and offer 
non-descriptivist accounts of the meaning and function of our modal expressions. For Sidelle, modal claims are fully grounded in our 
linguistic conventions. For Thomasson, they express constitutive semantic rules of our language. They both think that these sorts of 
solutions in turn simplify the modal epistemology. Here I am granting that our modal notions track genuine modal facts—specifically, 
facts about essence—which are independent of the way we shape the world linguistically or conceptually. My aim is to clarify what 
those essentialist facts are, which in turn I also believe simplifies the modal epistemology for a wide range of cases. This is a 
fundamental contrast between “conventionalism” vs. “realism” about essence and modality worth exploring further (cf. Vaidya 2017). 
(Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me on this issue).  
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different from the way it is?” (1980: 36. My emphasis). He further characterizes this as “absolute 
necessity” and “necessity tout-court”, as well as “necessity in the strongest sense”. Some of the Kripkean 
glosses are still popular in the literature (Fine 2005; Hale 2013; Kment 2014); while others have been 
added. For example, some classify metaphysical modality within the category of the so-called 
“objective” modalities; in fact, as the “broadest objective modality” (Williamson 2016; Vetter 2016). 
My view is that we have a grip on a notion of possibility and necessity that is both (a) 
different at least from matters of logical-conceptual coherence and apriority; and (b) de re in the 
sense of being dependent on the fundamental nature of things or their essences. I take those to be 
the most general, distinctive features of metaphysical modality. This characterization lines up with 
the notion adopted within the Neo-Aristotelian camp lead by Fine, as well as the Kripkean notion, 
while also being compatible with the idea that metaphysical modality has objective status. 
Furthermore, a modal-metaphysics, essence-first approach helps us address what might be 
regarded as the central problem for modal epistemology. We need suitable constraints for modal 
reasoning and imaginative exercises, so as to ensure (or at least enhance the chances) that they result 
in true beliefs. Vaidya and Wallner call this the problem of “Modal Epistemic Friction” (in “The 
Epistemology of Modality and the Problem of Modal Epistemic Friction”, ms.) In order for our 
conceivability, counterfactual, and other imaginative exercises to reliably capture modal truth, there 
must be some kind of push-back, or friction, to make sure that they do not lead us astray but rather 
capture genuine possibility and necessity. It is thus crucial to understand what the correct constraints 
for each particular modal sub-field are, and in virtue of what they lead us to correct modal judgment.  
I am suggesting that integrating this bit of essentialist theorizing might prove fruitful to get a 
better grip on the constraints for the sub-field of metaphysical modality—for those, I maintain, are a 
function of essentialist truth. By locating the source of metaphysical necessity in facts about the 
fundamental makeup of the world, my modal metaphysics-first approach secures us with principled, 
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non-arbitrary criteria for judging modal matters. We might compare an opposite, “a priori-conceptual” 
approach, which instead locates the source of metaphysical necessity at the level of our modal 
concepts—“in the rational domain”, as Chalmers puts it (2010: 185). This kind of modal 
metaphysics instead identifies metaphysical modality with conceptual truths based on our 
understanding of linguistic expressions and of the notion of metaphysical necessity. Thereby, it 
makes metaphysical possibility a matter of (ideal) coherence, rather than of what is compatible with 
the nature of things.4 
The broader philosophical atmosphere indicates that the project comes at an opportune 
moment, as we witness to an explosion of interest in modal metaphysics in the latest debates, 
especially the Neo-Aristotelian type here defended. Moreover, it is encouraging to see that several 
authors have recently developed an account of modal epistemology based on essentialist knowledge, 
thereby endorsing a modal-metaphysics, essence-first approach of the kind I propose (examples 
include Hale 2013; Jago “Knowing How Things Might Have Been” ms., Lowe 2012; Oderberg 
2007; Tahko forthcoming; Vaidya 2008; Vaidya and Wallner ms., cit.) However, to anticipate a little 
the following discussion, my account of modal knowledge differs from other essentialist accounts in 
the literature primarily in the way I characterize the notion of “essence”. My thesis is that essences 
are special properties that have two distinctive features. First, they have important causal and 
explanatory powers for how things are—indeed, they are superexplanatory properties. Second, essences 
are typically an object of empirical, scientific investigation. 
 
2. A Constitutive View of Essence 
What are essential properties? Following a prominent Neo-Aristotelian tradition lead by Fine 
(1994a), I hold that essential properties are not merely the necessary properties of things. We can 
                                               
4 For more on this contrast see my (2018). 
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distinguish between, on the one hand, a modalist conception of essence, for which essentialist notions 
simply amount to certain de re modal notions, namely metaphysically necessary properties and truths; 
vs. a Finean conception of essence, I call it “constitutive”, for which essentialist notions rather depend 
on the nature or identity of things. Essential properties make a thing what it is or constitutively 
determine what it is to be a certain thing. A thing is the very entity it is in virtue of its essence (cf. Kment 
2014; Hale 2013; Devitt 2008). Essences in this sense are also often said to be captured by Lockean 
real definitions, i.e., roughly, propositions that define the thing itself (as opposed to a word for the 
thing).5 
According to the constitutive conception, essences do not merely amount to necessities, they 
rather yield necessities.6 By contrast with the modalist account, which leaves the source of modal 
truth unspecified, the constitutive treatment clarifies that essentialist truths are a matter of the nature 
of things. Such a nature is what determines metaphysical necessities or what makes them true. In the 
case of kinds, which is our focus here, this fundamental relationship between essence and necessity 
can be expressed by the basic bridge-principle that: 
 
(E) If it is essential to x being F that it is G, then necessarily anything that is F is G7 
                                               
5 More precisely, we can distinguish between “essential properties” and “essences” for kind-membership. ‘P is an essential property of 
being an F iff anything is an F partly in virtue of having P’. Whereas, essences qua the sum or collection of the essential properties of 
an instance of a kind fully determine kind-membership: ‘P is the essence of being an F iff anything is an F in virtue of having P’ (cf. 
Devitt 2008: 345).  
6 Cf. Devitt “Defending Intrinsic Biological Essentialism” (ms.) 
7 Incidentally, for cases of individual essentialism we have a corresponding basic principle  
 
(E)i If x is essentially F, then necessarily x is F 
 
At the sentential level, (E) and (E) i can be expressed in a straightforward way with the Finean notation:   
 
(E)F  ☐xP→☐P 
 
which reads, “If a proposition P is true in virtue of the essence of x, P is metaphysically necessary”; where “x”, depending on the 
cases, stands for either an individual or a kind (I here leave out some complications discussed in Fine 1994b). See also Vaidya and 
Wallner (ms.), cit. 
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The constitutive conception expressed by principle (E) may help us gain a deeper understanding of 
some familiar cases of kind-essentialism. Take, for example, Kripke’s claim that necessarily gold has 
atomic number 79 (1980: 123). This suggests a more general connection between molecular 
structure and chemical kind-membership, such that 
 
(P1) If a chemical substance c has molecular structure M, then necessarily c has M  
 
We might well wonder what the status of (P1) is, namely how we know it. We may notice that (P1) 
instantiates Kripke’s conditional guiding our knowledge of a posteriori necessities:  
 
(P) If P, then necessarily P (1971: 180) 
 
Because of that, a natural thought is that (P1) is itself something that we know “by a priori 
philosophical analysis”, as Kripke remarked (ivi). But how can that be right, given that it took 
scientific investigation to find out about molecular structure?  
The answer is that (P1) follows from our overarching principle (E), together with an empirical 
premise saying that  
                                                                                                                                                       
It is important to stress that there is no direct entailment from (E) to the distinct thesis of Essential Membership: i.e., the doctrine that if 
an individual belongs to a kind it does so essentially (in Devitt’s terminology, “Individual Essentialism in Biology” ms.). According to 
Essential Membership, an individual I is essentially a member of kind K iff its having Ei (a certain individual essence) entails its having 
Ek (a certain kind-essence). So for example, a particular chunk of silver, call it Chunk, would essentially belong to the kind silver 
because having atomic number 47 is part of its individual essence. But that is not obvious. Granted that having atomic number 47 is 
essential to being an instance of silver, it is not clear that Chunk would stop existing altogether, i.e., it would go out of existence as an 
individual, were it somehow to lose or change its subatomic structure. A further nice example that I heard from David Papineau is a 
lead statue that turns into silver (imagine a conceptual artist making one). Arguably, the statue qua that very individual would still exist, 
though its kind-membership would have changed, from being a sample of lead to one of silver. Here I do not commit to non-
conditional individual essences, but only to the relatively uncontroversial principle (E)i. The intended moral is that knowledge of 
individual essence still requires careful investigation (but see Godman, Mallozzi, and Papineau (ms.), cit. for further discussion. I thank 
an anonymous referee for suggesting the Chunk case and pushing me on this point). 
 
 
50 
 
(C) Having molecular structure M is essential to being a certain kind of substance c 
 
In fact, especially in the case of natural kinds, we typically discover the essence of a kind 
empirically, as the result of scientific investigation. Thus, although Kripke did not say this explicitly, 
from his analysis we can take “P” to generally stand for some claim about a feature that we know to 
be essential via empirical investigation. In the case of kinds, the thesis is that instances of the original 
Kripke’s conditional (P) are true when an instance substitutes for “P” an appropriate statement 
about what is essential to a certain kind. We can think of many further cases similar to (P1), which 
follow in an analogous way from (E), plus its own version of (C), and lead to corresponding a 
posteriori, necessary conclusions. 
If this is correct, Kripke’s analysis of a posteriori necessities involves not only the familiar 
epistemic thesis that we need empirical information in order to know certain necessities. It also 
involves an embryonic or implicit version of Fine’s metaphysical thesis, namely the constitutive view 
of essence. More than that, Kripke’s epistemic thesis holds because metaphysical necessities are 
grounded in the way the world is or in the nature of things; or, equivalently, because essential 
properties are the source of metaphysical necessity. Fine’s essentialist insight completes Kripke’s 
inferential story: the bridge-principles support knowledge of metaphysical necessity because they 
embed essential properties. Their views look thus complementary: whereas Kripke focuses on the 
epistemic issue, Fine leaves that open and targets the metaphysical issue. But we can combine them 
in one organic positive view, according to which knowledge of necessity is the joint product of 
essentialist knowledge and knowledge of the bridge-principles.8 Following the constitutive view and 
                                               
8 I thus disagree with a certain reading of Kripke that wants him to hold a modalist conception of essence. His famous essentialist 
examples all appeal to properties that are distinctive of the individual or kind he considers (perhaps uniquely distinctive), in the sense 
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principle (E), “essence”, “essential property”, and “essentialist truth” are all more fundamental and 
more fine-grained notions than the corresponding de re modal notions, and give us a deeper 
understanding of metaphysical necessity—at least in the case of natural kinds.  
The broader consequence for modal epistemology is that knowledge of metaphysical 
necessity is typically the joint product of two things: essentialist knowledge on the one hand, and 
knowledge of the bridge-principles on the other hand, which are themselves based on principle (E). 
We might wonder how much progress we have made. For it seems that with this move we 
have just recast the epistemology of necessity in terms of the epistemology of essence. And we know 
that essences are often disparaged in the literature as elusive and mysterious, as some sort of relic of 
a pre-scientific era. I think that these criticisms are mistaken. Far from being hidden inaccessible 
entities, essences are rather things that we discover empirically. Actually, they are in many cases the 
plain object of scientific investigation, as we see most clearly in the case of natural kinds.  
 
3. Essences as Superexplanatory 
As anticipated, my thesis is that the essence of a kind plays a crucial explanatory role for all 
the instances of the kind. I should say something about natural kinds first. A very interesting fact 
about them is that they support many, many inductive generalizations. We can predict that 
unobserved members of the kind (members that are yet to be observed, members that existed in the 
past, or otherwise remotely physically located), will have the same many properties and behaviors 
that are typical of the observed members of the kind. These generalizations run along two 
dimensions of projectability: first, generality, that is, the projections cover all members of a kind. And, 
second, variety, that is, each kind supports many, many different generalizations (Khalidi 2015). 
                                                                                                                                                       
that they appear to be constitutive of the very nature of the individual or kind—of its identity. Think of the “internal structure” of tigers; of 
the genetic material of the Queen, and her particular biological origin; think of the specific chunk of wood that this lectern is made of. 
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Moreover, this is not only about inductive capacity, since kinds exhibit indeed a broader epistemic 
fertility, in the sense that they further support our scientific taxonomic and explanatory practices. 
We can describe and classify things as instances of a certain kind according to all their shared 
properties and behaviors. Crucially, we can explain all those features by appealing to kind-
membership.9  
But what does such a remarkable epistemic fertility itself depend on? What explains the 
global success of our scientific practices involving natural kinds? The point is not just that, in order 
to count as scientific, empirical generalizations have to be non-arbitrary and non-accidental—
namely, that there must be some sort of “nomological glue” that makes them more than 
correlations. The point is, rather, that there appear to be something which supports, at bottom, a 
great abundance and variety of generalizations that is uniquely distinctive of natural kinds. There is a 
reason why all the members of a kind share so many properties and behaviors. It would be indeed a 
weird huge coincidence if no such reason existed.10   
The answer is that there must be a common ground. There is a common cause—an underlying 
property, set of properties, or a mechanism—which explains all such occurrences. It is not a baffling 
massive coincidence, in other words, that all those properties and behaviors constantly co-occur in 
certain entities in nature. The causal ground determines kind-membership, and supports the whole 
range of projectible, lawful patterns and counterfactual dependencies that feature in the relevant 
scientific generalizations. More broadly, it explains the unique epistemic fertility of natural kinds.11 In 
                                               
9 One issue that I do not address here is the ontology of kinds or what sorts of entities they are (if they are entities at all). Not only 
would answering this question require its own paper; but, strictly, my view does not commit me to the existence of kinds (or 
properties, for that matter), since I am not quantifying over them. Take principle (E): this is a schema into which one substitutes real 
predicates for “F” and “G”, which means it is committed to Fs but not to F-hood. The central thesis presented here is neutral with 
respect to this issue, and indeed compatible with a variety of answers (ranging from kinds being some sort of universals to being just 
sets). 
10 Similarly, Devitt (2008); Millikan (1999), (2000); Papineau (1993), (2010). 
11 The causal structure of a natural kind might not be as simple as I am picturing it here. For Khalidi (2015), natural kinds are defined 
by multiple networks of causal properties. Causal relationships might thus not be strictly “horizontal” and “one-to-many” as I sketched 
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this light, natural kinds realize a distinctive fit or accommodation between our scientific epistemic 
practices on the one hand, and the causal structure of the world on the other hand (Boyd 1999a: 69). 
We may further note that this aptness to fit the aims of science, particularly its search for structural 
explanations, may well be part of what makes a natural kind “natural”. “Naturalness” might thus be 
thought of largely as a matter of possessing such unifying causal properties or mechanisms. Science 
is especially aimed at disclosing the causal structure of the world, and natural kinds exhibit such a 
causal structure—or “nature’s joints” in the metaphysician’s idiom. Accordingly, “scientific kinds” 
might be a better term choice than “natural kinds”.12 
The idea that natural kinds are causally grounded in this way has been circulating in the 
philosophy of science for quite a long time, sometimes under the name of “causal ground 
hypothesis” for natural kinds (Boyd 1980, 1991, 1999a, 1999b; Craver 2009; Khalidi 2013, 2015; 
Millikan 1999, 2000; Wilson 1999). The crucial point for our purposes is that this causally and 
explanatory powerful core is what I call the “essence” of the kind, and thus what constitutes the 
fundamental nature of the kind.  
Let us consider silver again, i.e., the element with atomic number 47. Having atomic number 
47 is the essence of silver because the specific number of protons (and subatomic configuration) in 
the nucleus of a sample of silver is what causes, given opportune environmental conditions, the many 
chemical and physical properties and behaviors typically shared by all those instances (e.g. melting 
and boiling point, electrical and thermal conductivity, disposition to combine chemically, tensile 
strength, color, and odor). Accordingly, having atomic number 47 also explains all those properties 
                                                                                                                                                       
them. Instead, the properties of a kind would be organized hierarchically and in web-like causal structures. Khalidi thinks that such a 
“hierarchy or series of cascading layers of properties” characterizes especially chemical elements. Still, his picture is consistent with the 
thesis that there is a single essential core or mechanism, which grounds the whole causal network and to which the various multiple 
relationships could be ultimately traced back. 
12 For a recent criticism of the idea that natural kinds depend on a core causal ground, see e.g. Slater (2015), who argues that natural 
kinds, although they may in fact be causally grounded, should be nonetheless defined in terms of the stability and cohesiveness of 
“cliquish” clusters of (superficial) properties. For a response to Slater, see Lemeire: “The Causal Structure of Natural Kinds” (ms.) 
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and behaviors that typically characterize silver. Silver is an extremely soft and malleable white, shiny 
metal. It actually exhibits the highest reflectivity and electrical and thermal conductivity of any metal. 
It is also rather unreactive, and resistant to corrosion. All those properties shared by all samples of 
silver qua instances of that element are caused and explained by its unique atomic number and 
subatomic structure, as reported on the periodic table. And that is why I call it the “essence” of 
silver: for having atomic number 47 is what actually plays those core causal-explanatory roles for all 
the instances of silver. 
The causal-explanatory account thus gives us a grip on the nature of silver, or what is about 
silver that determines, together with the environment, the typical features of all its instances.13 Some 
of those properties are also shared with other chemical elements qua members of the same chemical 
group. For example, other elements in group 11, to which silver belongs, like gold and copper, have a 
number of properties in common with silver qua members of that group. In particular, they also are 
highly light-reflecting metals, as well as excellent conductors of electricity and heat. We can think of 
chemical groups as higher chemical kinds; and themselves, in turn as included in even “higher” 
categories, such as metals, non-metals, and quasi-metals. Similarly, elements belonging to a certain 
chemical group share all the properties they do in virtue of certain common features of their 
subatomic structure, which causes and explains the occurrence of all the properties and behaviors 
typical of the group. Accordingly, we may distinguish essential properties that are uniquely 
identifying for being an instance of a certain element, from the essential properties that are tied to 
group-membership, and thus may be possessed by different elements. But just as the former are 
                                               
13 Strevens (2014) suggests that we think of kinds as “entangled” with such underlying core properties or causal mechanisms. Being an 
instance of silver, in Strevens’ picture, is thus more precisely a concomitant cause of all the properties and behaviors shared by all 
instances of silver. All Fs are Gs because Fs are entangled with an underlying core C, which in turn is causally responsible for all the 
occurrences of G in all the instances of F. Strevens’ analysis has the advantage of clarifying that being an instance of e.g. silver strictly 
doesn’t cause anything; and to allow for exceptions to the relevant causal generalizations. 
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necessary to being an instance of a certain element, so are the latter for certain elements to be 
members of a certain group. 
By contrast, it is merely contingent that silver is white and lustrous. Being so shiny plays no 
causal and explanatory role for the many, many other properties typically shared by all instances of 
silver; which is to say, being white and lustrous is not essential to being an instance of silver. Silver’s 
being shiny is rather one of the many properties that, in the right conditions, are caused and 
explained by a set of underlying core properties possessed by silver—specifically, by its distinctive 
atomic number.14 
By generalization from the element case, we can then conjecture that an analogous story is 
available in a whole range of cases, including not only other chemical elements as well as 
compounds, and minerals and stones; but also stars and planets, and perhaps also fundamental 
physical kinds, like massive objects. The substantive hypothesis is thus that something is an instance 
of a certain kind in virtue of a core of structural properties, or a mechanism, which, given opportune 
environmental conditions, causes and explains the many superficial properties and behaviors that are 
typically exhibited by all instances of that kind. If this is correct, there may be a scientifically 
grounded way to clarify in what sense essential properties constitute the “nature” of those kinds. 
When we talk, in a Finean fashion, of the “nature” of a kind, what we are pointing to is this causally 
and explanatorily powerful underlying core of properties, or mechanism.  
Importantly, like in all causal explanations, a number of other factors will be relevant to fully 
explain certain effects, e.g., contingent local environmental factors, but also the relevant laws of 
nature, and other broad background conditions, depending on the case. Ideally, one should be able 
                                               
14 Perhaps the story may be further complicated by adding that mass number (which equals the number of protons plus neutrons) also 
plays a role in the occurrence of the typical chemical properties and behaviors of elements. But note that the neutron number per se 
has only a slight influence on chemical behavior, which argues that the atomic number is after all the main feature responsible for the 
resulting properties. 
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to lay out the details of the whole causal structure underlying a certain effect. These are the sorts of 
“opportune environmental conditions”, mentioned above, which have to obtain in order for 
essential properties, or mechanisms, to produce their typical effects. Essential properties and 
mechanisms should always be understood as operating together with the environment, as well as the 
relevant laws of nature; and full structural explanations will ideally mention all the relevant 
surrounding factors. Take silver again. Its being white and lustrous is largely a consequence of a 
variety of metaphysically contingent nomological and environmental conditions, including e.g. the 
particular intensity and frequency of a certain range of wavelengths on Earth; the laws governing 
reflection as well as the nature of electromagnetic radiation; not to mention the particular features of 
the human eye and brain. It is plausible to think that had any of those conditions been different, 
silver might have been blue and dull, say, even if its atomic number were the same.15 
 In order for silver to be necessarily white and lustrous, some form of nomological 
necessitarianism would have to hold, according to which the laws of nature are metaphysically 
necessary (and perhaps also the relevant local environmental conditions would have to be stable 
across worlds). For example, if dispositional essentialism is right, properties have their identities 
fixed by their causal roles, that is, they are identified by dispositional essences.16 This in turn accounts for 
the laws of nature, which are taken to be a result of those causal behaviors. Laws spring from within the 
properties themselves, as opposed to being imposed, so to say, from without, whether by nature or 
by God. By being tied in such a way to the essence or identity of properties, the laws are themselves 
metaphysically necessary. Although fully compatible with nomological necessitarianism, and 
                                               
15 Contra Elder (2004). According to Elder, essential properties rather come in clusters held together by virtue of the laws of nature. 
All that matters for the existence of a kind is that “in combination they ensure, by virtue of the laws of nature, a package found in no 
other natural kind” (27). There appears to be no real distinction between the essential or underlying properties of a kind, and the 
accidental, often superficial, properties of the kind. All the properties possessed by an instance of a kind seem indeed essential to 
being an instance of the kind. Couldn’t silver have had a different melting point, say, if certain laws of nature happened to be 
different? Elder’s answer is that this would not have been silver—even if it still had atomic number 47 (39-41). 
16 See esp. Bird (2007) and Ellis (2001). See also Swoyer’s seminal paper (1982). 
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dispositional essentialism in particular, my account is neutral on the issue of the modal status of the 
laws of nature. 
Also importantly, the underlying essential cores belonging to the kinds we have looked at so 
far are typically intrinsic, in the sense that they are independent of the relative location in time and 
space of the members of the kinds. Put otherwise, those sorts of kinds seem to be characterized by 
stable, unchanging underlying structures. Ruth Millikan categorizes them accordingly as “eternal” 
kinds. Chemical, physical, and astrophysical kinds are for her all examples of eternal kinds, having a 
distinctive underlying core of structural properties, or a mechanism, with just the sort of causal and 
explanatory powers that I am describing. She calls such a core the “ontological ground of induction” 
(1999: 50).17  
Although in the case of chemical elements we can individuate their essence with a good 
approximation at the level of the subatomic particles, it is of course sometimes not easy to pin down 
exactly which properties or mechanisms do the relevant causal work. This should not be taken to 
undermine the essentialist picture, however. Often times we just do not know yet what the essence 
is—science progressively discloses the causal structure of the world. But even if such properties and 
mechanisms were in principle unobservable, that would still not affect the main point that structural 
explanations concerning all the properties shared by the instances of a kind appear to depend on an 
underlying causal ground that characterizes the kind (cf. Strevens 2014; Devitt 2008; Boyd 1980).18 
                                               
17 By contrast, for Millikan biological kinds are rather historical kinds, in that they are identified by their histories (1999). Similarly, 
Godman and Papineau (forthcoming), and the above-mentioned Godman, Mallozzi, and Papineau (ms.), where we hold that copying 
mechanisms from common ancestors play the relevant superexplanatory roles for biological species. Note that Devitt (2008), 
forthcoming, “Defending Intrinsic Biological Essentialism” (ms.) cit., and “Individual Essentialism in Biology” (ms.) cit., also defends 
a version of biological essentialism where essences have crucial causal-explanatory roles. In his view, essences are partly relational and 
historical, and partly intrinsic (largely genetic). 
18 An analogous point could be made in response to certain criticisms of Putnam’s example that water is essentially H2O (Needham 
2011; Tahko 2015). I take it to be a philosophically minor issue, and one that we can disregard, whether the molecular structure of 
water is exactly H2O, or rather something more complex. Whatever that structure or mechanism is exactly, we can identify it as what 
plays the relevant causal and explanatory roles for kind-membership. As Devitt puts it, the talk of certain specific essences, like H2O 
in the case of water, should be seen as “nothing more than a philosopher’s hand wave toward the scientific facts” (“Defending 
Intrinsic Biological Essentialism” ms. cit.: 12, fn. 21). 
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 4. Defending the Causal and Explanatory Powers of Essence 
I think that many metaphysical necessities can be understood by applying this causal-
explanatory notion of essence. This casts important light not just, of course, on what essences are, 
which is an important task per se; but also crucially on the source of metaphysical necessity, namely 
what grounds or determines those necessities. We have in other words a better grip on what in 
virtue of which a certain category of necessary truths hold or what they depend on. 
Philosopher of science, especially in the Quinean tradition, are usually critical of modal 
notions like essence and necessity, perhaps because they are afraid that these might be too 
“metaphysically loaded” and ultimately unscientific. But again, this is a prejudice that we should 
overcome. First, in investigating the causal structure of natural kinds with the goal of disclosing their 
fundamental nature or ontological basis, we also at the same time disclose modal consequences. 
Counterfactual reasoning based on core causal features of kinds plays central role in formulating 
scientific generalizations; and it does involve evaluating non-actual scenarios or other possible 
worlds, which are not mere nomological duplicates of the actual world. Moreover, essences fall 
squarely within a scientific description of the world because they are simply underlying causal cores 
having superexplanatory character.  
On the other hand, we may note a potential corresponding suspicion on the side of 
metaphysicians, who might raise doubts about a “naturalized” conception of essence. Particularly, 
some might find the claim that the defining features of essences are causal powers suspicious. 
Essence is often associated to claims of non-causal ontological dependence. As Bennett has recently 
put it, the received view seems to be that “causal and non-causal determination are rather different 
beasts” (2017: 67). In response, I shall stress again that investigating the nature of things is 
importantly partly a matter of trying to disclose their causal structure, especially when the inquiry 
 
 
59 
concerns natural kinds. But I should also say something else. Let us take, for example, 
microessentialism for chemical compounds, which holds that possessing a certain molecular 
composition is essential to being a certain kind of chemical substance. For example, having a 
microstructure (to a good approximation) H2O is essential to being a sample of water. According to 
the non-causal analysis, the essentialist claim amounts to saying that hydrogen and oxygen atoms are 
“ontologically prior” to the substance water; or, according to some, that the existence of a molecule 
of water is “grounded” in the existence of the underlying atoms of hydrogen and oxygen. 
But the causal and the non-causal form of determination, and the corresponding 
explanations, are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, both analyses may capture important 
aspects of the nature or identity of a chemical substance, particularly the relationship between its 
microstructure or fundamental composition and its macrostructure or superficial properties. The 
non-causal or grounding analysis treats the structural properties of a substance as what in virtue of 
which something counts as an instance of that substance, and results in non-causal, mereological 
explanations concerning the deep composition of those instances. This analysis thus pursues broad 
conditions of existence as well as compositional truths concerning chemical substances, which have 
distinctive modal, necessary consequences. The causal analysis, on the other hand, also holds that 
the structural properties of a substance are what in virtue of which something counts as an instance 
of that substance; but it further tells us that those structural properties, when the conditions are 
right, cause the superficial properties that are shared by all the instances of that substance. This 
analysis thus results in causal and structural explanations, and pursues truths capturing the causal 
structure of natural kinds. Importantly, this, too, entails modal, necessary, truths that are tied to the 
nature of substances. Thus, more generally, both the causal and the non-causal analyses may count 
as pursuing metaphysical, essentialist explanation; and we might indeed think of putting them together 
in fruitful cooperation. The intra-world behavior of essential properties of natural kinds may thus be 
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captured partly by a “horizontal” causal analysis, and partly by a “vertical” non-causal analysis, each 
having cross-world modal implications that are tied to the nature of the kind. Together, the two may 
lead us to develop a more complete account of the nature of such kinds. Causal and non-causal 
forms of determination may not be such different beasts after all.19  
Turning to the explanatory power of essences—better, their superexplanatory power—this is 
also partly a reflection of their causal roles. The capacity of explaining so many generalizations 
involving the properties and behaviors of things is a central desideratum of both scientific and 
metaphysical inquiry. Specifically, “explanation” here should be understood as (a) fully objective or 
metaphysical; and (b) of central interest for both the natural sciences and metaphysics. Point (a) 
stresses that this type of explanation is not merely subjective or otherwise dependent on particular 
human interests or goals. Certain relationships between things, which are informative and 
explanatory when discovered, are actually “out there” in the world independently of those 
discoveries and our particular formulations. Those are structural explanations, as opposed to 
epistemic ones. Point (b) stresses that the explanations in question address crucial questions for both 
scientific and metaphysical inquiry, because they appeal to causal patterns in nature that are 
ultimately tied to what it is to be a certain (kind of) thing. 
Conceiving essentialist explanation as both objective and tied to causation also helps us 
answer certain skeptical objections concerning kind-essentialism. Why should a certain property or 
set of properties of a natural kind be “elevated” above all the others? Silver has many other 
properties, especially extrinsic and social properties, like being used for manufacture of silverware 
and jewelry, or being valuable to us human beings. Why couldn’t any of those properties turn out to 
play the relevant causal and explanatory roles for identifying the kind silver? What if the biggest 
                                               
19 This is also Bennett’s stance. We can think of causal and non-causal determination as part of the same family, which she calls 
“building”. Importantly, as she remarks, “the class of building relations—causation together with vertical building—is unified not just 
on the cheap, but in explanatorily useful ways” (2017: 103. My emphasis). 
 
 
61 
overall causal-explanatory factor for being (an instance of) silver is that, say, people like to make 
forks out of it? And what would prevent us from taking some completely arbitrary description—say, 
a child’s first sentence about silver—to pick out the essence of silver?20  
In response: first, let us not lose sight of our goal here. What we are pursuing are non-
arbitrary, non-accidental conditions that explain all the properties and behaviors shared by all the 
instances of a kind. Children’s utterances are simply not significantly related to those properties and 
behaviors; whereas the sort of ontological ground that I have identified as the “essence” of the kind 
is. For that is properly what causes all such properties and behaviors. That is the reason why we 
should “elevate it” above all the other properties that characterize the kind. In the case of silver, the 
chemical properties and behaviors shared by all its instances are certainly not the product of people’s 
feelings about silver. By focusing on the social properties of silver, in other words, we miss the target 
of clarifying what in virtue of which something is a sample of silver. Indeed, every sample of silver 
would have the chemical properties and behaviors it does even if there were not, or had never been, 
anyone around to appreciate those qualities, let alone make forks out of it. 
More generally, we can certainly single out and name all sorts of kinds, as many as we please. 
But note, first, that what then does or does not go into the kind is not up to us. That it is rather 
determined by how the world is (think of a bunch of random things that we decide belong to the 
same kind simply because they are all from New York: say, the Empire State Building, my super Joe, 
the Yankees, and the delicious everything bagels). Second, things are clearly different when we turn 
to scientific kinds. Then it is not a matter of our frivolous classificatory intentions. Instead, there is an 
underlying goal of progressively discovering the causal structure of the world. To be sure, in some 
cases we might found out that we were wrong and a certain kind actually depended on something 
                                               
20 Thanks to Jonathan Schaffer for raising a version of this objection. For a classic criticism of kind-essentialism centered on the idea 
that traditional categories like “essence” and “kind” have pragmatic, interest-dependent roles, especially in biology, see Dupré, e.g. 
(1993). 
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different than what we had initially thought. We might mistakenly identify a certain property for its 
essence, in other words. But note that in such cases, like the chemical elements that we have been 
considering so far, we would need a scientific story for why that counted as a mistake, as well as for 
identifying another property as the actual essence of the kind. That story could not be based on our 
social customs or personal feelings; it would have to invoke instead the causal structure of the kind.21 
To take stock. The account I propose shares the central tenets of traditional kind-
essentialism from Aristotle through Locke to Kripke, and develops them in light of the causal 
ground hypothesis on the one hand, and a Finean, constitutive conception of essence and modality, 
on the other hand. According to the hypothesis I advance, essences constitute the nature of kinds in 
two different respects. First, essences causally bind together all the instances of a kind, thereby they 
underlie the structure of the kind. Second, they determine the modal implications involving the 
instances of the kind—essences ground or constitutively determine metaphysical necessities 
involving the instances of the kind. Both capacities are part of what we refer to as the “nature” of a 
kind. The causal capacity may be understood as part of the intra-world behavior of essence, at any 
metaphysically possible world. The modal capacity is instead distinctive of the cross-world behavior 
of essence. Furthermore, note that the latter is in some sense “fixed” by the former: what is essential 
to a certain natural kind at the actual world grounds or constitutively determines what is 
metaphysically necessary for the instances of that kind.  
In virtue of such combination of capacities, essences play a role for both scientific and 
metaphysical explanation, which is tied to the very nature of the kind. Furthermore, there should not 
                                               
21 Thanks to Michael Devitt for helpful discussion of this point. See also Devitt (1991), esp. ch. 13. 
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be any residual question that essential properties are somewhat elusive or mysterious. They are 
rather ordinary and accessible properties: the properties that are, typically, of interest in science.22 
 
5. From Knowledge of Essence to Knowledge of Metaphysical Necessity 
I call “reductionists” those who think, like I do, that once we have a grip on the metaphysics of 
essence we have all the elements in place to understand our knowledge of metaphysical modality (e.g. 
Lowe 2012; Hale 2013). From a reductionist point of view, there is a direct route, so to say, from the 
epistemology of essence to the epistemology of modality. Accordingly, elucidating the metaphysics 
of essence further enables us to resolve both epistemologies at once.23 
An immediate problem that we can put aside is how we know essential properties. We may take 
reductionists to have a straightforward answer, at least if they endorse the view recommended so far 
for the case of natural kinds. Our knowledge of essential properties in those cases is simply 
knowledge of the relevant structural core properties, or mechanisms, having the relevant causal and 
explanatory powers for all the instances of the kind, as identified by the results of the natural 
sciences.  
However, it is important to stress that, for the reduction to go through, knowledge of 
essential properties is not strictly sufficient. We further need to know specific bridge-principles 
                                               
22 I assume that we can generally trust the scientific knowledge that is already available to us and that we can use it to make progress in 
modal epistemology. Fischer (2016) raises the question how we know the scientific theories themselves, and how we can trust that our 
philosophical interpretations of such theories are correct. One of his worries is that some modal knowledge might be needed to assess 
those theories in the first place. These are crucial questions for both the epistemology of science and of metaphysics, and like Fischer, 
I am not aiming to answer them. Note however a crucial difference between Fischer’s and my view. Fischer has a deflationary view of 
modal epistemology, which is based on knowledge of theories. If Fischer's view gives us modal knowledge on the cheap from non-
modal theories, such as chemistry, then he needs to make sure that we never adopt a theory in virtue of modal knowledge, on pain of 
circularity. But no such a problem arises for my view. 
23 What about all the other modal knowledge that needs explaining, especially the necessities of logics and mathematics, as well as 
conceptual necessities and normative necessities? The crucial problem is that in those areas empirical factors do not seem to 
contribute to knowledge of necessity. Specifically, we do not seem to have any causally-mediated connection to their relevant objects, 
e.g. numbers, or sets. One might perhaps develop an analogous story for such cases of purely a priori necessities—as I call them—trying 
to preserve the general thesis that essences have “superexplanatory” powers. One could, for example, appeal to conceptual entailments 
from real definitions as the analogues of causal connections from essential properties and mechanisms. Clearly, addressing those issues 
adequately requires its own paper, which is why I leave it to future work. (Thanks to Paul Boghossian for pressing me on this issue).  
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connecting actual essentialist truths with their modal necessary implications24, the most basic of 
which is the above introduced 
 
(E) If it is essential to x being F that it is G, then necessarily anything that is F is G  
 
Specifically, knowledge of metaphysical necessity proceeds inferentially from knowledge of 
essence, following Kripkean bridge-principles of the sort ‘If a chemical element e has subatomic 
structure S, then necessarily e has S’; where this, in turn, is supported by the overarching bridge-
principle (E), plus the empirical premise stating that having a certain atomic number is essential to 
being a certain element. If having atomic number 47 is essential to being (an instance of) silver, then 
necessarily anything that is an instance of silver has atomic number 47.25 These Kripkean bridge-
principles capture the metaphysical connection between essence and necessity and support our 
inferences from essentialist truths to metaphysically necessary truths accordingly. In this way, they 
contribute to justify those inferences from knowledge of particular essential properties to knowledge 
of the corresponding metaphysical necessities, and provide the desired extra-component for 
knowledge of necessity, besides essentialist knowledge. Without such principles, our modal 
inferences appear unsupported. Any serious attempt at elucidating the justification of our modal beliefs 
thus needs to incorporate such principles.  
                                               
24 Compare Horvath’s criticism of Lowe’s account of modal knowledge (2014). Horvath crucially draws the general moral that 
essence-based accounts of modal knowledge need to integrate knowledge of the fundamental connection between essence and 
metaphysical necessity. Tahko (2016: 34-35) disagrees. For him, reductionism just follows from a Finean constitutive conception of 
essence. While this may be true, nonetheless I do not think that it exonerates us, for epistemological purposes, from making 
knowledge of that underlying connection explicit. Similarly, Vaidya and Wallner (ms.) cit. 
25 We can further specify two sub-principles of (E), depending on whether we are considering essential properties or essences:  
 
(E)p  If E is an essential property of being an F, then necessarily anything that is an F has E 
(E)e  If E is the essence of being an F, then necessarily anything that has E is an F 
If, as I hold, having a certain atomic number is the essence of being an instance of a certain element, then as per (E)e we should 
conclude that e.g. necessarily anything that has atomic number 47 is an instance of silver.  
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At the most basic level, principle (E) makes clear that metaphysical necessities are grounded 
in essentialist facts. By explicitly embedding an essential property or set of essential properties “F”, 
(E) improves Kripke’s original conditional, ‘If P, necessarily P’, by clarifying what in virtue of which 
all the metaphysically necessary truths are true. (E) draws attention to the content of the empirical 
premises that feature in modal inference; and, in this way, it also sets a working framework for 
potential new cases and expanding on Kripke’s original examples. Principle (E) thus holds at 
the metaphysical-constitutive level because it expresses the fundamental relationship between essence 
and metaphysical necessity. But it also holds at the epistemological-normative level because it shows how 
correct modal inference to metaphysical necessity goes, based on that fundamental relationship. 
 Moreover, (E) is a priori, as it expresses the fundamental connection between the actual and 
the non-actual (necessary). It is a familiar point that empirical knowledge of the actual world cannot 
give us access to the non-actual, which is something that structurally or by its very nature cannot be 
an object of empirical observation and experience. (One might draw a comparison with the 
analogous case of induction).26 Nonetheless, this should not throw us into deep modal skepticism. 
The epistemology of other important areas of knowledge where we similarly seem to lack 
experiential connections with their objects, primarily logic and mathematics, also requires that we 
resort to some form of a priori justification in order to explain how we support the relevant beliefs.27 
The structural lack of experiential connection with the non-actual thus simply shows that modal 
knowledge is importantly partly a priori. We need an a priori step of some sort (inferential, or 
intuition-based) to contribute to justify those beliefs that go beyond our experience of the actual 
world. Principle (E) supports such a step, and accordingly is itself a priori. Indeed, it is analytic—on a 
                                               
26 For an opposite view, see e.g. Strohminger (2015), who argues that we have perceptual knowledge of possibility. Indeed, a number 
of authors in the literature have recently advocated a sharply empirical turn in modal epistemology, often with the goal of eschewing 
traditional a priori means for knowledge of metaphysical modality (e.g. Bueno and Shalkowski 2015; Fischer and Leon 2017; Vetter 
2016). But note also that there has already been an opposite push-back (see Mallozzi: forthcoming).  
27 Cf. the classic Benacerraf (1973). 
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Finean, “thick” notion of analyticity that captures truth in virtue of the very nature of the concepts 
involved—as (E) expresses part of what the concepts of “metaphysical necessity” and 
“metaphysically necessary truth” pick out.28  
Finally, as anticipated, while all bridge-principles will have an a priori component by working 
as connectives between the actual and the non-actual realm, their conclusions will often come out a 
posteriori, especially in the many cases involving natural kinds. This is because discovering what plays 
the actual causal and explanatory roles for a kind, that is its essence, is an empirical matter. We 
typically carry it out within scientific practice, through considerations of empirical nature, particularly 
inductive and abductive ones. 
 
6. Conclusion 
I argued that knowledge of metaphysical necessities involving natural kinds is the product of 
essentialist knowledge concerning those kinds, together with knowledge of certain Kripkean 
conditionals that instantiate a basic modal bridge-principle. We discover (most) essential properties a 
posteriori, via scientific investigation aimed at disclosing the causal structure of kinds; while the 
particular Kripkean conditionals all involve an a priori inferential component. This approach to the 
epistemology of metaphysical modality puts metaphysics first and, specifically, essence first. Thus, we 
should focus on investigating the properties that constitute the nature of things, namely the essential 
properties, as well as the metaphysical principles that structure modal reality, namely the Kripkean 
essentialist bridge-principles. In the background of the project is the idea that metaphysical modal 
inquiry is an empirically informed inquiry into what is possible and necessary for the things of our 
world, given their nature. T. E. Wilkerson nicely pointed out that natural kinds “lend themselves to 
                                               
28 A further option could be that the principle is neither strictly a priori nor a posteriori. The friend of Williamson’s views would claim 
that its justification is perhaps “armchair”, as it seemingly straddles our ordinary epistemological categories (Williamson 2007, 2013). 
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science” (1988: 29). As it turns out, the essences of natural kinds lend themselves to us through science. 
The epistemology of metaphysical modality thus proceeds, via the epistemology of essence, hand in 
hand with scientific investigation.29 
                                               
29 I am grateful to Paul Boghossian, Michael Devitt, Boris Kment, David Papineau, Andrea Raimondi, Jonathan Schaffer, 
Tuomas Tahko, Anand Vaidya, Michael Wallner, and two anonymous referees for useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
Thanks also to audiences at the Saul Kripke Center in March 2017, at the Conceivability & Modality conference in Rome in June 2017, 
and at the Pacific Meeting of the APA in San Diego in March 2018. 
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Essentialist Constraints on Counterfactual Knowledge 
 
 
Abstract 
I compare my approach to modal knowledge—a form of Essentialist Deduction, which grounds 
knowledge of metaphysical modality in knowledge of essence—against Williamson’s 
“Counterfactual-theory” of modal knowledge. I discuss a number of problems that have been raised 
against Williamson’s theory, and argue that those all ultimately trace back to a common source. 
Namely, the failure to elucidate the proper normative constraints on modal reasoning. This is the 
central problem of “Modal Epistemic Friction” for modal epistemology (Vaidya and Wallner 
forthcoming). On the other hand, the “Essentialist Superexplanatory” account I defend successfully 
addresses the problem of Modal Epistemic Friction. For it clarifies (a) that the proper constraints on 
modal reasoning are essentialist constraints, and (b) that essences have distinctive causal and 
explanatory powers. As such, the Essentialist Superexplanatory account is an overall better choice 
than Counterfactual-theory in the epistemology of modality. 
 
 
 Introduction - Three Accounts of Modal Knowledge and the Problem of Modal Epistemic Friction 
In order to clarify how we know modal truth we need to first clarify the nature of modal 
truth. According to the approach I favor, metaphysical necessity depends on facts about essence, so 
that it is a consequence of the fundamental nature or makeup of things that certain features of 
things are metaphysically necessary. In previous work (2018a, Godman Mallozzi Papineau ms.), I 
gave an account of essences based on what I called their “superexplanatory” power. Essences cause 
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and explain many, many properties of individuals and (instances of) kinds, which captures the nature 
of those individuals and kinds. On the basis of this metaphysics of essence, we can build a 
corresponding modal epistemology. We gain knowledge of metaphysical modality based on 
essentialist knowledge, which is typically empirical, scientific knowledge about the causal structure of 
the world. More precisely, modal knowledge proceeds inferentially, on the basis of a basic Kripkean 
bridge-principle connecting the actual to the non-actual and necessary. I call this principle “(E)”: in 
the case of kinds, (E) says that ‘If it is essential to x being F that it is G, then necessarily anything 
that is F is G’. In the case of individuals, ‘If x is essentially G, then x is necessarily G’.  The theory I 
promote is thus an inferentialist theory, specifically a form of “Essentialist Deduction” (as Vaidya 
2017 labels it). Essentialist Deduction goes back originally to Kripke’s analysis of the necessary a 
posteriori (1971). More recently, it has been developed in a systematic form by Lowe (2012) and Hale 
(2013; 2018) and has gained increasing popularity in the latest debates. Among his latest promoters 
are Vaidya and Wallner (forthcoming), Jago (forthcoming), Tahko (forthcoming), and myself 
(2018a). Moreover, Essentialist Deduction seems the natural choice in modal epistemology for all 
those metaphysicians who endorse Fine’s Neo-Aristotelian reduction of metaphysical modality to 
essence (1994). 
Essentialist Deduction is also a main alternative to Conceivability-theory, which has long 
dominated the field of the epistemology of modality. In its broadest lines, Conceivability-theory 
argues that our imaginative capacities, when adequately constrained, give us knowledge of 
metaphysical possibility and necessity (I am thinking mostly of Chalmers’ Modal Rationalism, 2002; 
but see also e.g. Ichikawa and Jarvis 2012; Kung 2010; Menzies 1998; Yablo 1993). In previous work 
(2018b), I argued that Conceivability-theory as cashed out by Chalmers does not help cast light on 
genuine metaphysical possibility and necessity as traditionally pictured by Kripke, but it only safely 
ranges over logical-conceptual possibility under standards of ideal coherence. Essentialist Deduction, 
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on the other hand, offers a more promising alternative by getting straight at the heart of 
metaphysical necessity and de re modality. Further problems that have been raised over the years for 
Conceivability-theory include resorting to dubious notions of ideal coherence and reasoning (Priest 
2016; Worley 2003); presupposing a specific semantic framework, namely two-dimensionalism, which is 
fundamentally misguided (Bealer 2002; Soames 2005); failing to account for de re modality (Roca-
Royes 2011a; Vaidya 2008), and/or for strong necessities (Goff and Papineau 2014). (See also Chalmers’ 
discussion of a number of objections in his 2010: 154-205). More generally, there is a longstanding 
skepticism against epistemologies that rely wholly or in part on a priori methods, as these are usually 
thought to be carried out by some special sui generis faculty for accessing modal truths (as well as, 
typically, mathematical, conceptual, and normative truth. For discussion, see e.g. BonJour 2001; 
Boghossian & Peacocke 2000; Devitt 2005; Williamson 2007). 
A third leading theory in recent debates in modal epistemology is Counterfactual-theory. Here I 
am looking specifically at Williamson’s version (2007 ch. 5) (but see also Hill 2006; Kroedel 2012; 
and Kment 2014 and forthcoming). Williamson’s Counterfactual-theory assimilates our capacity for 
knowing metaphysical possibility and necessity to our capacity for counterfactual reasoning. 
According to Williamson, the ordinary cognitive capacities that we use in all sorts of everyday 
epistemic tasks also underlie our capacity for handling metaphysical modality. Williamson supports 
these claims by invoking certain basic logical equivalences involving modal and counterfactual 
operators, to the effect that statements of possibility and necessity can be reformulated by means of 
the counterfactual language in a straightforward way. On the basis of those equivalences, Williamson 
argues that we gain knowledge of what is necessary and possible by evaluating counterfactual 
suppositions via imagination. 
A main advantage of Counterfactual-theory over Conceivability-theory is that it seems to 
avoid the problems that arise for Conceivability-theory mentioned above. In particular, in the spirit 
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of philosophical “anti-exceptionalism”, we don’t need to appeal to “supernatural” ideal reasoners, or 
mysterious a priori faculties, which in Williamson’s view indicate “a bizarre lack of cognitive 
economy” (162) (but see Malmgren 2011 for an argument against this conclusion). For Williamson, 
modal knowledge can be easily explained within ordinary epistemology; whereas any residual 
skepticism about metaphysical modal knowledge quickly translates into skepticism about ubiquitous 
and uncontroversial ordinary counterfactual knowledge. As he puts it, “far from being sui generis, the 
capacity to handle metaphysical modality is an “accidental” byproduct of the cognitive mechanisms 
that provide our capacity to handle counterfactual conditionals” (162). 
On the other hand, we can see that Conceivability-theory and Counterfactual-theory have 
something important in common, in that they both fall squarely within what we might call the 
“traditional” approach to the epistemology of modality. This tackles the question “how do we know 
(metaphysical) modal truths?” by giving an account of the means or mental operations that we actually 
carry out when reasoning about modal matters. As I say, theories within the traditional approach 
prioritize the investigation of the means by which we gain modal knowledge, or “put the means 
first”.  
There is a crucial problem that all such “means-first” theories face. In order for our 
conceivability, counterfactual, and other imaginative exercises to reliably capture modal truth, they 
need to be somehow adequately constrained. Indeed, this may very well be the crucial problem for the 
epistemology of modality. I follow Vaidya and Wallner (forthcoming) in calling it the problem of 
“Modal Epistemic Friction”. There must be some kind of push-back, or friction, on modal reasoning 
to make sure that it does not lead us astray but rather capture genuine possibility and necessity. For 
our conceivability and other imaginative exercises may present to us a number of (ceteris paribus) 
equally plausible scenarios; while they do not also indicate which one is the correct one. It seems 
prima facie conceivable, for example, that water might have had a different molecular structure, or 
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that Saul Kripke might have been Rudolf Carnap’s son, say. But how do we know from those 
imaginings alone which ones are genuinely metaphysically possible? Recent literature in the 
philosophy and psychology of imagination has pointed to a corresponding problem in the case of 
practical everyday imaginative exercises. Even among equally “realistic” imagined scenarios, 
imagination does not tell you which one is the correct one. You can imagine, say, flying rocks as easily 
as you can imagine rocks falling down because of the actual force of gravity. You can imagine the 
couch going through the doorway as well as getting stuck in there. All such mental simulations 
might be equally realistic. Against recent enthusiasms for the epistemic roles of imagination, this can 
be taken to undermine the thesis that imagination is a source of knowledge (see e.g. Spaulding 2016; 
Langland-Hassan 2016; Kind & Kung 2016).  
But what are the relevant constraints for modal reasoning, and in virtue of what do they 
hold? The version of Essentialist Deduction I promote tackles the problem of Modal Epistemic 
Friction by prioritizing the investigation of the relevant constraints. This involves switching our 
whole approach to modal epistemology and putting “modal metaphysics first”. In order to answer 
the question “how do we know (metaphysical) modal truths?”, we need to first clarify the nature of 
modal truth itself, namely, what metaphysical possibility and necessity is. Having a metaphysical story 
about modality, in turn, helps us not only make the correct modal judgments; but also define the 
correct modal epistemology by telling us what those judgements depend on. Specifically, Essentialist 
Deduction holds that metaphysical necessity depends on facts about essence. In order to know what is 
necessarily true of things, we need to know what is essential to them or part of their fundamental 
nature. If this is correct, it is then a short step to safely reduce the epistemology of metaphysical 
modality to the epistemology of essence.  
My aim in this paper is to show that Essentialist Deduction is explanatorily more powerful 
than Counterfactual-theory, and that it avoids a number of problems that arise for Counterfactual-
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theory. In my view, those problems depend, at bottom, on a failure to clarify what provides the 
modal epistemic friction in the theory. Williamson’s method involves keeping certain “constitutive 
facts” fixed in the background while developing in imagination the supposition in the antecedent. 
He gives us examples of such constitutive facts throughout his discussion, so that we might build a 
rough list of which things in his view count as proper constraints on counterfactual reasoning. 
However, he does not give us a story of why those facts should be selected rather than others, or 
what distinguishes them from non-constitutive facts. To be sure, Williamson gives us an interesting 
empirical hypothesis about the psychological processes and methods that we actually carry out in modal 
reasoning. But he overlooks the normative issues of how or in virtue of what those are to be 
constrained, exactly, and why. This results in a poor overall explanatory capacity of his theory of 
modal knowledge. Essentialist Deduction, by contrast, provides an account of the relevant 
constitutive facts, thus addressing the crucial problem of Modal Epistemic Friction. As such, it 
constitutes an overall better option in modal epistemology compared to Counterfactual-theory.  
 
1. Williamson’s Counterfactual Route to Knowledge of Metaphysical Modality  
Williamson’s main thesis is that knowledge of metaphysical modality is a “special case” of 
knowledge of counterfactual conditionals. In particular, “the ordinary cognitive capacity to handle 
counterfactual conditionals carries with it the cognitive capacity to handle metaphysical modality” 
(136). The capacity for modal knowledge can be thought in other words as a byproduct of our 
capacity for counterfactual thinking.  
Williamson supports this thesis with an apparatus of logical equivalences between counterfactual 
operators and modal operators, which show that statements of possibility and necessity can be 
reformulated in counterfactual terms in a straightforward way. The two central equivalences are the 
following:  
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(N)  □A ≡ (¬A □→ ⟘)  
(it is necessary that A IFF if it were not the case that A a contradiction would follow) 
 
(P)  ◊A ≡ ¬(A □→ ⟘) 
(it is possible that A IFF it is not the case that if A were true a contradiction would follow1) 
 
According to Williamson, (N) and (P) show that “metaphysically modal thinking is logically 
equivalent to a special case of counterfactual thinking.” Consequently, “modulo the implicit 
recognition of this equivalence, the epistemology of metaphysically modal thinking is tantamount to 
a special case of the epistemology of counterfactual thinking” (158). By means of those equivalences, 
we come to know about possibility and necessity by developing counterfactuals in search for a 
contradiction, while keeping fixed certain constitutive facts in the background of our supposition. 
 Counterfactual reasoning is itself strictly tied to causal thinking, and plays an important, 
widespread role in everyday life. We resort to counterfactual reasoning in making choices and 
planning future action, in learning from experience, as well as in interpreting others’ behavior and 
apportioning praise and blame. Also, counterfactual thinking is a key theoretical tool in scientific 
practice, where we reason counterfactually in formulating hypotheses and predictions: “If it is a law 
that property P implies property Q, then typically if something were to have P, it would have Q” 
                                               
1 In quantified contexts, the following two equivalences also hold:  
 
(N)q □A ≡ ∀p (p □→ A)  
i.e., something is necessary IFF whatever were the case, it would still be the case, 
and  
 
   (P)q ◊A ≡ ∃p ¬ (p □→ ¬A)  
i.e., something is possible IFF it is not such that it would fail in every eventuality (159). 
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(141). In sum, “counterfactual thought is deeply integrated into our empirical thought in general” 
(141). 
Importantly, counterfactual thinking is for Williamson largely imaginative thinking—and 
typically, though not necessarily, quasi-perceptual imagining. In assessing a given counterfactual, we 
evaluate the consequent on the supposition of the antecedent by developing the supposition through 
an imaginative exercise, which typically involves offline simulations of our cognitive capacities. Also 
importantly, the exercise requires keeping certain background knowledge fixed within the scope of the 
supposition. As a main example of how this works, Williamson considers a case where a rock falls 
down a mountain and ends up into a bush. What would have happened if the bush had not been 
there? It is worth quoting Williamson’s answer at length: 
 
A natural way to answer the question is by visualizing the rock sliding without the bush 
there, then bouncing down the slope into the lake at the bottom. Under suitable background 
conditions, you thereby come to know this counterfactual: 
 
If the bush had not been there, the rock would have ended in the lake. 
 
[...] Somehow, you came to know the counterfactual by using your imagination. That sounds 
puzzling if one conceives the imagination as unconstrained. You can imagine the rock rising 
vertically into the air, or looping the loop, or sticking like a limpet to the slope. What 
constrains imagining it one way rather than another? You do not imagine it those other ways 
because your imaginative exercise is radically informed and disciplined by your perception of 
the rock and the slope and your sense of how nature works. The default for the imagination 
in its primary function may be to proceed as “realistically” as it can, subject to whatever 
deviations the thinker imposes by brute force: here, the absence of the bush. Thus the 
imagination can in principle exploit all our background knowledge in evaluating 
counterfactuals. Of course, how to separate background knowledge from what must be 
imagined away in imagining the antecedent is Goodman’s old, deep problem of cotenability 
(1954). For example, why don’t we bring to bear our background knowledge that the rock 
did not go far, and imagine another obstacle to its fall? Difficult though the problem is, it 
should not make us lose sight of our considerable knowledge of counterfactuals: our 
procedures for evaluating them cannot be too wildly misleading. (142-143) 
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Thus, according to Williamson, we can generally trust our capacity for assessing 
counterfactual conditionals to deliver the correct answers, as it is informed and disciplined by a 
whole lot of pre-existing knowledge concerning how nature works. Our imaginative exercises 
faithfully trace our cognitive capacities in an “offline” mode; so that Williamson’s thought seems to 
be that they inherit, so to say, the reliability of the ordinary perceptual capacities. Counterfactual 
reasoning is in other words an important source of knowledge, with widespread applications in 
ordinary life (see also Williamson 2016 for the role of imagination in acquiring specifically quotidian, 
non-modal knowledge). 
 Williamson’s story carries over, via the above mentioned logical equivalences, a 
corresponding account of modal knowledge. We gain knowledge of metaphysical modality via the 
same cognitive capacities and methods at play in the case of counterfactual knowledge. Concretely, 
in our example, we know that it is possible for the rock to have landed in the lake, for imagining away 
the bush does not lead to a contradiction. If Williamson is right, we have a straightforward picture 
of modal knowledge. In the spirit of philosophical anti-exceptionalism, we no longer need to 
postulate a special sui generis faculty for accessing modal truth. Incidentally, we might note that in 
Williamson’s view modal knowledge is not even strictly “a priori” as it has been traditionally 
characterized. Mostly because of the role of imagination and offline simulation for counterfactual 
thinking, the resulting knowledge is rather “hybrid” between traditional a priori-a posteriori 
classifications. As Williamson puts it, modal knowledge is an example of “armchair knowledge”, 
where experience plays a role that is not strictly evidential, nor merely enabling for the resulting 
knowledge. A strictly evidential role would result in a clear case of a posteriori knowledge according to 
traditional parameters; while a merely enabling role, e.g. in acquiring the necessary concepts via 
empirical means, would not affect the apriority of the resulting knowledge (Williamson 2013. I 
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criticize Williamson’s rejection of the a priori-a posteriori distinction in my “Imagining Shades of Red”, 
ms). 
  
2. Normative Modal Epistemology and Modal Epistemic Friction 
I see a central problem for Williamson’s account of modal knowledge. Williamson puts 
forward a speculative empirical hypothesis within what we might call “descriptive” modal epistemology, 
namely that part of modal epistemology dedicated to individuating the belief-formation processes 
and methods actually involved with modal reasoning. But Williamson’s hypothesis does not bear 
directly on issues relevant to “normative” modal epistemology. This aims instead to elucidate what 
constrains such processes and methods or in virtue of what those are correct or incorrect. 
Normative modal epistemology is in effect primarily concerned with answering the problem of 
Modal Epistemic Friction.  
While Williamson stresses the role of background knowledge of “constitutive facts” for 
correctly developing the supposition in a counterfactual conditional, it is not clear what this 
background information exactly is, and why it counts as “correct”. As a result, his theory of modal 
knowledge does not answer the problem of Modal Epistemic Friction, and has little explanatory 
power within normative modal epistemology. I think that a number of problems that have been 
raised by recent literature against Williamson’s theory all point in effect to the same failure to 
address the problem of Modal Epistemic Friction. I look at some of these problems next. 
 
3. Issues for Williamson’s Counterfactual-theory 
3.1 Logical Equivalences and Metaphysical Modality 
Williamson’s subsumption of the epistemology of modality under the epistemology of 
counterfactual conditionals relies on logical equivalences (N) and (P). But those are not 
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uncontroversial. In particular, in order for (N) to hold, one has to accept that all counterpossibles 
(i.e., counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents) are vacuously true. But this is actually 
the subject of heated disputes in the literature, as many defend false counterpossibles within a 
semantics that includes impossible worlds (e.g. Berto 2011; Berto French Priest Ripley 2017; 
Brogaard and Salerno 2013; Jago 2013; Nolan 1997; Restall 1997). Thus, insofar as equivalences (N) 
and (P) are meant to offer support for Williamson’s epistemological reduction, questioning their 
validity also casts doubt on the broader project. 
More generally, it actually seems wrong to think that logical contradictions directly bear on 
matters of metaphysical necessity and possibility. Counterfactually assuming that water is not H2O, or 
that Saul Kripke is Rudolf Carnap’s son, does not entail a logical contradiction. We might accept, 
perhaps, that there is a purely formal equivalence between counterfactual statements and modal 
statements as Williamson draws it, but with the important qualification that the modality at stake is 
logical not metaphysical. But if that is the case, and modal reasoning is actually a simple a search for 
contradictions, Williamson’s theory would only range over logical possibility and necessity, and 
merely give us a method to establish matters of logical truth. (Note how an analogous worry arises 
for Chalmers’ Conceivability-theory. However, Chalmers’ theory identifies logical-conceptual and 
metaphysical modality, and relies on considerations of ideal coherence to access modal truth. See my 
2018b).  
It is thus crucial to clearly distinguish between logical and metaphysical modality, and in 
particular to specify what the latter is about, or what sorts of modal truths it involves. In other 
words, we need a story about the nature of metaphysical possibility and necessity. Essentialist 
Deduction complies with these needs well. According to the version I promote, metaphysical 
modality in its most general characterization has two main distinctive features. It is (a) different at 
least from matters of logical-conceptual coherence and apriority; and (b) de re in the sense of being 
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dependent on the fundamental nature of things or their essences. Accordingly, considerations of 
logical-conceptual coherence may not be sufficient to cast light on metaphysical possibility and 
necessity, but knowledge of essentialist truths is further needed. I will say more about how to 
understand essence and essentialist truth according to my “Essentialist Superexplanatory” account in 
section 4. 
 
3.2 Constitutive Facts and Pre-Existing Modal Knowledge 
There is an easy way to resist the objection that Williamson’s theory only ranges over logical 
modality as opposed to metaphysical modality. As mentioned, Williamson’s method for applying (N) 
and (P) further involves keeping certain “constitutive facts” fixed within the scope of the 
supposition while assessing a counterfactual. As he remarks, “the imagination can in principle 
exploit all our background knowledge in evaluating counterfactuals” (2007: 141). Once we integrate 
this background information in our counterfactual supposition, we might effectively go beyond 
matters of strictly logical modality and deploy our search for contradictions to establish metaphysical 
modal conclusions. At several points Williamson indicates that knowledge of such constitutive facts 
will include general knowledge of chemical, physical, and other basic scientific facts, as well as some 
grasp of the causal-natural laws. More tentatively, our background knowledge might perhaps also 
include some essentialist principles— for example, Kripke’s principle of the necessity of origin, 
which Williamson finds “plausible” (161). Thus, developing a counterfactual supposition where 
water has a different chemical structure than H2O leads to a contradiction. So it does, probably, 
developing the supposition that Saul Kripke might have been Rudolf Carnap’s son. Whereas, 
developing a counterfactual supposition where the bush is not there in the falling rock scenario does 
not. 
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However, introducing those further requirements for counterfactual reasoning triggers a 
whole number of other issues. Several authors, including Roca-Royes (2011a, 2011b) and Tahko 
(2012) have pointed out that in this way our counterfactual evaluations seem to rely on pre-existing 
modal knowledge, rather than vice-versa. In this light, Boghossian also has a point that this might 
undermine Williamson’s whole project: “I am very doubtful that knowledge of modal claims can be 
reduced to knowledge of counterfactuals. It seems to me that, on any plausible account, knowledge 
of logical, mathematical and constitutive truths will be presupposed in accounting for our knowledge 
of counterfactuals” (2011: 490, fn. 1).   
We can guess Williamson’s reply. First, he would probably back off on the reductionist claim 
(he never really speaks of a “reduction” after all), and stress that his main thesis is simply that our 
capacity for handling modal claims is a special case or byproduct of our capacity for counterfactual 
thinking. This per se does not imply a reduction of modal knowledge to counterfactual knowledge. (It 
would be of course interesting to push Williamson to clarify what exactly the relationship between 
the two is). Second, he would contend that the counterfactual procedure does not involve pre-
existing knowledge that the constitutive facts are necessary. The background knowledge is just general 
knowledge about how nature works, which we fruitfully put to use in drawing modal conclusions as 
a product of the counterfactual assessment.  
Still, that does not exhaust the possible concerns regarding the required background 
knowledge of constitutive facts. On the contrary, there are several serious problems that emerge in 
this regard. 
 
3.3 Knowledge and Analysis of Constitutive Facts 
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What are the constitutive facts? And how do we select them among all other facts? We saw 
that based on Williamson’s suggestions, we might build a rough list of such constitutive facts. 
However, Williamson’s theory does not give us any principled criterion for individuating them.  
Thus, Tahko (2012) raises the issue of how to select the constitutive facts when this involves 
deciding between rival scientific hypotheses. For example, how are we to decide whether we should 
keep fixed atomic number, or rather nuclear charge, in counterfactual reasoning aimed at 
establishing modal truths involving chemical elements?  
More generally, we might point out that some things that are explicitly on the list are actually 
controversial. Take the causal and natural laws. These would come out as necessary within 
Williamson’s theory, while the received view seems to be rather that those are metaphysically 
contingent. On the other hand, some things that we would like to see on the list are actually not 
there. We saw for instance that Williamson is rather cautious with Kripke’s essentialist principles; 
even more so with matters such as the mind-body identity, say. His theory does not wish to speak 
about e.g. philosophical zombies, and how those might be relevant to deciding substantive issues in 
metaphysics (164). But one might protest that those are crucial matters to address for any purported 
theory of modal knowledge. In sum, the list of constitutive facts that we may gather from 
Williamson’s discussion is problematic because it is not clear what it does and does not include, and 
on the basis of what criteria we might decide that. 
Roca-Royes (2011a, 2011b) pushes an analogous line, and argues that for Williamson’s 
method to succeed, we need to know not only the constitutive facts; but also that they are constitutive, 
namely that those are the right facts to be held fixed in our counterfactual supposition. Roca-Royes’ 
objection is another variation on the problem of Modal Epistemic Friction. We need a story of what 
the correct constraints on modal reasoning are; specifically, we need a story of how we can tell apart 
constitutive and non-constitutive facts. But importantly, for Roca-Royes there is more than that: it 
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cannot be that we somehow just happen to tell those facts apart. In order to be able to put those facts 
to use in counterfactual reasoning, we further need to know that those are constitutive facts.   
From his externalist, reliabilist stand in epistemology, Williamson would likely reply that 
Roca-Royes sets the bar too high. For one does not need to know that those facts are constitutive, 
and thereby that they count as the right facts to be held fixed in counterfactual reasoning. Instead, it 
is sufficient that one is somehow reliably sensitive to those facts, so that “something short of 
knowledge is enough” (Yli-Vakkuri 2013). However, one might insist that relaxing the epistemic 
requirements in this way only superficially answers the problem. Vaidya and Wallner (forthcoming) 
thus argue that the problem re-emerges at the lower level. Even granted more relaxed epistemic 
requirements, for which, say, the subject only needs to have “some sort of epistemic access” to 
some criterion for discerning the constitutive facts, she still needs to be somehow acquainted with 
those facts in order to create epistemic friction and put them to good use in counterfactual 
reasoning.  
It may also be worth questioning who are those epistemic subjects doing the counterfactual 
thinking that Williamson has in mind.2 He seems to be referring to non-experts all along; indeed, to 
just about any thinker who might find herself engaged with those sorts of reasonings. We may thus 
suppose that, to the extent that people do keep certain facts fixed in actual practice, we (modal 
theorists) can read off a list of relevant facts out of what they do. But are people reliable here? Can we 
theorists trust the actual practice to track the correct normative constraints? A natural worry is that 
people’s practice actually misses a lot of things. Also, it seems merely accidental that people think in 
a certain way rather than another. Again, there is an important gap between descriptive empirical 
modal epistemology and normative modal epistemology in Williamson’s theory. 
                                               
2 Thanks to David Papineau for drawing my attention to this point. 
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Finally, Peacocke (2011) also targets Williamson’s appeal to the constitutive facts for correct 
counterfactual reasoning, though from a different angle. By contrast with Tahko and Roca-Royes, 
Peacocke questions not as much Williamson’s purported epistemology, but rather the underlying 
metaphysics. He complains that Williamson does not give us an analysis of the constitutive facts and 
how they are connected to modal facts. At bottom, Williamson does not clarify metaphysical necessity. I 
of course fully agree with Peacocke’s criticism, which I think hits at the heart of Williamson’s 
proposal. But Williamson might protest that this is not a fair objection. After all, it is not among the 
aims of his Counterfactual-theory to offer an analysis of metaphysical necessity, but only to show 
that our capacity to handle counterfactual conditionals is sufficient to handle modality as well (cf. 
Deng 2016). Asking for an analysis of metaphysical necessity might seem to go far beyond the scope 
of the project. Still, in order for Williamson’s theory to have some serious epistemological bearing as 
far as normative modal epistemology is concerned, it needs to integrate an account of the underlying 
metaphysics. While the theory is not required to give us a definitive account of metaphysical 
necessity, that is, it should at least further develop the analysis of the constitutive facts and their 
connection to modal facts. In general, it seems impossible to assess a claim about how we know 
about some area of reality without being told about the nature of that reality we are supposed to 
know. This is indeed the core idea of my “metaphysics-first” approach to modal knowledge, which 
instead tackles these issues head-on. 
In fact, Essentialist Deduction—and my Essentialist Superexplanatory account more 
specifically—scores better than Williamson’s Counterfactual-theory, since it offers a substantive 
analysis of the constitutive facts. As we are looking at typical cases of metaphysical necessity, the 
constitutive facts are essentialist facts. Moreover, we have a principled criterion for individuating those 
facts among all others. Essences are superexplanatory properties, or sets of properties, or mechanisms, 
thanks to the fact that they cause the many superficial properties and behaviors that characterize a 
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certain individual or (instance of a) kind. This criterion thus invites us to investigate, case by case, 
which properties play the relevant causal and explanatory roles for that individual or (instance of a) 
kind. In this light, essences are not mysterious as it has often been argued, but are rather the plain 
object of scientific investigation. The Essentialist Superexplanatory account offers just the sort of 
metaphysical analysis of the relevant constitutive facts that is required in order to cast light on modal 
knowledge.  
 
 3.4 Causal-Nomological Necessity and Metaphysical Necessity 
I remarked that it is an especially controversial claim in Williamson’s theory that the 
constitutive facts should include the actual causal and natural laws. But assuming that Williamson is 
right and those come out correctly as necessary, a different sort of problem arises. This mirrors in a 
way the first problem we encountered in 3.1 above—i.e., the one concerning Williamson’s purported 
logical equivalences. As we saw, taken by themselves, all that those equivalences seem to give us is a 
method to establish matters of logical not metaphysical modality. Now, the target is still the adequacy 
of Williamson’s theory to handle metaphysical modality; but the worry this time is that Williamson’s 
method merely leads us to gain knowledge of causal-nomological modality.  
In different ways, Lowe (2012), Deng (2016), Gregory (2017), and Thomasson (2018) among 
others, have all called into question the capacity of Williamson’s account to elucidate knowledge of 
metaphysical modality. Gregory contends that is not clear that the same sorts of considerations 
effectively bear upon mundane counterfactual judgments as well as metaphysical modal judgments. 
Lowe and Deng similarly argue that Williamson’s account only explains knowledge of causal-
nomological modality not metaphysical modality. The reason for this is that knowledge of 
metaphysical modality is subsumed as a special case of knowledge of counterfactual conditionals, 
where this is in turn strictly causal-nomological knowledge. Lowe worries that Williamson is then 
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“surely misrepresenting the metaphysical modalities as a species of causal modality” (2012: 932). 
Whereas Deng points to “a gap between the modality involved in our ordinary counterfactual 
thinking, which is usually causal, and the “metaphysical” modality properly so-called” (2016: 490). 
Thomasson (2018) raises this problem as well, while she further remarks that this not just a problem 
for Williamson’s theory, but a widespread problem in the contemporary debate. Other recent 
“empiricist” accounts of modal knowledge that are for Thomasson equally open to this objection 
include Vetter (2015), Bueno and Shalkowski (2015), Leon (2017), and Roca-Royes (2017). 
How does Williamson’s theory deal with traditional cases of metaphysical possibility and 
necessity on the basis of mere causal counterfactual thinking? How is the theory to answer 
distinctively metaphysical questions such as whether a zombie-world is possible? (Deng 2016: 480) 
Van Inwagen (1998) has famously distinguished between ordinary, everyday modal knowledge, 
which we can and often do have, vs. modal knowledge about concerns remote from everyday life. The 
latter is the sort of modal knowledge that is at stake in fanciful philosophical arguments—like the 
zombie case just mentioned. Van Inwagen is skeptical that this sort of modal knowledge is within 
our reach. On his part, Williamson explicitly says that his theory is meant to cover the ordinary cases 
rather than the more extravagant ones. That is still by all means knowledge of metaphysical 
possibilities, although admittedly only “close-by” possibilities. It should be no drawback to the 
theory that those cases are more tractable than the remote ones. On the contrary, we probably have 
an additional practical interest in explaining the “easy” cases first, as those are mostly directly relevant 
to the epistemic purposes of our ordinary lives. (Williamson is not alone in restricting the target of 
modal epistemology in this way. Similarly, Strohminger 2015; Leon 2017; Roca-Royes 2017). 
Fair enough. But these considerations seem to confirm the worry that Williamson’s theory 
does not address cases that are “metaphysical” in any distinctive sense of the term. Otherwise put, 
while his theory only safely ranges over causal-nomological possibility, it is less clear that it can cast 
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light beyond that into the metaphysical realm. Metaphysical possibility is covered only to the extent 
that it coincides with causal-nomological possibility; thereby it remains largely unexplored (I raised 
this worry already in my 2018b: fn.4). 
Once again, it seems that an analysis of the constitutive facts would help. What sorts of 
considerations do we appeal to when assessing modal claims via Williamson’s counterfactual 
method? We know his answer: our sense of how nature works, which is based on a vast amount of 
background knowledge, and especially on knowledge of chemistry, physics, and other sciences; and 
more generally on our more or less explicit grasp of the causal laws. This all seems correct. Indeed, 
we might note that Kripke’s own conception of metaphysical modality, which is originally behind 
Essentialist Deduction, seems often to take a similar turn, and perhaps to coincide with causal-
counterfactual modality. The Kripkean conception of metaphysical modality might in other words 
amount to nomological necessitarianism: causal-nomological modality and metaphysical modality 
coincide. However, as it is well-known, whether this is correct depends primarily on whether the 
laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. This is not an obvious matter; and perhaps not even 
something that we might be able to establish by a priori philosophical argument. Unless one is overtly 
eliminativist or deflationist about metaphysical modality, it is a substantive philosophical issue 
whether causal-nomological modality and metaphysical modality overlap wholly, or in part. That 
means that a theory of modal knowledge that wants to be neutral on this issue needs to have at least 
in principle the resources to address not only the easy “close-by” cases where the difference between 
the two is less obvious, but also the harder “remote” cases which would count as distinctively 
metaphysical within a non-reductionist framework. Thomasson puts it in terms of a general 
challenge for accounts of knowledge of metaphysical modality: “the distinctively metaphysical modal 
features at issue in characteristic metaphysical debates are cases in which we have the very same 
empirical information, and same physical laws and properties, and yet come to different modal conclusions” 
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(2018: 6, original emphasis). Thomasson’s point is that appealing to empirical facts and criteria is not 
sufficient to answer the relevant metaphysical questions. I think that this is correct, and that, in 
response, we need to bring in further considerations in assessing counterfactuals with remote 
metaphysical content; or we need a different general analysis of the constitutive facts. As I hold, 
empirical information is useful for the purposes of the epistemology of metaphysical modality once 
it is properly located within an essentialist framework.  
Accordingly, Essentialist Deduction can deal with this issue in a straightforward way. For the 
constitutive facts, as mentioned, are essentialist facts, and the sorts of considerations that guide 
modal reasoning do not just invoke causal-counterfactual principles, but rather distinctively 
metaphysical Kripkean principles connecting essence and necessity. Against this framework, we have a 
substantive story of how the modal knowledge we acquire is about metaphysical modality. And 
whether or not nomological necessitarianism is true, there is still at least an interesting conceptual 
difference between strictly causal-nomological and metaphysical modality. 
Furthermore, my own version of Essentialist Deduction, namely the Essentialist 
Superexplanatory account, directly connects essence and causal relationships. Essences are causally 
responsible for many of the properties characterizing both individuals and (instances of) kinds; so 
that in investigating the causal structure of the world we trace these causal networks all the way back 
to underlying properties and mechanisms. Those underlying properties and mechanisms are thus 
essential to being a certain individual or (instance of a) kind; that is why those are superexplanatory 
with respect to individuals and kinds. Moreover, this account gives us a grip on how essences 
constitute the “nature” of things in a genuinely metaphysical sense. The modal, necessary 
consequences that seem problematic and unexplained within Counterfactual-theory, are in my 
account instead straightforward consequences of facts about essence. We know about metaphysical 
modality by knowing the constitutive facts (chemistry, physics, biology, etc.) and about their 
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superexplanatory character, which is what makes them properly essentialist facts with their 
associated modal consequences. Causal-nomological modality and metaphysical modality are thus 
intimately interconnected via the notion of essence and the nature of things; though it is still a 
substantive philosophical question whether, and to what extent, they overlap.  
To take stock. All these problems we saw in section 3 can be taken as direct consequences of 
one common underlying problem, namely, a fundamental lack of clarity on Williamson’s part 
concerning what creates modal epistemic friction in his account. Williamson’s theory neglects to 
elucidate what the proper constitutive facts are, why they are constitutive, and how we can know 
them. While we can see an interesting empirical hypothesis about the means and processes by which 
we gain modal knowledge, Williamson’s Counterfactual-theory does not engage with the central 
concerns of normative modal epistemology. As a theory of modal knowledge, Counterfactual-theory 
has thus poor explanatory power and it is open to many objections.  
I anticipated that a theory based on Essentialist Deduction has instead the right tools to 
address the issues involving the constitutive facts, and thereby answer the central problem of Modal 
Epistemic Friction. I now turn to the details of my own version of Essentialist Deduction, i.e, the 
Essentialist Superexplanatory account, and give some examples. 
  
 4. The Inferentialist Approach to Knowledge of Metaphysical Modality 
Essentialist Deduction is based on the central idea that we can derive modal knowledge from 
knowledge of essence. Kripke gave an implicit formulation of this idea in the context of his 
treatment of a posteriori necessities (1971). He showed how we can come to know that certain 
empirical, often scientific statements are necessary, on the basis of the conditional: “If P, then 
necessarily P”. In all Kripke’s examples, “P” stands for some statement that not only we know to be 
true via empirical investigation, and so a posteriori; but also that distinctively involves reference to 
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what is essential to a certain individual or kind (see my 2018a; 2018b). In recent work by Hale (2013) 
and Lowe (2012), the method of deduction from essentialist truths has been developed in explicit 
and systematic form. This is done in particular against the background of Fine’s treatment of essence 
and modality (1994). Fine locates the source of metaphysical necessity in facts about essence, and 
contrasts this picture with a “modalist” conception that instead treats necessity as a primitive, which 
merely captures truth at all possible worlds (analogously for possibility). If the conception of 
metaphysical modality promoted by Fine is correct, it is then plausible that we have a corresponding 
epistemic route available, from knowledge of essence to knowledge of necessity.  
In my 2018a I developed an “Essentialist Superexplanatory” account, which understands 
essences in terms of their special causal and explanatory roles. Essences cause and explain the many, 
many properties and behaviors that typically characterize a certain (instance of a) kind, as well as a 
given individual. I showed how this in turn elucidates knowledge of metaphysical modality. We first 
gain knowledge of essence empirically, largely via scientific investigation. From there, we proceed to 
knowledge of what is necessary inferentially, on the basis of certain Kripkean bridge-principles 
connecting the actual with the non-actual and necessary. More precisely, these conditionals can be 
treated as instantiations of a basic bridge-principle, which I call “(E)”, explicitly connecting essence 
and metaphysical necessity. In the case of kinds,  
 
(E) If it is essential to x being F that it is G, then necessarily anything that is F is G 
 
In the case of individuals,  
 
 (E)i If x is essentially F, then necessarily x is F 
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Finally, at the sentential level, (E) and (E)i can be expressed in a straightforward way with the Finean 
notation:   
 
 (E)F  □xP→□P 
 
which reads, ‘If a proposition P is true in virtue of the essence of x, P is metaphysically necessary’; 
where ‘x’, depending on the cases, stands for either an individual or a kind. Importantly, principle 
(E) holds both at the metaphysical-constitutive level (because it expresses the fundamental relationship 
between essence and metaphysical necessity), and at the epistemological-normative level  (because it 
guides modal inference to metaphysical necessity, based on this fundamental relationship). 
Essentialist Deduction as cashed out by the Essentialist Superexplanatory account thus offers a clear 
and straightforward method for modal knowledge. 
 It is worth stressing that the Essentialist Superexplanatory account is meant to apply to 
distinctive cases of metaphysical necessity: i.e., traditionally, after Kripke’s Naming and Necessity, all 
those cases involving fundamental kind-membership, individual origin, the constitution of particulars, and cases 
of the necessity of identity (for examples and discussion, see Godman Mallozzi Papineau ms). On the 
other hand, I am setting aside a whole range of other necessities, including logical and mathematical 
necessities, conceptual necessities, and normative necessities. It is no surprise that such cases are all 
plausibly purely a priori. For these involve (relatively) uncontroversial abstract entities, which are 
structurally causally disconnected from the actual world and from us (cf. Benacerraf 1973). (I say 
more about these purely a priori necessities and their relationship to the distinctively metaphysical 
necessities in the Appendix below). 
The Essentialist Superexplanatory account successfully handles knowledge of all typical cases 
of metaphysical necessity and gives us a robust method to handle new cases as well. We gain 
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knowledge of necessity by inferring appropriately from essentialist truth, that is on the basis of 
principle (E) and its particular instantiations. And we know about essences empirically, mostly on 
the basis of scientific investigation, and in virtue of the distinctive causal and explanatory roles that 
those play for individuals and kinds. Once this is understood, we have a story of why in reasoning 
about metaphysical necessity and possibility we should proceed from facts about essences. In the 
language of Williamson’s Counterfactual-theory, we could say that we have an answer to the 
question why we should treat those particular facts as “constitutive”, rather than others, and hold 
them fixed in assessing the relevant counterfactual conditionals. The answer is because they are 
essentialist facts. Furthermore, we can give a story of why they are essential, or what it means to be 
essential more precisely. This provides an analysis of the constitutive facts and answers the problem 
of modal epistemic friction.  
 Drawing in part from previous work (2018a, Godman Mallozzi and Papineau ms.), I give 
now a few concrete examples of how Essentialist Deduction, by contrast with Williamson’s 
Counterfactual-theory, clarifies what the “constitutive facts” are and why they count as such. In 
particular, I show how the proposed account answers central questions of normative modal 
epistemology by appealing to the special causal and explanatory powers of essences.   
 
4.1 Natural Kinds. Chemistry and Biology  
Chemical kinds offer probably the clearest example of the superexplanatory roles of 
essences, and of how those reflect their distinctive causal powers. Chemical elements as well as 
compounds all display a similar structure: in normal conditions, samples of each kind share many, 
many typical chemical properties and behaviors. Thus, all samples of gold share the same boiling and 
melting point, the same capacity for electrical and thermal conductivity, the same combinatorial 
dispositions, and so on. How is that possible? The answer is that all these properties are caused by an 
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underlying core property, namely their atomic number (according to a specific subatomic 
configuration). Thereby, the atomic number of gold also explains all such properties and behaviors. 
Atomic number plays an absolutely unique role within the economy of properties of a sample of 
gold, which is why we identify it as the essence of gold. That is the fundamental nature of gold, or what 
determines all the actual typical features of gold. Accordingly, gold necessarily has atomic number 79. 
At all possible worlds, that is what identifies a certain chemical chunk as a sample of gold. (A parallel 
story can be told for chemical compounds, such as water, as well as for chemical mixtures, such as 
rocks and other minerals).  
Biological kinds are trickier. The sort of mainstream essentialism that draws from the views 
of Kripke and Putnam in the 1970s and 1980s is usually taken to claim that biological essences are—
not differently from chemical essences—fully intrinsic. A traditional reference is Naming & Necessity, 
where Kripke argues that tigers have a certain “internal structure”, and that is what in virtue of 
which, at any possible world, something is a tiger, regardless of its superficial features (1980: 120-
121). However, the consensus in the philosophy of biology (insofar as theorists refer to “essences” 
at all) is to reject that essences are intrinsic. Philosophers of biology rather treat essences as relational 
and historical: what determines kind-membership is having a certain history. In previous joint work 
with Godman and Papineau (ms.), we took a similar line, arguing that appealing exclusively to 
intrinsic components does not have the sort of explanatory power that historical and, particularly, 
copying mechanisms have for all the phenotypic features of the members of a species. More precisely, 
first of all, an explanation merely in terms of intrinsic essences fails to deal with non-genetic 
inheritance and non-sexual reproduction (Papineau and Godman forthcoming). Second, and most 
importantly, it is the copying mechanism from common ancestors having certain features, which 
explains why all those same features co-occur in the members of a certain species. In other words, 
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the essence of the species is the copying mechanism involving those particular properties because that is 
what plays the superexplanatory role for all the members of a species.  
Note that the account we propose is not the only way to spell out biological essentialism in 
terms of core causal and explanatory powers. In a series of recent papers, Devitt has also elaborated 
the traditional Kripke-Putnam line with regards to biological taxa, particularly species (2008, 
forthcoming a, forthcoming b, ms). Devitt holds that there is an underlying, intrinsic, “largely 
genetic” component to the essence of a biological species, which causes, given appropriate 
environmental conditions, the distinctive phenotypic features of the members of a species. 
Accordingly, this intrinsic component is at the basis of structural or “proximal” explanations in 
biology. On the other hand, Devitt also goes along with the consensus and grants a further relational 
and, specifically, historical component to the essence of a species, which is responsible for the origin 
of the species. This other component is instead at the basis of evolutionary and historical 
explanations in biology. Thus, in Devitt’s view essences are tied to causal roles and explanation in a 
crucial way, like the Essentialist Superexplanatory account, at least in its general lines, predicts. 
 In conclusion, in the case of essences of kinds, we have a story of why those count properly 
as constitutive facts within a theory of modal knowledge. For they play special causal and 
explanatory roles for all the instances of a kind. That gives us a principled reason why they count as 
“essential”, and a clear sense of how to distinguish them from the non-constitutive or merely 
accidental facts. 
 
4.2 Individual Origin 
The superexplanatory account of essences also gives us the tools to handle metaphysical 
necessities involving individuals (I am drawing here from our discussion in Godman Mallozzi and 
Papineau ms.) We can treat individuals as similar to historical kinds, by thinking of the different 
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stages of an individual’s history virtually as multiple instances of that individual. Like in the case of 
the instances of a kind, all the stages of an individual will then share many, many properties. What is 
that plays the relevant causal and explanatory role for all such properties in this case? Similarly to the 
case of biological taxa, it is plausible to think that it is the individual’s origin that plays the relevant 
roles; and thus that origin is essential to being a certain individual. Each stage in the individual’s 
history can thus be thought of as a copy of the previous one, all the way back to the individual’s 
origin. Although it is likely that many properties would change over time throughout an individual’s 
history, the particular origin will explain all the many stable properties that characterize that 
individual. We thus conclude that the original stage of any individual is essential to it. “Necessarily, 
something is a stage of a given Individual only if it descends from that particular origin” (17). 
 
4.3 Zombies?  
 Could there be zombies, i.e., beings that are physically identical to us but that lack 
consciousness entirely? As it is well-known, the answer to this question it thought to have the 
potential to settle once and for all the problem of the relationship between the mental and the 
physical. If zombies are possible, the mental is not fully reducible to the physical. If they are not 
possible, on the other hand, several options open up regarding the correct account of the 
relationship between the two—whether identity, supervenience, grounding, and so on. (I won’t get into the 
technicalities of this literature). The zombie case seems to fall squarely within distinctively 
metaphysical modal speculation. Indeed, it is paradigmatic of Conceivability-theory as developed by 
Chalmers (2002); and, as we saw, it has also been presented as a challenge for Counterfactual-theory 
as developed by Williamson. For empirical knowledge and causal-counterfactual thinking do not 
seem sufficient to give us an answer (Deng 2016; Thomasson 2018).   
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How does Essentialist Deduction as cashed out by the Essentialist Superexplanatory account 
deal with the zombie case? It might seem that in this respect we are not better off than 
Counterfactual-theory. How could appealing to empirical knowledge of essence help here?  
In response. First of all, I should stress that the Essentialist Superexplanatory account does 
not claim to have an answer to all the questions of metaphysical possibility and necessity that we 
might happen to contemplate. By difference with Williamson, however, this does not mean the 
theory somehow sets in advance the modal space that it can cover. Nor it does mean, a fortiori, that it 
conveniently circumscribes such a modal space to the cases that are closest to the actual world. 
Instead, the account I propose could in principle answer all the questions of metaphysical possibility 
and necessity that we might happen to contemplate—including the more remote and extravagant 
ones. The Essentialist Superexplanatory account gives a general method for answering metaphysical 
modal questions of all sorts. As we saw, this involves starting from empirical, typically scientific 
knowledge of the relevant essentialist facts, and proceeding by simple inference to the 
corresponding necessary truths, based on the basic bridge-principle I called “(E)”. Importantly, this 
account gives us conditional knowledge of modality: if something is essential, then it is necessary. It is 
empirical, typically scientific work that establishes the truth of the antecedent, by individuating what 
plays the relevant causal and explanatory roles in the case under consideration. Thus, a preliminary, 
perhaps disappointing point here is that my account does not claim to have a definitive answer to 
the question whether zombies are possible—like instead it does to the question whether gold could 
have had a different atomic number, say.  
But there is a more important point. Note that the question whether zombies are possible, 
although obviously modal, is not ultimately meant to establish a modal truth, but rather an actual 
one. For answering this question, as mentioned, supposedly amounts to answering the question 
whether the mental is actually nothing above and beyond the physical. The speculation over whether 
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zombies are possible, if meaningful, in effect legitimates the method of Conceivability-theory for 
establishing modal truth—where in this case that serves as a purely instrumental step to establish an 
actual truth.  
 But in my view, wondering whether zombies are possible is rather an unnecessary detour to 
establish what the right connection between the mental and the physical is. Indeed, the latter issue 
(which is the real main issue), although certainly metaphysical, is not a distinctively modal one. We 
should thus flip the perspective altogether: it is not a priori modal speculation that can give us 
answers regarding actuality. Quite the other way around, it is empirical knowledge that gives us 
answers regarding the possible and the necessary. (Papineau 2013 makes a similar point. 
Interestingly, though, he concedes that intuitions of possibility are in general philosophically 
important not as a source of evidence for or against our theories, but rather as a means to clarify our 
thinking). Once science will have established what the nature or essence of consciousness is, we will 
then be able to derive in the usual straightforward way the relevant modal consequences—including 
the answer to whether or not zombies are possible. 
In conclusion, the zombie-case does not constitute a challenge to Essentialist Deduction and 
the causal-explanatory account, because establishing whether zombies are possible is a misguided 
way to answer a question regarding actuality. Like all other questions regarding actuality, its answer 
will mostly depend on empirical results—not on purely a priori conceivability exercises.  
 
Conclusion 
I argued that Williamson’s Counterfactual-theory fails to answer normative concerns in 
modal epistemology and, in particular, it fails to address the crucial problem of Modal Epistemic 
Friction. Essentialist Deduction as cashed out by the Essentialist Superexplanatory account, on the 
other hand, gives us an account of the relevant constraints on modal thinking in terms of essences 
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and their superexplanatory powers. With a number of examples involving both individuals and 
kinds, I showed how this results in a stronger theory of knowledge of metaphysical modality. 
  
 
 
100 
References 
Bealer, G. (2002). Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance. In T. Gendler & J. 
Hawthorne (Eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 71–125. 
Benaceraff, P. (1973). Mathematical Truth. Journal of Philosophy, 70, 661–679. 
Berto, F. (2010). Impossible Worlds and Propositions: Against the Parity Thesis. Philosophical 
Quarterly 60, 471-486.  
Berto, F., French, R., Priest, G., Ripley, D. (2017). Williamson on Counterpossibles. Journal of 
Philosophical Logic, 1-21. 
Boghossian, P. (2011). Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 82, 488–497. 
Boghossian, P. and Peacocke, C. (2000). New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
BonJour, L. (1998). In Defense of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Brogaard, B. and Salerno, J. (2013). Remarks on Counterpossibles, Synthèse, 190, 639–60. 
Bueno, O., & Shalkowski, S. (2015). Modalism and Theoretical Virtues: Toward an Epistemology of 
Modality. Philosophical Studies, 172: 671–689. 
Chalmers, D. (2002). Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), 
Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 145–201. 
Deng, D.M. (2016). On the Alleged Knowledge of Metaphysical Modality. Philosophia, 44, 479-495. 
Devitt, M. (2005). There is No A Priori. In E. Sosa & M. Steup (Eds.), Contemporary Debates in 
Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell, 105-115. 
___. (2008). Resurrecting Biological Essentialism. Philosophy of Science, 75, 344–382. 
___. (forthcoming)a: Historical Biological Essentialism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part 
C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences. 
___.(forthcoming)b: Individual Essentialism in Biology. Biology & Philosophy. 
___. (ms). Defending Intrinsic Biological Essentialism. 
Fine, K. (1994). Essence and Modality. Philosophical Perspectives, 8, 1–16. 
Godman, M., Mallozzi, A., and Papineau, D. (ms). Essential Properties are Super-Explanatory. 
Taming Metaphysical Modality. 
Godman, M., and Papineau, D. (forthcoming). Species Have Historical not Intrinsic Essences. In 
Bianchi, A. (ed.), Language and Reality From a Naturalistic Perspective: Themes From Michael Devitt. 
Springer Editions. 
Goff, P. and Papineau, D. (2014). What Is Wrong with Strong Necessities? Philosophical Studies, 167, 
749–762. 
Gregory, D. (2017). Counterfactual Reasoning and Knowledge of Possibilities. Philosophical Studies, 
174, 821-835. 
Hale, B. (2013). Necessary Beings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
___. (2018). Essence and Definition by Abstraction, Synthese, 1-17, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-
018-1726-7  
Ichikawa, J. & Jarvis, B. (2012). Rational Imagination and Modal Knowledge. Noûs, 46, 127-158. 
Jago, M. (2013). Impossible Worlds. Noûs 47, 713-728. 
___. (forthcoming). Knowing How Things Might Have Been. Synthese. 
Jenkins, C. (2008). Modal Knowledge, Counterfactual Knowledge and the Role of Experience. The 
Philosophical Quarterly, 58, 693-701. 
Kind, A. & Kung, P., (eds.) (2016). Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kung, P. (2010): Imagining As a Guide to Possibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81, 
620-663. 
 
 
101 
Kripke, S. (1971). Identity and Necessity. In Munitz, M.K., (eds.), Identity and Individuation, New York: 
New York University Press, 135-64. 
___. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Langland-Hassan, P. (2016). On Choosing What to Imagine. In Kind, A. & Kung, P., (eds.), 
Knowledge Through Imagination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 61-84. 
Leon, F. (2017). From Modal Skepticism to Modal Empiricism. In Fischer, B. and Leon, F. (eds.), 
Modal Epistemology After Rationalism, Synthese Library, 247-262. 
Springer. 
Lowe, E.J. (2012): What is the Source of our Knowledge of Modal Truths. Mind, 121, 919-950. 
Mallozzi, A. (2018)a. Putting Modal Metaphysics First. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-
018-1828-2  
___. (2018)b. Two Notions of Metaphysical Modality. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-
018-1702-2  
___. ms:  Imagining Shades of Red. Williamson on the A Priori-A Posteriori Distinction. 
Malmgren, A.S. (2011). Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgment. Mind, 120, 263–327. 
Menzies, P. (1998). Possibility and Conceivability: A Response-Dependent Account of Their 
Connections. In R. Casati (ed.), European Review of Philosophy, 3, 255–277. 
Morato, V. (2017). Conceivability, Counterfactual Thinking and Philosophical Exceptionality of 
Modal Knowledge. Topoi, 1-13, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9464-x 
Nolan, D. (1997). Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38, 
535–572. 
Papineau, D. (2013). The Poverty of Conceptual Analysis. In MC Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: 
The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge, Abingdon and New York: 166-194. 
Peacocke, C. (2011). Understanding, Modality, Logical Operators. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 82, 472–480. 
Priest, G. (2016). Thinking the Impossible. Philosophical Studies, 173, 2649-2662. 
Restall, G. (1997). Ways Things Can't Be. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38, 583–96. 
Roca-Royes, S. (2011)a. Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge. Noûs, 45, 22–49. 
___. (2011)b. Modal Knowledge and Counterfactual Knowledge. Logique et Analyse, 54, 537– 
552. 
___. (2017). Similarity and Possibility: An Epistemology of De Re Possibility for Concrete Entities. 
In Fischer, B. and Leon, F. (eds.), Modal Epistemology After Rationalism. Synthese Library, 221-
246. 
Soames, S. (2005). Reference and Description. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Spaulding, S. (2016). Imagination Through Knowledge. In Kind, A. & Kung, P., (eds.), Knowledge 
Through Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 207-226. 
Strohminger, M. (2015): Perceptual Knowledge of Nonactual Possibilities. Philosophical Perspectives, 
29: 363-375. 
Tahko, T. E. (2012). Counterfactuals and Modal Epistemology. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 86, 93–
115. 
___. (forthcoming): The Epistemology of Essence. In A. Carruth, S. C. Gibb & J. Heil (eds.), 
Ontology, 
Modality, Mind: Themes from the Metaphysics of E. J. Lowe. Oxford University Press. 
Thomasson, A. (2018). How Can We Come to Know Metaphysical Modal Truths?, Synthese, 1-30, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1841-5 
Vaidya, A. (2008). Modal Rationalism and Modal Monism. Erkenntnis 68, 191-212. 
 
 
102 
___. (2017). The Epistemology of Modality. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta 
(ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/modality-epistemology/ 
Vaidya, A. and Wallner, M. (forthcoming). The Epistemology of Modality and The Problem of 
Modal Epistemic Friction, Synthese. 
van Inwagen, P. (1998). Modal Epistemology. Philosophical Studies, 92, 67–84. 
Vetter, B. (2015). Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Williamson, T. (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell 
___. 2013 
___. (2016). Knowing by Imagining, in Kind, A. & Kung, P. (eds.). Knowledge Through Imagination. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 113-123. 
Worley, S. (2003). Conceivability, Possibility and Physicalism. Analysis, 63, 15–23. 
Yablo, S. (1993). Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
53, 1-42. 
Yli-Vakkuri, J. (2013). Modal Skepticism and Counterfactual Knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 
162, 605-623.
 
 
103 
 
 
“Even when all questions of necessity have been resolved, 
questions of their source will remain.”  
(Fine 1994: 8) 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
On Purely A Priori Necessities 
 
 
1.   The Essentialist Super-Explanatory Account 
In a couple of recent papers (2018b; and ms.) I laid out a picture of modal epistemology 
based on knowledge of essence. I call this the “Essentialist Superexplanatory” account. My focus so 
far has been on metaphysical modality, and particularly on a wide range of distinctive cases of 
metaphysical necessity. Within post-Kripkean modal metaphysics, examples typically include the 
necessity of fundamental kind-membership, the necessity of individual origin, of particular substance 
composition, and cases of the necessity of identity. My thesis is that knowledge of necessity in all 
those cases is a matter of knowing what is essential to the individuals and kinds at stake, in the sense 
of knowing what plays certain causal and explanatory roles for those individuals and kinds. 
Specifically, it seems fruitful to think of essence in terms of a single underlying core property or set 
of properties, or mechanism, which (actually) causes a multitude of properties that are typical of the 
entities at stake. This is especially clear in the case of kinds. (For example, the atomic number of an 
element causes the many chemical properties and behaviors that are typically shared by all the 
instances of that element. Similarly, the copying mechanism from common ancestors causes all the 
phenotypic properties that are typically shared by all the members of a certain species). Such “one-
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to-many” causal structures, as we might label them,`do not only characterize kinds. As I argue in 
joint work with M. Godman and D. Papineau (ms.), individuals also display that very same pattern. In 
this respect, individuals are indeed similar to kinds—particularly, to biological kinds having a 
historical essence (simplifying a bit, we argue again in a Kripkean fashion that part of what is 
essential to being a certain individual, say a particular human being, is having a particular origin). The 
causal powers of essences thus understood determine, in turn, corresponding explanatory powers. For 
essences explain why so many properties consistently co-occur in those individuals and kinds. 
Understanding essences in this way gets at the heart of the “nature” or fundamental makeup of 
things, thus clarifying what it is about those entities that yields characteristic modal consequences.  
The overall account thus claims that knowledge of metaphysical modality proceeds 
inferentially from knowledge of essence. Specifically, we form our beliefs about what is metaphysically 
necessary via essentialist deduction, based on a basic bridge-principle that I call “(E)”, which connects 
the actual with the non-actual and necessary (in the case of kinds: ‘If it is essential to x being F that it 
is G, then necessarily anything that is F is G’. In the case of individuals: ‘If x is essentially G, then x 
is necessarily G’). Importantly, knowledge of modality in all such cases is largely an empirical pursuit, 
as we get to know what is essential to those entities via empirical investigation—often scientifically.  
To sum up, the Essentialist Superexplanatory account systematizes knowledge of a wide 
range of cases of metaphysical necessities around the following four theses:  
 
(1) metaphysical necessities depend on facts about essence 
(2) essences have distinctive causal and explanatory powers for how things are, according 
to a “one-to-many” structural pattern 
(3) we infer from essentialist knowledge to knowledge of necessity via a basic Kripke 
conditional, (E), which connects what is actual to what is necessary  
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(4) we discover essences empirically, which makes the resulting modal knowledge a 
posteriori, even though principle (E) is plausibly a priori 
 
 2.   Counterexamples? 
Although the Essentialist Superexplanatory account appears to work well for the cases 
mentioned so far, it might also seem to leave out quite a bit of other modal knowledge. Think, for 
example, of knowledge of logical necessities, or of mathematical necessities. An immediate problem 
with those kinds of truths is that we seem to grasp them a priori, that is presumably via some 
intuitive or inferential method, which is alleged to be evidentially independent of experience. If the 
Essentialist Superexplanatory account is meant to be exhaustive and cover all cases of modal 
knowledge, those “purely a priori metaphysical necessities”, as I call them, would be counterexamples 
to it. For, in those cases, not only we do not gain epistemic access to such necessities in an empirical 
way; but also the presence of causal networks like those mentioned above is excluded. Causal 
relationships can only involve concrete actual particulars—however we want to spell that out more 
precisely—certainly not abstract entities like numbers and sets. Moreover, since I claim that the 
causal roles of essences support corresponding structural explanations, in cases where causal 
relationships are absent, the explanatory power of essence would also seem undermined. In sum, 
unless the Essentialist Superexplanatory account is restricted to only empirically grounded modal 
knowledge, the purely a priori metaphysical necessities may constitute a counterexample to it.  
More precisely, such potentially problematic modal sub-fields include (at least) the following: 
 
● Logical necessities (e.g., ‘∀x nec(x=x) - Necessarily, everything is self-identical’) 
● Mathematical and geometrical necessities (e.g. ‘Necessarily, two plus two equals four’) 
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● Conceptual necessities (e.g., ‘Necessarily, all crimson things are red’. Perhaps more 
controversially, ‘[Necessarily,] There must be a valley in between two mountains’, van 
Inwagen: 1998) 
● Laws of Grounding/supervenience (e.g. ‘Necessarily, [P&Q] is grounded in [P], [Q]’) 
and Principles of Mereology (e.g. ‘Necessarily, everything is part of itself’) 
● Normative necessities (e.g. ‘Necessarily, violence is wrong’) 
 
How could the Essentialist Superexplanatory account spelled out by theses (1)-(4) above 
handle these various cases of purely a priori necessities?  
Perhaps one might deny that some or all of these truths are in fact necessary. Consider for 
example the XXth century developments of mathematics and geometry. The choice between, say, 
classical vs. non-Euclidean geometry might not be a matter of which one is strictly speaking true, but 
rather of which axiomatic system we decide to adopt for certain purposes. But then, the added 
modal force that has been traditionally attributed to the classical conceptions of math and geometry 
also has to go. Simply put, the truths of math and geometry might not be necessary. Similar 
considerations apply to the case of logical truth; just think of all the non-classical logics that have 
been developed in the last few decades.  
Still, one might insist that at least certain bits of mathematics are both true and necessary: by 
contrast with the case of geometry, they do not have alternatives.1 Furthermore, even someone like 
Graham Priest would keep modus ponens and universal instantiation fixed across any sort of (non-
classical) logical systems. So, let us assume that truths in those modal sub-fields are in fact necessary.  
                                               
1 I should flag, however, that fictionalists in mathematics deny the existence of abstract mathematical objects and thus 
maintain that mathematical theories based on such entities are strictly false.  
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I will also not question that those truths are in fact a priori. However problematic the 
epistemology of the a priori is, I take it as uncontroversial that if there are any genuine examples of 
truths that can be known a priori, the most plausible candidates will be from math, logic, and the 
other modal sub-fields in our list above.  
My aim in what follows is to set up a framework for discussing these cases of purely a priori 
metaphysical necessities, and to sketch a possible way forward for the Essentialist Superexplanatory 
account of modal knowledge. Methodologically, I take this to be an issue we should address first of 
all at the level of modal metaphysics. Indeed, this constitutes a clear, practical example of how a 
metaphysics-first approach to modal knowledge is actually most helpful (cf. my 2018b). In order to 
elucidate modal epistemology, we need to first clarify the underlying metaphysics or the nature of 
modal truth. 
 
 3.   Modal Pluralism and Non-Uniform Modal-Epistemology  
 As mentioned, an easy way for the Essentialist Superexplanatory account to deal with 
knowledge of purely a priori necessities is simply to avoid the challenge. One could say that the 
account is aimed at explaining just those necessities that are not a priori. Would this weaken the 
overall theory? Perhaps not, if restricting the target in this way were to go together with a certain 
broader stance in modal epistemology, namely what is sometimes called a “non-uniform” modal 
epistemology. According to this, different kinds of necessary truths require us to employ different 
epistemic-cognitive means or methods in order to know them, which determines in turn different 
accounts of modal knowledge. In this light, it would be ok to think that those abstract domains, 
which are traditionally thought to be only accessible a priori, do not really fall within the scope of the 
Essentialist Superexplanatory account, but have instead their own modal epistemology. 
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Note however, that the need for both a priori and a posteriori methods for modal knowledge 
per se might not determine a non-uniform modal epistemology with multiple epistemic means and 
methods. It is not sufficient, for it is possible that one single epistemic means or method operates 
both a priori and a posteriori, depending on the cases. Think, for example, of Chalmers’ conceivability, 
which operates both purely a priori—i.e., “primary” conceivability—as well as a posteriori, based on 
empirical inputs—i.e., “secondary” conceivability. See his (2002). Nor it is necessary, for it is possible 
that knowledge of modality involves a variety of epistemic means and methods, which happen to be 
either all empirical or all a priori. Think of a version of non-uniform modal epistemology which 
variously resorts to, say, rational intuition, abduction, and imaginative procedures for modal 
knowledge, depending on the cases.  
I suggest that we think of non-uniform modal epistemology rather as the natural correlate of 
a “pluralistic” picture of modal space that distinguishes different kinds of modal truth. In particular, 
the kind of modal pluralism I have in mind sharply separates metaphysical necessity as interpreted so 
far from necessities in other modal sub-fields—especially those in our “problematic” list above. 
What determines epistemological differences is in other words the underlying modal metaphysics; 
that is, what constitutes modal truth and its source in the different sub-fields. The simplest example 
of a pluralistic framework is perhaps a familiar version of the so-called “modal dualism”. According to 
this, roughly, metaphysical modality and logical modality (sometimes logical-conceptual modality), 
constitute two different separate regions of modal space, each with its own kind of modal truth. The 
idea can be further cashed out in various ways, depending on one’s purposes, e.g. in terms of 
different modal primitives, or different sources of necessity; or, also, formally, in terms of different 
domains of worlds (for discussion, e.g. Chalmers 2006, 2010, ch. 3, 2011; my 2018a; Soames 2011; 
Vaidya 2008). The important point for our purposes is that according to pluralism, modality can vary 
in substantive ways, i.e., ways that might not be captured by a general umbrella notion of “necessity” 
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or single modal primitive.2 A pluralistic picture of modal space accommodates this variety of more 
fine-grained modal notions by allowing for different sources of necessity, which ground truth in the 
corresponding modal sub-fields.  
A non-uniform modal epistemology naturally matches such a pluralistic modal metaphysics. 
For it argues that we need multiple epistemic means and methods to access different kinds of modal 
truths. For example, one might argue that we come to know about everyday physical-causal 
possibilities through, say, counterfactual reasoning and quasi-perceptual imagination; about 
metaphysical possibilities via essentialist deduction based on knowledge of essence; and about logical 
possibilities purely a priori, say via intuition or rational insight (this is of course just one possible 
combination). In a non-uniform perspective, the Essentialist Superexplanatory account may not be 
required to handle the purely a priori necessities, because those would be part of different modal sub-
fields not metaphysical necessity, and so they would have their own modal epistemology. As a result, 
those a priori necessities would not constitute a real challenge to the account. 
 
4. The Monistic Push-back 
Against the non-uniform-epistemology strategy, however, one might point out that it is not 
obvious that we can just “cut out” all the a priori necessary truths from the space of metaphysical 
necessity (which is the domain that is covered by the Essentialist Superexplanatory account, ex 
hypothesi). On the contrary, there seems to be a clear sense in which e.g. logical truths, or normative 
truths, are also metaphysically necessary. The received view seems to be that those hold at all 
metaphysically possible worlds. More generally, granted that we come to know many necessities a 
                                               
2 Though note that modal monists may not deny that modality is varied. Some hold that we can still draw the desired 
distinctions between different kinds of modal truths at the level of their meaning or content (semantics), rather than at 
level of the source of their truth (metaphysics), e,g. by distinguishing e.g. different rules for assigning referents and truth-
values to sentences across worlds. The main claim of monism in such cases is that the different modalities are not 
irreducible to each other, but can rather be traced back to one single source or modal primitive (see e.g. Chalmers 2002 
and 2010, ch. 3). 
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posteriori, the space of metaphysical necessity seems not limited to what we can discover empirically. 
Quite the opposite, if there are any truths that we can know to be necessary via purely a priori 
methods, those will likely be metaphysical necessities. For arguably, the reason why we can grasp such 
necessities a priori is that they are most basic or fundamental truths structuring reality, and as such 
independent of the particular makeup of the actual world. In this light, they certainly qualify as 
properly “metaphysical”. It might thus look like an arbitrary choice to restrict metaphysical 
necessities only to truths that we can know a posteriori, via empirical means. From this point of view, 
modal pluralism may seem misguided. The space of metaphysical necessity might instead be more 
inclusive and monistic. Metaphysically necessary truths might only differ superficially, so to say, as to 
their particular subject matter. Correspondingly, although we would still know some of those truths 
a priori and some a posteriori, a uniform modal epistemology with one single means or method for 
modal knowledge might look like a more suitable option.  
If this is correct, the defender of the Essentialist Superexplanatory account should offer 
good reasons for endorsing a non-uniform framework nonetheless. She should try, in particular, to 
draw substantive differences among modal sub-fields so as to back up her desired epistemology with 
a pluralistic modal metaphysics.  
So far we have focused on how knowledge of purely a priori necessities stands against a 
specific bit of the Essentialist Superexplanatory account, namely that captured by thesis (4) above 
(i.e., “We discover essences empirically, which makes the resulting modal knowledge a posteriori”). But 
in evaluating the possibility of modal pluralism and a corresponding non-uniform modal 
epistemology, we should look also at theses (1) and (2), which are meant to clarify the source of 
metaphysical necessity (i.e., respectively, “Metaphysical necessities depend on facts about essence”; 
and “Essences have distinctive causal and explanatory powers for how things are, according to a “one-
to-many” structural pattern”).  
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To see how this is relevant to our issue, consider that a priori necessities are also often 
thought to depend on facts about essence. Several philosophers think for example that logical 
necessities are grounded in the nature or essence of logical functions—they are “written into” the 
logical operations themselves (Fine 1994; Hale 2013); or, analogously in the case of geometry, the 
necessary truths about e.g. circles depend on the real definition or what it is to be a circle (Lowe 2012, 
Hale 2013). According to this picture, the space of metaphysical necessity is qualitatively 
homogeneous, so to say, with essence as the single source of metaphysically necessary truths. So, 
regardless of whether such metaphysically necessary truths are about, say, fundamental subatomic 
particles, or rather numbers and sets, they all have their source in facts about essence. 
One possible concern regarding the project of a non-uniform modal epistemology has to do 
with economy. Many would say that, in general, we should aim for a single, unitary explanation that 
holds across all modal sub-fields and cases. There are familiar reasons for thinking so, involving the 
theoretical advantages of formal virtues like simplicity and unification, and the beauty, perhaps, that 
those bring about. But the considerations above suggest that there might be a more substantial 
reason not to pursue a non-uniform modal epistemology: namely, the simple fact that there is 
uniformity across modal sub-fields. Perhaps the differences among modal truths are only superficial. 
They might only have to do, say, with the way we organize different subject matters through useful 
categories; or with the particular semantic rules governing our use of words. But such truths in the 
different sub-fields are all on a par or qualitatively alike with respect to their modal status in that they 
all are metaphysically necessary. This depends, specifically, on the fact that they all have the same 
source by all being grounded in facts about essence.  
Do the above considerations indicate that we should endorse a monistic picture of modal 
space—one with a single, overarching kind of necessity, i.e., metaphysical necessity, unifying all the 
cases across-the-board? Does such a monism rely on essence qua the common source of those truths 
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or what in virtue of which they are true? Finally, should we endorse, in turn, a uniform modal 
epistemology with a unified account of how we know modal truths?  
  
5. Taking Stock  
The purely a priori necessities seem problematic for the Essentialist Superexplanatory 
account of modal knowledge because they are taken to have the following two features. They are 
 
● a priori, i.e., we know them independently of empirical evidence 
● abstract, and as such not involved in causal connections 
 
Because of that, they are apparently located outside the scope of the Essentialist Superexplanatory 
account. This suggests a pluralistic picture of modal space, matched by a non-uniform modal 
epistemology. But this seems not a viable option when we consider that purely a priori necessities are 
also presumably 
 
● metaphysically necessary 
● grounded in essence 
 
Because of that, they are instead apparently located inside the scope of the Essentialist 
Superexplanatory account. This rather suggests a monistic picture of modal space, matched by a 
uniform modal epistemology. However, this seems not a viable option, either, for Essentialist 
Superexplanatory account operates with specific, restricted notions of “metaphysical modality” and 
“essence”, which are incompatible with the purely a priori cases, by being tied to empirical 
investigation, causal networks, and structural explanations. 
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Is there a way for the defender of the Essentialist Superexplanatory to reconcile these two 
conflicting pictures of modal truth and knowledge?  
As I explain in detail in the next section, I think that a promising option for picturing modal 
space is what I am calling “Sophisticated Modal Pluralism”. This recognizes different sources of modal 
truth, as well as a more comprehensive notion of necessity in the background. The main feature of 
this proposed framework is that it distinguishes between two kinds of metaphysical necessities: the 
“general” vs. the “distinctively” metaphysical necessities. In developing an account of modal 
metaphysics that acknowledges the varieties of modality, we may thus need to rethink our categories 
of modal truth, and draw a map of modal space that clearly shows how the different sub-fields are 
interrelated and how they stand with respect to this broader notion of necessity. I have literally 
drawn such a map (fig.1 below).3  
We can predict that against Sophisticated Modal Pluralism, future developments in modal 
epistemology will then likely lead us to a corresponding non-uniform account of modal knowledge. 
 
6. Sophisticated Modal Pluralism 
I am calling “distinctively” metaphysical modality a kind of possibility and necessity that is 
both (a) different from matters of ideal logical-conceptual coherence; and (b) de re and dependent on 
                                               
3 A distinct question that I should here mention and set aside is what I call the “H-question”, as I draw it from an issue 
recently raised by Paul Horwich (in a seminar on Necessity at NYU in fall 2017). The H-question is twofold. It asks (a) 
whether there is a primitive or most basic notion of necessity—a sort of “supercategory” or “Ur-Necessity”, say; and (b) 
whether this may correspond to a (only minimally qualified) notion of “metaphysical” necessity according to familiar 
glosses like “absolute”, “the most general”, or “the broadest” necessity. I think that we may have some sort of 
immediate, intuitive grasp on a notion like (a), though in my view this is as completely unqualified as we can think of—
something like a most basic, purely definitional concept of “MUST”. At any rate, I will not delve further into this issue, 
and in particular I will not try to address point (b). But note how the H-question is different from the issue of modal 
monism. Whether or not we accept this sort of Ur-Necessity, and whether or not this corresponds to metaphysical 
necessity according to the above characterizations, it still open to discussion whether this is the only kind of necessity, or 
whether there are more (in which case they will be built on it, according to a sort of modal hierarchy). In setting aside 
the H-question, I turn instead to a qualified notion of metaphysical necessity, which I take to be metaphysical necessity 
proper. As I say below, I call it “distinctively” metaphysical necessity, and I distinguish it in particular from a broader 
kind of “general” metaphysical necessity. 
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the nature or essence of things as cashed out by the Essentialist Superexplanatory account. I take 
this characterization to capture metaphysical modality properly speaking. 
Distinctively metaphysical necessity is “this-world”: these necessary truths are true at all 
(metaphysically) possible worlds in virtue of their being grounded in truths concerning the 
fundamental makeup of the actual world. This restricted notion of metaphysical necessity, or 
metaphysical necessity “proper”, excludes the purely a priori cases. Instead, distinctively metaphysical 
necessities are grounded in essentialist truths concerning the causal networks that structure our 
world, with their typical “one-to-many” patterns (namely, again, patterns where one fundamental 
property, set of properties, or mechanism, causes many typical, consistently co-occurring properties). 
Correspondingly, distinctively metaphysical possibility is genuine possibility or the only kind of 
possibility that is truly compatible with the nature of things.4 Since main examples come from 
Kripke’s work (1971; 1980), I further call them “Kripkean” necessity and possibility. But it should 
be clear that this kind of modality is also in a robust sense “Finean”, in that it treats metaphysical 
necessity as dependent on the nature or essence of things. The point of difference with the received 
Finean notion, if any, is that the Essentialist Superexplanatory account specifies what this nature or 
essence is in the relevant cases, or what it is about the entities at stake that determines (distinctively) 
metaphysical necessity (cf. my 2018b).   
On the other hand, there is a unifying and looser notion of metaphysical possibility and 
necessity, which I call “general” metaphysical modality. General metaphysical necessity is a coarse-grained 
notion of necessity that captures truth at all metaphysically possible worlds, where such truths have 
no special tie or connection to the nature or fundamental makeup of the actual world. We can think of it 
                                               
4 I am taking for granted that we can contrast metaphysical modality to epistemic modality in similar terms. This is indeed 
a standard point in the literature. Many hold that metaphysical but not epistemic modality is “real” (Edgington 2004), or 
“genuine” (Kripke 1980; Fine 2005b), or “objective” (Williamson 2016). A more interesting point, in my view, is 
whether logical-conceptual modality coincides with epistemic modality, when the latter is understood under idealized, a priori 
conditions (like Chalmers’ Modal Rationalism seems to imply: see my 2018a). 
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as a pre-Finean, or “modalist” notion of necessity, as it is sometimes called, which may group together 
different ways in which truths are metaphysically necessary, or different sources of modal truth.  
The notion of general metaphysical necessity helps us handle the cases of purely a priori 
necessities. When we say that logical, mathematical, or normative truths, and so on, are 
metaphysically necessary, we use the expression “metaphysical necessity” in a somewhat promiscuous 
way, since those necessities are not really grounded in the nature or fundamental makeup of the 
world. But we are roughly correct in that those also happen to hold at all metaphysically possible 
worlds.  
General metaphysical necessities are true instead in virtue of most general or purely structural, 
a priori requirements for something to be the case. We might think of them as epistemically necessary 
in Chalmers’ sense; and as de dicto, in the sense that they do not depend on the essence or nature of 
specific entities, but rather have their source in fundamental aspects of reality such as logical and 
mathematical facts, and basic conceptual categories. Following a suggestion from Fine (2005a), we 
can think of such purely a priori necessities as transcendental truths or preconditions for any world to exist. 
The idea is that those truths are independent of how things have actually turned out or any particular 
matter of fact at our world. Correspondingly, general metaphysical possibilities are in a sense “empty” 
possibilities: namely, purely formal a priori possibilities that are completely independent of the actual 
makeup of our world—indeed, of any world (cf. my 2018a).  
Furthermore, we are also roughly correct when we speak of the purely a priori necessities as 
being true in virtue of the nature or essence of logical constructions, mathematical entities, or geometrical 
categories (and so on). Though here, too, we are using, “nature” and “essence” in a somewhat loose 
or inappropriate way, since those are all perfectly abstract, purely formal entities. We are in other 
words stretching the meaning of “essence” and “nature” by detaching them from any actual matter 
of fact. Take some necessarily truth-preserving inference rule such as modus ponens or universal 
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instantiation. Those do not seem to be grounded in the nature of the world in any substantial sense. 
In fact, they do not seem to have any connection to our world as opposed to any other worlds. Thus, 
purely a priori metaphysical necessities are not distinctively metaphysical. They rather each constitute 
their own specific modal sub-field (logical, conceptual, normative, etc.) according to a pluralistic 
picture of modal space that acknowledges different sources of necessity. The idea is that we can 
know a priori which things are necessary, in such cases, precisely because they are not grounded in the 
nature of the actual world.  
Given this picture, we can agree with several authors in the field that we know some 
metaphysical necessities a priori (e.g. Lowe 2012, Hale 2013). Usually the idea is that there is a real 
definition that gives the conditions in virtue of which something is the very thing it is. This definition 
captures the essence of the thing and is knowable a priori. Hale and Fine have a similar story on the 
case of conjunction, for example. “Having the property of being true only if both conjuncts are true 
makes conjunction the very thing it is, that truth-function; and it also explains why it is necessarily so” 
(Hale 2013: 158. My emphasis). But again, the important point for the Essentialist Superexplanatory 
account is that here “essence” is to be understood more or less just as a manner of speaking. 
A consequence of this is that the superexplanatory powers of essences properly called may not 
carry over to the a priori cases. It seems that when a priori matters of definition are involved, such 
powers are more limited compared to the empirical cases. That is not just because there are no 
causal connections at stake to determine corresponding structural explanations. But also because 
examples indicate that there may not be the sorts of “one-to-many” relationships among properties 
that we saw in the distinctively metaphysical, empirical cases. Think of conjunction again. In these 
cases it seems that the real definition or “essence” that we access a priori does not explain many 
properties of conjunction. It is arguable that there are not many to be explained to start with—but 
just one or a few. Other examples, however, suggest an opposite verdict. The real definition of circle, 
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for instance, as the collection of all the points in a plane equidistant from a given point, might plausibly be 
taken to explain the many geometrical properties and relationships that pertain to circles. Thus, I am 
inclined to say that whether essences in this loose general sense have superexplanatory powers in the 
purely a priori cases has to be established on a case-by-case basis.  
Finally, I believe that we can still frame modal knowledge in terms of (broadly) essentialist 
deduction. But importantly, the direction of inference will vary depending on whether we look at the 
distinctively metaphysical necessities vs. the general metaphysical necessities. Recall thesis (3) above: 
i.e., “We infer from essentialist knowledge to knowledge of necessity via a basic Kripke conditional, 
(E), which connects what is actual to what is necessary”. We can now restrict this thesis to the 
distinctively metaphysical necessities. Specifically, in these cases we proceed from empirical premises 
through an a priori inferential transition to empirical conclusions. By contrast, in the case of purely a 
priori metaphysical necessities the direction of inference seems reversed. We infer from necessary a 
priori truths to particular actual instantiations of such necessities, for any world considered as actual 
(that is just the T-axiom, “☐P → P”). The inferential transition is again itself a priori, and so are the 
conclusions.  
Will Sophisticated Modal Pluralism be matched by non-uniform modal epistemology? As we 
saw, the fact that we need both a priori and a posteriori means and methods for modal knowledge may 
not mark a substantial theoretical difference for modal epistemology. What about the two, opposite 
directions that deduction might take in modal reasoning? Perhaps what we loosely call “deduction” 
in both cases actually picks out quite different epistemic routes for accessing modal truth, leading 
thereby to a non-uniform epistemology (a natural thought is, for example, that in the purely a priori 
cases inference is aided by intuition or insight, which thus contribute evidentially to our resulting 
justification). 
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My view is that the most important factor in determining whether modal epistemology is 
uniform or non-uniform has to do with what constitutes truth in the different modal sub-fields; and, 
in particular, with whether we can analyze all kinds of necessity in terms of essence. Although I 
sketched a way to answer these questions positively, I wish to leave further discussion to future 
work. 
Finally, here below is Fig.1, representing modal space according to Sophisticated Modal 
Pluralism. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The space of “general” metaphysical necessity and its sub-fields.  
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The diagram should be self-explanatory at this point. I will just flag that (1) normative 
necessities might require more careful consideration. Those necessities seem to depend in an 
important way on human beings—not in the sense that moral norms are “up to us” or a matter of our 
creative decisions; but rather in that they arguably necessarily coexist with sentient individuals like 
human beings. But human beings are only contingent beings—we might not have existed. So 
normative necessities are “conditionalized” necessities, after all. They are not pre-conditions for any 
world to exist, nor therefore are they completely independent of the nature of the actual world—
like, instead, mathematical and logical necessities are. Note, also, that Fine (2005b) treats normative 
necessity as different from and irreducible to metaphysical necessity; he would accordingly locate it 
outside the outer circle in the diagram. (2) The laws of grounding and the principles of mereology might 
plausibly be thought as part of, or even reducible to, the logical or conceptual necessities. Accordingly, 
those circles should be thought as possibly intersecting with each other, or even being concentric. 
Where the main rationale behind this is that those modal sub-fields appear to be themselves at the 
intersection of logic and ontology. (3) Grounding and the principles of mereology might also be thought 
to partly overlap with the distinctively metaphysical or Kripkean necessities. Think of how we can analyze 
central cases of e.g. kind essentialism by means of such principles (say, “water is H2O”). (4) Note, 
finally, that conceptual necessities (epistemic necessities in Chalmers’ sense, as noted), are not 
coextensive with metaphysical necessities: Evans’s Julius case (1979) is a clear example of that. 
Thereby, it seems best to picture the spaces of epistemic and metaphysical necessity as partly 
overlapping with each other. 
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